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ABSTRACT 
 
Bangladesh has been undergoing economic reforms and institutional transitions to a 
market economy in the past forty years. An important product of this strategic transition 
can be argued to be the emergence of interlocking directorates, where a director sits on 
multiple directorate boards of corporations. Given this background, this thesis seeks to 
examine the attributes of a corporate network of interlocking directorships in 
Bangladesh. There is huge evidence that interlocking directorate research has largely 
been concentrated on the West. Therefore this study attempts systematic research 
regarding the exploration of the corporate network of Bangladesh, based on preliminary 
data on the pattern of interlocking directorships among the 2010 top 100 largest listed 
companies, based on market capital. 
A board of directors (BoD) is considered to be an internal corporate governance 
mechanism as the board monitors and supervises management, and gives management 
strategic guidelines (Daily et al., 1993). According to Daily, Dalton and Cannella 
(2003), there is no universal set role for a board. However Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
argue that boards undoubtedly have multiple roles to play in the corporations they 
govern. 
In Bangladesh the BoD is an equally important major element of corporate governance 
as in most other countries. There are several research studies that have been conducted 
regarding board attributes in Bangladesh. However very little attention has been given 
by researchers to work on the board connections in Bangladesh. More specifically, the 
interlocking directorate and corporate network issue is still unexplored by researchers. 
This research thus attempts to focus on the corporate network of Bangladesh which is 
formed through interlocking directorships. Moreover, this study aims to focus on some 
of the network attributes of the corporate network of Bangladesh. 
In this exploratory research, the two different but parallel sets of literature concerning 
interlocking directorates and social capital will be used to understand how board 
connections create a corporate network and how that network influences company 
performance and some other board attributes in a developing economy like Bangladesh.  
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An interlocking directorate is a formal connection occurring between companies when 
companies share their directors in different boards (Scott, J. 1991b). On the other hand 
social capital literature argues much broader connections between people (Coleman, J. 
1990). As this is an exploratory type of study, there will be no hypothesis as such 
proposed.  
This exploratory research investigates the corporate network attributes of Bangladesh 
based on the relationship of board of director networks and company performance and 
related corporate governance variables. Furthermore, to explore the networks’ 
attributes, this study analyses whether the size, location and closest path of the network 
linkage have significant influences on company performances and other corporate 
governance and network variables.  These include company size, board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, percentage of family members sitting in the board, whether 
it is a family controlled firm, an independent company, a holding company with 
subsidiaries, or indeed a subsidiary of another company, whether it is a company who is 
part of  the corporate network or sub network etc.  
This research has explored various characteristics of the Bangladeshi corporate network.  
For instance, through the network visualization process this researcher achieved the 
result that the observed corporate network is an undirected network which has a 
tendency towards scale-free degree distribution. Research observed from correlation 
and regression analysis showed that there is a significant positive correlation between 
CEO duality and network degree. This means firms having CEO duality have more ties 
with each other and they are better connected with each other than firms who do not 
have CEO duality. Moreover, it is also observed that there is a significant negative 
correlation existing between network closeness and Tobin’s Q, which is a market, based 
measure of firm performance. However no significant associations were evident 
regarding company network and accounting-based performance measures. Research 
also demonstrated that there is a significant positive correlation between the corporate 
network and board size, meaning firms having a large board have the shortest paths 
passing through to the other firms in the network. Research also captured one attribute 
of the corporate network and business group. Results suggested that the companies 
belonging to a business group have much more interlocking directorates than stand-
alone companies. However this study also determined that there is a significant negative 
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relationship between family controlled firm and corporate network.   
This paper contributes to corporate network literature as well as corporate governance 
literature by using resource dependency theory, social cohesion theory and class 
hegemony theory.  As far as this researcher is aware, this is the first systematic 
exploratory corporate network study regarding Bangladesh, an original contribution of 
this research. Another contribution of this research is to find evidence of the 
relationship between market-based measures of firms’ performance and the corporate 
network, as outlined above.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
The research question proposed was: 
 “What are the characteristics of corporate network of Bangladesh?”  
 In this thesis the question was explored by investigating boards of directors’ inter corporate 
network, which was created through firms’ strategy of having interlocking boards. Moreover, 
the Bangladeshi corporate network and its effects on firms’ performance and some 
governance and network variables were examined, which might suggest a systemic vision of 
governance that contributes to defining corporate governance mechanisms for boards of 
directors in Bangladesh. 
Over the past decades, corporate governance has received constant exposure from the 
researchers. Well known researchers have targeted boards of directors and their roles. 
Similarly, as an element of boards’ strategic decision-making (Daily et al., 1993), 
interlocking directorates have become ‘perhaps the most-studied social structure in 
organization theory’ (Davis & Greve, 1997, p.12) over the last four decades. 
The board of directors (BoD) is considered to be an internal corporate governance 
mechanism as the board monitors and supervises management, and gives management 
strategic guidelines (Daily et al., 1993). Researchers differ about the BoD’s authority and the 
extent to which they should or could participate in monitoring, strategy setting and decision 
facilitation, however there is no argument that the BoD is considered as one of the key 
corporate governance mechanisms for organizations (Baysinger et al., 1985). According to 
Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003), there is no universal board role set. However Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003), argue that boards undoubtedly have multiple roles to play in the corporations 
they govern. 
In Bangladesh the BoD is equally important as a major element of corporate governance like 
most other countries. There are several research studies that have been done regarding the 
board attributes of Bangladesh, for example Farooque et al., (2007) and Imam-Osman and 
Malik, (2007). Some research has investigated the attributions of a board of directors in 
relation to the board’s size, board independence and its performance, for example Chowdhury 
(2010) and Kutubi (2011). 
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As discussed, an interlocking directorate is considered a very significant strategic issue of a 
board as well as for organizations (Mizruchi, 1996). Therefore the area of board research, 
interlock has achieved huge attention from researchers of both developed and developing 
countries. Several pieces of research have been done which provide descriptions of what the 
network of interlocked firms look like (Sana, 2009).However very little attention has been 
given by researchers to work on the board connections of Bangladesh. More specifically, the 
interlocking directorate and corporate network issue in this country is still unexplored by 
researchers. This research thus attempts to focus on the corporate network of Bangladesh 
which is formed through interlocking directors. Moreover, this study aims to focus on some 
of the main attributes of such a corporate network. Especially, this study focuses on how the 
network influences the firms’ strategy and decision-making process, as well as its 
performance. This study also attempts to explore whether the family controlled firm has a 
high influence on the corporate network or not. Moreover the study examines whether the 
business group has impact on the corporate network significantly. As it is argued by Hossain 
(2005, p. 4) the economy of Bangladesh is dominated by large family-owned, state owned 
and foreign-owned companies whereby the economic power of the businesses is concentrated 
with dominant shareholder groups. Therefore the arguments will also be analysed through 
this network analysis. Through exploratory analysis all the mentioned issues will be 
addressed within this research. 
In this exploratory research on interlocking directorates and the social capital of board 
members, two different but comparable literatures will be used to understand how the board 
connections create a corporate network and how that network influences performance and 
some other board attributes in a developing economy like Bangladesh.  
As explained above, an interlocking directorate is a formal connection occurring between 
companies when companies share their directors on different boards (Scott, 1991b). On the 
other hand, social capital literature argues much broader connections between people 
(Coleman, 1990). Thus these two parallel literature streams will be used in this study to 
capture more details about the formation of the corporate network in connection with 
interlocking boards and also relevant theories will be used to understand and present the 
network phenomenon and attributions in the context of a developing economy, specifically 
for Bangladesh. 
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As this study explores the corporate network of Bangladesh and its characteristics, the 
network literature will be analysed in connection with financial and market performance of 
Bangladeshi firms. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of this thesis.  In Section 1.2, the research problem is 
discussed. The justification for the research is contained in Section 1.3 and an overview of 
the research methodology is discussed in Section 1.4.  The thesis structure is discussed in 
Section 1.5, and the definition of key terms used throughout the thesis is contained in Section 
1.6. Finally in Section 1.7, the limitations to this research are discussed. 
1.2 Research problem  
 The research problem as mentioned above investigates the corporate network attributes of 
Bangladesh based on the relationship of board of director networks and company 
performance and related corporate governance variables.  Specifically the central theme of 
this research is to explore the corporate network pattern of Bangladesh. Furthermore to 
explore the networks’ traits this study analyses whether the size, location and closest path of 
the network have significant influences on company performances and other corporate 
governance and network variables. These include Company size, Board size, Board 
independence, CEO duality, Percentage of family members sitting in the board, whether it is 
a family controlled firm, an independent company, a holding company with subsidiaries, or 
indeed a subsidiary of another company, whether it is a company who is part of corporate 
network connections or sub network etc.   
As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1, this research is based on the 
fundamental idea of considering a board as an important strategic source of critical resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Firms can ensure their survival through proper and optimal uses 
of that source of resources. This observation of the board is based on resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   
According to resource dependence theory, firms form connections with each other for 
acquiring and controlling critical resources (Mizruchi, 1996). For acquiring and controlling 
critical resources, firms might connect directors to improve their access to external resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In summary, they can use interlocking directorships as a resource 
acquiring strategy. Therefore an interlocking directorate is considered an important strategy 
of companies.   
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The term interlocking directorate refers to the situation where a member of a board of 
directors of one corporation also serves as a member of the board of directors of another 
corporation (Mizruchi,1996, p. 271) which I have discussed detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1. 
As discussed in this section an interlocking directorate is considered to be an external link of 
different boards as it connects different organizations through directors. It is also considered 
to be a creator of inter-corporate connections which can control the flow of resources (Scott, 
1991a). In this study I will explore the corporate network connections created through an 
interlocking board.  
This research has explored various characteristics of the Bangladeshi corporate network. For 
instance through the network visualization process the researcher obtained the information 
that the obtained corporate network is an undirected network, that has a scale-free degree 
distribution tendency. More attributes of the Bangladeshi corporate network observed from 
this study are discussed below. 
From correlation and regression analysis it was observed that there is a significant positive 
correlation between CEO duality and network degree. This means firms having CEO duality 
have more ties with each other and is better connected with each other than firms who do not 
have CEO duality. Moreover, it is also observed that there is a significant negative correlation 
existing between network closeness and Tobins’s Q. This observation indicates firms who are 
more closely located to each other in a corporate network have a more negative market based 
performance than firms who are not closely located. More specifically, in Bangladesh the 
network analysis results represent the closely connected companies are associated with lower 
company performances, the performance measure being market-based measures.  However 
no significant associations were evident regarding company network and accounting-based 
performance measures.  
Through research it was also observed that there is a significant positive correlation between 
corporate network and board size, meaning firms having a large board have the shortest paths 
to the other firms in the network. Results suggested that companies belonging to a business 
group have much more interlocking directorates than stand-alone companies. However this 
study also found a significant negative relationship between family controlled firms and the 
corporate network. Family controlled firms have less interlocking directorates than firms who 
are not controlled by family members. 
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1.3 Justification for the research 
There is considerable research that has investigated the effectiveness of interlocking 
directors’ networks in developed economies such as the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia. 
But very little is known about the interlocking directors’ network in developing and 
underdeveloped countries. In spite of different traits of interlocking directorates and firm 
performance, very little is known about the dynamics of these relationships and their 
incidence.  Moreover, a scarcity of detailed research in the emerging economies is still 
apparent. 
 
The Bangladeshi corporate network is characterized by large ownership concentration with a 
limited stock market role; moreover bank finance has been dominant in Bangladeshi 
corporate economy. Interlocking directorships are therefore considered to be an important 
feature of this system. Shareholder families have established cross-ownership links among 
their companies, on whose boards their members also sit; consequently an interlocking board 
corporate network is created. However the corporate network characteristics of Bangladesh 
still remain undiscovered because as per this researcher’s knowledge no systematic study 
based on a Bangladeshi corporate network has been undertaken. Therefore my aim is to 
discover this undiscovered phenomenon and make some contribution to this network 
literature, especially for a developing economy. This study seeks to understand the 
phenomenon of the interlocking board network and its attributes in Bangladesh by focusing 
on the BoDs of Bangladesh’s top 100 listed companies, based on market capitalization for the 
year 2010. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the effectiveness of these 
BoDs.  
Although corporate governance has received increasing attention in emerging countries a gap 
still exists in the theoretical implications of the interlocking directors’ network in the 
Bangladeshi institutional setting. This study thus attempts to fill that gap. In particular the 
main objective of this thesis is to investigate the incidence of interlocking directorates in the 
listed firms of Bangladesh and to examine the effects of the structure of such interlocking 
networks on the performance of firms and some other corporate governance and network 
variables.  
This paper contributes to corporate network literature as well as corporate governance 
literature by using resource dependency theory, social cohesion theory and class hegemony 
theory.  As per my knowledge this is the first systematic exploratory corporate network study 
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regarding Bangladesh therefore this is a contribution of this research. Another contribution of 
this research is to find evidence of the impact of firm performance on network.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
In this section an introduction and overview of the approach to this research is provided.  A 
detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 4, including the research philosophy (Sections 4.2 
and 4.2.1), the research approach (Section 4.2.2), and research method (Section 4.3.1 and 
4.3.3). A positivist approach to this study was adopted as my fundamental belief is there is an 
observable and measurable social reality waiting to be discovered (Saunders et al, 2003). 
Correlation and regression analysis was employed to explore network attributes. A further 
research objective was to analyse the network attributes in relation to companies’ 
performances and the influences upon the family dominated firm, together with other 
corporate governance variables. 
To operationalise board connectivity measures, social network analysis (SNA) was used. The 
network was mapped, and then it was necessary to test how the network impacts a firm’s 
performance. In this study, for analysing the network attributes purposes, regression analysis 
and a correlation table were employed.  Finally some descriptive analysis was provided as a 
third model. Some common corporate governance variables will be selected, based on their 
relevance to the study, borrowing from techniques referred to in the literature.  Finally, to test 
the network features more scientifically, variables will be segregated and used as dependent, 
independent and control variables. 
Details of other measures and the variables used in the analysis are discussed in Section 4.3.5. 
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the institutional and legal 
background of Bangladesh in which listed companies operate their business. Chapter 3 details 
the literature review, outlining the major theories of corporate governance and discussing the 
concept of BoDs and the important roles they play in relation to the corporate network. This 
chapter also includes a section developing research question in section 2.6. In Chapter 4, the 
research approach and the research design are discussed, including the method used to answer 
the research question. Chapter 5 presents the results of data analysis and also the 
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interpretation of results. Finally in Chapter 6, the results are discussed and major conclusions 
that can be drawn from this research as a whole are considered. I further discuss the 
implications which can be drawn from these conclusions and consider future research 
agendas which may be helpful for future researchers.  
1.6 Delimitations of scope and key assumptions 
According to Perry (1998, p.19) delimitations define clear boundaries around the research 
and key assumptions which together may limit the application of this research and need to be 
clearly expressed for a research. 
This study is limited to corporate governance and its application is useful only for corporate 
entities. Moreover this study relates to a particular population, which are the top 100 listed 
companies of Bangladesh for 2010 based on market capitalization. This study focuses on 
company board members who are serving as a director for the year 2010. In Bangladesh some 
companies count the company secretary as a board member, so these were also included as a 
member of board. 
Finally the data collected was a relatively narrow and at times superficial dataset. As a 
consequence, results are limited as they provide numerical descriptions rather than a detailed 
narrative and generally provide less elaborate accounts. In addition, the existing research does 
not necessarily reflect how board members really feel about the corporate network. And last 
but not least, as the development of standard questions by researchers can lead to 'structural' 
bias and false representation, the analysis of data may actually reflect the researcher’s view 
instead of those of the participating subjects.   
1.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, information which could be considered as the foundations for this research 
has been presented. A background to the study was provided in Section 1.1 and the research 
problem and research issues were introduced in Section 1.2.  Section 1.3 explains the 
importance of the research within the corporate governance perspective.  In Section 1.4 a 
brief introduction about the methodology used has been discussed.  In Section 1.5 a detailed 
guide of for the thesis is provided.  Finally this chapter concludes with a brief discussion of 
its scope and limitations. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance entails a set of control mechanisms established by stakeholders of 
companies to ensure their return on investments (Shleifer & Vishney, 1997). Corporate 
governance controls the rights and responsibilities of different participants in the corporation, 
such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders.  It spells out 
the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs, which ultimately benefits 
company objectives and performances.  
The board of directors (BoD) is considered to be an internal corporate governance 
mechanism as the board monitors and supervises management, and gives management 
strategic guidelines (Daily et al., 1993). According to the National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) (2000), boards should both contribute to and be accountable for firm 
performance, which is also an expectation of investors (Johnson et al., 2000). Thus in 
corporate governance research, the BoD is considered one of the most important research 
issues. 
According to Fama (1980,p.289) “The board of directors is viewed as a market induced 
institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most 
important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm”. Similarly, agency 
theory and contract theory also suggest that the BoD is an important part of the governance 
structure of business corporations (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1983, 1984). 
According to Baysinger et al. (1985) the BoD has the power to hire, fire, and compensate 
senior management. Due to the BoD’s authority and participation in monitoring, strategy 
setting and facilitating decisions, it is considered one of the key corporate governance 
mechanisms for organizations. 
In Bangladesh the BoD is equally important as a major element of corporate governance as in 
most other countries. As mentioned earlier, there are several research studies regarding the 
board attributes of Bangladesh, for instance that of Farooque et al., (2007), Imam and Malik, 
(2007). The attributes of BoDs in relation to board size, board independence and its 
performance have been investigated by Chowdhury (2010) and Kutubi (2011).Other research 
undertaken by Rashid, et al., (2007) and Siddiqui (2010) investigated the development 
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process of corporate governance regulations in Bangladesh. Some researchers worked on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting, performance evaluation, competitive analysis 
of banks, board composition and firm performance in Bangladesh (Arif et al., 2012; Siddiqui, 
2010; Reaz, & Arun, 2006; Imam, 2007; Sobhan & Werner, 2003). Therefore in Bangladesh, 
corporate governance has already gained researchers’ attention and the BoD issue has 
achieved similar prominence as one of the main corporate governance elements. However, as 
mentioned earlier, very little research has been done on board connections of Bangladesh, 
specifically in terms of the interlocking directorate and corporate network issues.  
An interlocking directorate is considered a very significant strategic issue for a board as well 
as for organizations (Mizruchi, 1996) and has been widely researched in developing and 
developed country contexts. Sana (2009) has provided a description of what a network of 
interlocked firms look like. Everard and Henry (2002) have undertaken to explain the 
influence of interlocks on firms’ strategies and performance. This research thus attempts to 
explore the corporate network of Bangladesh which is formed through interlocking directors 
and on some of its main features, such as how the network influences firms’ strategies and 
decision-making processes as well as their performance. This study also attempts to explore 
whether the family controlled firm has a high influence on the corporate network or not. 
Through exploratory analysis all the mentioned issues will be addressed within this research.  
In this chapter, firstly interlocking directorships and their impact on firms’ performance will 
be discussed, based on different theories in developed and developing countries. Secondly, 
the social capital theory will be examined in light of social network analysis (SNA), to 
understand corporate network attributes and the types of network, investigating relationships 
between organizations which are captured by interlocked directors. Moreover in this chapter 
structural properties of social networks will be explored to clarify their possible impact on the 
corporate performance resulting from interlocking directorships in Bangladesh.  
As mentioned earlier two literature streams will be examined, on interlocking directorates 
and social capital, to understand how board connections create a corporate network and how 
that network can influence firms’ performance in terms of financial and market performance 
in a developing economy like Bangladesh.  
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2.2 Summary of key theories and their relationship to this thesis 
According to Zahra and Pearce’s (1989) extensive analysis regarding interlocking 
directorates, there are four major theories which have best analysed the topic of interlocking 
directorates. These are resource dependency theory, agency theory, class hegemony theory 
and legalistic theory. However among the four, resource dependency theory has received the 
strongest support by researchers because of its basic and logical proposition (Peng, 2001). 
Resource dependency theory basically predicts the management and control process of 
limited resources in unstable and uncertain environments (Pfeffer &Salancik, 1978). These 
predictions have been supported by a large body of empirical research in developed countries 
(Boyd, 1990; Pennings, 1980). However Peng (2001) argued that resource dependency theory 
can better explain the uncertain environments and critical resources in developing countries. 
He argued the institutional background of developing economy in light of the theory. Thus in 
this research resource dependency theory has been analysed to explore the corporate network 
of Bangladesh as a developing economy. 
Next the class hegemony theory achieved significant supports from researchers interpreting 
the interlocking phenomenon, from a different perspective. Researchers argued that the class 
hegemony theory can be used to discuss the influence of interlocking directorates on the 
capital structure of familial relationships (Mintz & Schwartz, 1981). This theory might be 
suitable to describe the corporate culture of a developing economy. This culture may, in turn, 
have an influence on the interlocking network of directorate relationships (Au, 2000). In 
Bangladesh the company board is generally structured by the huge representation of family 
shareholdings (Chowdhury, 2010). A significant portion of total share value is typically 
managed by founding family members, and/ or a holding company, while a very small 
portion of shares are held by institutional investors (Islam & Khaled, 2005). Therefore it can 
be argued that the class hegemony theory might significantly explain the Bangladeshi 
corporate background regarding family dominancy on company boards.  
Researchers into interlocking directorates also argued for agency theory and legalistic theory 
because of these theories’ moderate support for the interlocking phenomenon (Au et al., 
2000). However for the present study such theories are not significantly influential because of 
conceptual mismatching. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), agency theory stands on a 
fundamental assumption of the separation between ownership and control. Agency research 
in this area focuses on how boards and directors can minimize agency problems on the part of 
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senior managers (Berle & Means, 1932). Therefore this theory describes board connections 
from a different angle rather than focusing on the interlocking board. In the case of legalistic 
theory, most of the research focuses on the U.S. or some other Anglo Saxon countries’ 
corporate practices and laws (Au et al., 2000).  Thus it might not be best suited to the current 
study’s focus on describing the interlocking directorate phenomenon within a developing 
economy. For these reasons this study mainly focuses on resource dependency theory and 
class hegemony theory to examine the interlocking directorate phenomenon in Bangladesh. 
Secondly as this study explores corporate networks in Bangladesh and focuses on social 
capital in connection to corporate contacts, another relevant theory is social cohesion theory. 
The theory will be used to discuss how the directors’ individual connections contribute to the 
whole corporate network and the board’s social capital.  
According to Mizruchi (1992)1 social cohesion theory is associated with members sharing 
similar interests and with an extensive network of social contacts. As social cohesion theory 
interprets and supports social contacts where people with similar interests create connections 
and make contacts with each other, it is relevant to use this theory to describing interlocking 
directorates and the corporate network. Moreover, social cohesion provides ways to prevent 
competition, collect information, and set prices or policies among interlocked organizations 
(Watts, 1998; Forrest, 2001). In this study, social cohesion theory will be used to analyse 
different social network attributes in Bangladesh. Moreover the theory will also be used to 
clarify how a social network contributes to managing and controlling social capital.  
2.3 What is an interlocking directorate? 
2.3.1 Definition and overview of interlocking directorates 
The term “interlocking directorate” refers to the situation where a member of a BoD of one 
corporation also serves as a member of the BoD of another corporation (Mizruchi, 1996, p. 
271). Interlocking directorate is considered an external link of different boards as it connects 
different organizations through directors. If a director of one company sits on a board of one 
or more other companies, all those companies are connected to a network through the 
director. The interlocking directorate phenomenon can be created both intentionally and 
unintentionally. Sometimes those connections are informal and unintentional, for example 
                                                 
1  Unless explicitly stated otherwise, I use “cohesion” in the objective rather than subjective sense of the term. 
That is to say, “cohesion” refers to the density of observable relations or similarity of observable behaviour 
among actors, without any presumptions regarding the extent to which these are associated with subjective 
sentiments of solidarity or collective identity (cf. Mizruchi 1992, pp. 34–43). 
12 
 
where companies are automatically entered into a network when an existing board member of 
their company sits on the board of another new company (Smith, 2009). According to Scott 
(1991b) an unintended or unintentional interlock is qualitatively different from an intended 
interlock because the intentional interlock might have more influences on company 
performance or have more contribution to social capital than the automatic unintentional 
interlocking (Scott,1991b). 
According to Alexander and Murray (1992), most interlocking directorate research uses 
companies as the unit of analysis of their research. The research then measures the number of 
interlocks or ties within directors per company to have an understanding of the network. Thus 
the directors’ connections are turned into a network which is mapped through different 
software to visualize it (Mintz & Schwartz, 1985). Peng et al., (2001, p.62) argued that 
exploring interlocking directorates may allow researchers to map out the inter-organizational 
network of corporate governance. Therefore the BoD can be viewed as an interconnected 
social and familial entity which may connect the organizations with the external environment 
(Pennings, 1980; Pfeffer &Salancik, 1978). 
2.3.2 Classification of interlocking directorates As discussed before, an interlocking 
directorate refers to the practice of members of a corporate board of directors serving on the 
boards of multiple corporations (Scott, 1997). Moreover Scott (1991b) classified interlocks 
into two groups, primary and secondary interlocks, based upon an individual’s competence as 
a director. Primary interlocks are considered to be when an executive director, including a 
managing director, in one company sits on another BoD as an executive or non-executive 
director (Smith, 2009). On the other hand, secondary interlocks are formed exclusively by 
non-executive directors. These classifications are demonstrated in Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1 Classification of director interlock 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scott (1991b), as cited in Smith (2009, p.38) 
Company-X                                         Company-Y                    Classification of interlock                                
Executive director                     Executive director            Primary interlock 
Executive director               Non - Executive director          Primary interlock           
 Non - Executive director     Non - Executive director      Secondary interlock 
Represents the interlocking 
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The strong point of the primary interlocks are argued by Scott (1991a) who stated that the 
interlocked companies have better potential to exchange significant information with the 
connected companies more promptly. Through primary interlocking, organizations are 
enabled to make better institutional links and control (Smith, 2009). According to Mizruchi 
(1996) executive directors such as managing directors, bankers, lawyers and chartered 
accountants of many organizations very commonly serve on other BoDs as non-executive 
directors. From the Figure 2-1 it is also evident how secondary interlocks are created 
exclusively within and between the organizations by non-executive directors. These 
interlocks are basically encouraged by frequent institutional orientations and may be due to 
the qualifications, skills and expertise of the non-executive directors (Mizruchi, 1996).  
2.3.3 Measurement of interlocking directorates  
 Measurement of interlocks normally deals with the number of directors shared between 
company boards (Kiel &Nicholson, 2003).  The graphical representation below details the 
associations in Figure 2-2. In the figure below five companies are shown.  Company X has a 
total of 5 interlocks. Companies Y and Z have 3 interlocks each. Company O has one 
interlock whereas Company P has no interlocks. Therefore Company P can be said to be an 
isolated company. Figure 2-2 shows the number of interlocks which connect companies X, Y, 
Z and O but does not show the directors who are responsible for the connections and ties. The 
two directors shared on the boards of Companies X and Y may or may not be different from 
those who serve on the BoD of Companies X and Z, thus the question arises as to whether an 
automatic and unintended interlocking exists. If a single director provides directorial service 
on the board of Companies X, Y, Z and O, it can be argued that all those companies are 
directly interlocked as they are connected through a single director. On the other hand, if the 
interlocking occurs between Companies X and O through another director who has no 
interlocking connections with any other companies, then Companies Y and Z would be 
indirectly interlocked with Company O as Company O has interlocking connections with 
Company X who also connects Company Y and Z. 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Figure 2-2 Measurement of interlocking directorate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed, there are two types of interlocks which normally occur in an organization: 
direct interlocks and indirect interlocks2. These terms are widely accepted by researchers.  A 
direct interlock occurs when two firms share a director, or when an executive of one firm sits 
on the board of another firm (Kiel &Nicholson, 2003).  An indirect interlock occurs when 
two corporations have directors who also serve on the board of a third firm (Salinger, 2005). 
                                                 
 
2 Both direct and indirect interlocks create upper class connections. These connections sometimes coordinate 
some special political actions and create a corporate syndicate to control the economy (Burt, 1983; Au et al., 
2000). Moreover this upper class connection allows corporations to use their class influence by exercising 
power as a group to control and achieve some specific goal, whether legally or illegally (Scott, 1997;Johnson et 
al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
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P 
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An interlocked board has more strength and power than a non-interlocked board as the 
interlocked board has more scope to exchange information (Scott, 1991a) and create more 
powerful institutional associations than indirect interlocks (Burt, 1983; Au et al., 2000). For 
example when the CEO, banker, investors, lawyer or accountant of large firms commonly 
serve as a part of a direct interlock between two firms they make better linkages (Mizruchi, 
1983). However indirect interlocks, commonly created by non-executive directors who do not 
hold any managerial position in either organization, have limited influence on linkage 
creation (Salinger, 2005). 
2.3.4 Effects and consequences of interlocks 
There are different arguments on the origin and effect of board interlock networks and inter-
organizational relations. However whether interlocks are willingly or unintentionally initiated 
by directors or by firms, the consequences can be argued to be the same (Smith, 2009). 
According to Mizruchi (1996, p.280) “the causes of interlocks pale in comparison to the 
consequences or ‘so what’ question”. The main effects and consequences of interlocking 
directorates are discussed as follows.  
From an organizational perspective researchers have discussed the effects and consequences 
of interlocking directorates. According to Dooley (1969), Mizruchi and Stearns (1994), and 
Schoorman et al. (1981) it was argued that interlocks are a way for firms to coopt and 
monitor each other through a network in order to achieve better performance. In connection 
to this, Non and Philip (2007, p.1) state that “an interlock between a financial institution and 
a nonfinancial firm enables the financial institution to monitor the nonfinancial firm and it 
reduces the risk for the financial firm to provide capital to the nonfinancial firm.” Thus 
interlocking directorates can establish monitoring and trust within the organizations (Phan, 
2003). 
 Brass et al. (2004) argue that through interlocking directors, organizations can benefit from 
inter-corporate communication channels. The same argument was presented by Fohlin (1999) 
and Non (2007), by stating that interlocking directorates share information on different 
business practices.  For example a director who encounters a new practice in one of the firms 
where he/she serves could introduce this practice to the other firms where he/she serves as a 
director. It is also argued that through interlocking, directorates can extend new ideas, 
information and business values within the interlocked companies (Domhoff, 2005; 
Westphal, 2001; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). 
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Some research on the interlocking directorate phenomenon suggests an interlocking board 
might influence a broader range of behaviours such as political action, public policy, firms’ 
organizational structure and their mergers and acquisitions (Mizruchi, 1996). Mizruchi (1996) 
argued further that corporations may promote their own legitimacy by having influential 
directors in their organizations who sit on other BoDs. Useem (1984) concluded from his 
sociological point of view that by sitting on two or three corporate boards, directors extend 
the prospects of business executives, which he called their "business scan" of contemporary 
business practices, which may affect performance. According to Selznick, (1957) and 
DiMaggio and Powell, (1983), interlocking directorates can be used as a source of legitimacy, 
thus agreeing with Mizruchi (1996).  
In summary, firms favour interlocked boards because external directors that sit on more than 
one board bring resources to the firm, assist with monitoring and enable information 
dissemination.  However, other researchers suggest that interlocked boards exist to protect the 
interests of the upper classes (Useem, 1979; Zajac 1988) or as a source of organisational 
legitimacy (Selznick, 1957; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Useem, (1979) and Zajac (1988) 
suggest that interlocking directorates can support and strengthen the structure of the capitalist 
class. Research by Koenig and Gogel, (1981) also proposed that board interlocking exists in 
organizations to mutually protect the interests of a social class by its members. Similarly, 
Phan, et al. (2003), Lester and Cannella (2006) and Portes (1998) discuss the concept of 
social capital in relation to interlocking directorates as a form of intra-family agency issue 
where an elite network of directors tries to achieve their goal of protecting their individual 
and collective positions in society.   
Many research studies have argued that interlocking directorates usually play an important 
role in business groups in countries such as Belgium (Cuyvers & Meeusen, 1976, 1985), 
Canada (Attig and Morck, 2005), China (Keister, 1998), India (De, 2003), Israel (Maman, 
1999), Japan (Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln et al., 1992) and Sweden (Collin, 1998). According to 
their argument, a business group naturally consists of legally independent firms operating in 
multiple markets (Rommens, et al., 2007). Those researchers argue that business groups are 
ever-present around the world regardless of whether they are in developed, developing and 
even underdeveloped countries.   
According to Rommens (2007, p.2) “Business group members may be tied by cross-
shareholdings or by direct or indirect controlling stakes held by an ultimate shareholder, or 
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they may cooperate without ownership links”. Thus in interlocking research a huge 
importance is placed on the business group. In a developing economy it is apparent that 
family owned business groups typically dominate corporations through interlocking boards 
within by their group of firms (Silva, 2006).   
In a developing economy there is a lack of efficient capital market, which forces firms to     
arrange capital by private equity, friends and the family network (Phan et al., 2003). 
According to Lester et al. (2006) and Au et al. (2000) the family controlled business group 
uses board interlocks to build and maintain community-level social capital. Furthermore Burt 
(1983) and Au et al. (2000) posit that in uncertain emerging economies; corporations may use 
directorial interlocks to obtain better coordination with other organizations, thus reducing 
uncertainty and improving performance. Some of the predominant effects of interlocking 
directorates are summarised in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Key literature on the potentials effects of interlocks and their research based 
evaluation: 
Potential reason for interlocks Study Research based evaluation 
Collusion: Interlocks represent 
intentional attempts to restrict 
inter-firm competition and foster 
cooperation and collusion. 
(Schoorman et 
al., 1981) 
(Galaskiewicz, 
1985) 
Reasonable but doubtful in a sense that 
there is no systematic evidence. 
However collusion could be a 
motivation for interlocks as it can 
influence communications at the 
highest level of organizations.  
Information source: Interlocks 
can extend new ideas, information 
and business values within the 
interlocked companies. 
(Domhoff,2005) 
(Carpenter&West
phal,2001) 
(Haunschild& 
Beckman ,1998) 
(Davis ,1991) 
(Mizruchi ,1996) 
(Ussem, 1984) 
 
Interlocking directorates provide useful 
information to achieve a business scan 
of contemporary business practices, 
which may affect performance. 
Co-option: Interlocks are used by 
firms to co-opt sources of 
environmental uncertainty 
therefore interlocks are a way to 
reduce the uncertainty of limited 
resources.  
(Burt, 1980; 
Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). 
(Mizruchi 
&Stearns.1988). 
Considering the research based 
evidence, it can be argued that 
interlocks are connected with inter-
firm resource dependence as resources 
are critical and limited in nature. 
Monitoring: Interlocks are used 
for the purpose of exercising inter-
organizational control to monitor 
their activities. Moreover interlocks 
(Dooley,1969), 
(Mizruchi 
&Stearns ,1994), 
(Brass et 
Empirically, it is not possible to 
distinguish between cooption 
interlocks and monitoring of influence-
driven interlocks. However researchers 
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create inter-organizational 
networks which provide 
information channels among 
organizations 
al.,2004) 
(Galaskiewicz & 
Burt ,1991), 
(Ahuja,2000) 
argued that network ties transmit 
information to monitor and control 
business practices by using a diversity 
of knowledge. 
Legitimacy: Interlocks are used to 
increase firms’ environmental 
legitimacy through making 
prestigious connections which 
ultimately affects the connected 
firm’s confidence. 
Mizruchi(1996) 
Selznick,(1949) 
Theoretically accepted by researchers 
however few empirical results support 
this, as this model is difficult to test 
and analysis. Another argument 
complicating this is that the effect is 
very close to the cooption effects of 
interlocking.  
Career advancement: As an 
individual directors’ personal 
effect, interlocking may provide 
prestige and good remuneration 
which influences career 
advancement through greater 
corporate connections. 
(Zajac,1988), 
(Useem,1984) 
According to Useem (1984, p.66) “The 
pattern is readily explicable, the more 
the company boards on which a senior 
manager sits, the more forthcoming are 
invitations to join the clubs of which 
the manager’s fellow directors are 
members”.  
Social cohesion: Interlocks are an 
effect of social attachment among 
members that may be observed as 
an instrument for business, political 
or total social cohesion. 
(Mizruchi& 
Koenig, 1986). 
(Mizruchi ,1990), 
(Forrest, 2001). 
Interlocks are expected to influence 
corporate political power. Moreover 
research argued that interlocks can 
partially represent intra-class 
connections in addition to inter-
organizational ties. 
Corporate financer: Interlocks 
may assist the connected firms to 
obtain and manage access to 
financial resources 
(DiMaggio 
&Powell, 1983) 
It is argued by some researchers that 
some influential and high profile 
directors may create a convenient 
environment for the connected firms to 
access easy financing. 
Elite support:  Interlocks can offer 
structural support for the ruling 
elite. 
(Huse,2007), 
(Kotz,1978); 
(Mintz& 
Schwartz, 
1981),(Useem,19
79) (Allen ,1974) 
Class hegemony theory explains that 
interlocks can be used to benefit a 
particular social group or social class. 
Therefore interlocking can be used as 
an instrument of intra-class grouping.  
Business group: Interlocking 
directorates usually play an 
important role in business groups 
in many countries and have an 
influence on performances. 
 
 
(Rommens et al., 
2007).(Attig&Mo
rck,2005),(Keiste
r, 1998),(De, 
2003)  
Interlocking directorates may increase 
profitability of member firms of a 
business group through facilitating 
information. Moreover business group 
firms may ensure the presence of high 
quality directors through intra-firm 
interlocking and the qualities of these 
directors may also contribute to a 
higher profitability. 
 
Sources: Heracleous (2001, p.150); Renbing (2005, p.25); Smith (2009, p.41-43). 
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2.3.5 Theories used to explain interlocking directorates  
2.3.5.1 Resource dependency theory 
Resource dependency theory is one of many theories that analyse organizational behaviour 
(Mizruchi, 1983). Resource dependency theory mainly attempts to describe how firms 
achieve and control their dependence on limited resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003); 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Research on larger organizations has extensively concentrated on 
interlocking directorates as a mechanism to access critical and limited resources (Burt, 1980), 
(Mizruchi &Stearns, 1988), (Zajac, 1988). According to Aldrich (1979); Aldrich & Pfeffer 
(1976) a firms’ existence is hugely dependent on how effectively and efficiently the firm 
performs to acquire and control external resources. Therefore resource dependency theory is 
considered a powerful theory to explain the corporate interlocking phenomenon more 
practically (Peng & Wang, 2001). 
Resource dependence theory suggests that organizations’ survival and success are conditional 
(Peng & Wang, 2001, p.163) on how successfully organizations can manage and control the 
flow of resources (Pfeffer &Salancik, 1978). The resource dependency perspective asserts 
that in a competitive capitalist market, survival and continual success are uncertain (Zang, 
1999). Therefore business organizations have to initiate various co-operative strategies with 
others to reduce and manage the significant sources of uncertainty in their environments.  
It is also crucial for organizations to seek or to predict the potential threats or troublesome 
unilateral actions of other business competitors (Zang, 1999, p.862). This theory captures the 
motivation for cooperative strategic actions commenced by organizations to manage their 
interdependencies with other organizations and treats inter-organizational relations as the 
basic unit of analysis (Aldrich, 1999, p. 62). Corporate interlocking is an essential component 
of such cooperative strategies (Burt, 1992; Pennings, 1980). According to the main concept 
of resource dependency theory, the primary job of corporate interlocking seems to be for 
exchange of information and expertise among firms to reduce market uncertainties (Zang, 
1999). Moreover it has been observed by Allen (1974) and Scott (1991) that corporate 
interlocking provides an established means of communication and cooperation among 
interdependent firms from the perspective of resource dependency theory. According to Ong 
and Ong (2003) the business structure that emerges from the dynamics of interlocking 
directorates is a dense network, where interdependent companies frequently move towards 
improved positioning in relation to their environment. 
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From the above discussion it is clear that interlocking directorates are considered by 
researchers an influential phenomenon promoting integrative ties (Sana, 2009). Mizruchi 
(1983) posits that organizations that face uncertainty from technological shifts, deregulation, 
globalization of capital and product markets and political reforms can efficiently acquire 
resources through interlocking boards as these have the potential to create influential 
integration to benefit each other. Resource dependence theory thus examines the extent of 
these influences and the interdependency of organizations which may use networks such as 
interlocking directorates to navigate uncertainty and ensure the organizations’ continued 
existence (Mizruchi, 1983).  
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) the basic foundation of resource dependency theory 
depends on three key assumptions which are resource interdependence, external social 
restrictions and organizational adjustment. Previously in year 1978 to support this idea they 
argued that resource dependency theory is based on the idea of social systems, social 
interactions and social interdependence. Therefore resource dependency theory can explain 
how a firm is linked to its external environment where organizations are surrounded by a 
network of interdependences and social relationships (Forrest, 2001).  
For this particular study, resource dependency theory is used because of its basic and 
reasonable proposition in connection to presenting the interlocking phenomenon of 
conducting business in a developing country like Bangladesh.  
Resource dependency theory holds the idea that interlocking exists to organize the 
interorganizational exchange of resources such as are capital, information and market 
strategies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Organizations of developed and developing economy 
therefore adopt different strategies to tackle critical and limited resources. While the 
phenomenon of interlocking directorates is a natural phenomenon for both developed and 
developing economy their extent and attributes might be different because of different 
institutional and corporate settings.  
In a developing country like Bangladesh environmental uncertainties have several dimensions 
which may influence firms to get connected with each other through interlocking boards to 
improve their business strategy and also performances.  
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In Bangladesh the capital market is weak, unstable and inefficient (Rashid et al., 
2010).Potential investors are hesitant regarding their investment to Bangladesh because of 
this weak and risky market. There are also some problems in the labour market of Bangladesh 
about expertise, skill and professional knowledge which make the corporate sector unstable 
(Islam & Khaled, 2005). These factors might force many firms to concentrate on making 
inter-organizational relationships through interlocking directorates. In a developing economy 
private firms sometimes face extensive governmental involvements that apparently seem to 
encourage economic development. However these governmental interests create extra stress 
for private companies in connection to taxation or may not be beneficial in terms of their 
effects on financing issues. The situation is exacerbated because most of this government 
involvement provides very little financial support, incentives or even guidelines, which 
ultimately creates dilemmas (Islam & Khaled, 2005).These extra government pressures 
sometimes make the firms’ leadership more anxious and worried about the firms’ survival, 
further contributing to the uncertainties of Bangladesh as a developing country.  
Therefore the factors of the weak capital market, the lack of labour market expertise and the 
extensive but unhelpful government involvement could be potential reasons for the 
pervasiveness of interlocking directorates between corporations to defend themselves against 
the effects of environmental uncertainty (Phan et al., 2003Jackling et al., 2009). Moreover as 
resource dependency theory also explains how organizations seek to manage their 
environments, in a context of economic crisis, dissatisfaction with political leadership and 
increased social activism which is very common for developing economies, the interlocking 
directorate could be thus considered one of the solutions for organizations specifically for a 
developing country like Bangladesh (Phan et al., 2003).  
 
 
2.3.5.2 Class hegemony theory 
Class hegemony theory is used to explain the characteristics of social class in relation to 
interlocking directorates. According to Zang (1999) the class hegemony approach is mainly 
concerned with the business associations within a particular class. Corporate directors are 
viewed as members of a specific capitalist business or family class who mainly interlock their 
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boards to benefit themselves and to make their connections more strongly focused on success 
(Useem, 1982). 
Class hegemony theory originated from Marxist ideology (Useem, 1982). The theory 
explains the mutual protection of the interests of a social class (Koenig & Gogel, 1981).  
Research by Kotz (1978), Mintz & Schwartz (1981), Useem (1979), Allen (1974) and 
Pittman (1977) has shown that class hegemony theory can be used to discuss the influence of 
interlocking directorates on the capital structure of familial relationships. The members of the 
elite family or corporate class may balance their power by becoming the source of 
information (Kotz, 1978; Mintz & Schwartz, 1981). Class hegemony theory has been used to 
argue that board interlocks exist for class integration to give mutual protection of the interests 
of a particular social class (Koenig & Gogel, 1982), (Useem, 1982). According to Koenig and 
Gogel (1981); Useem (1982) the results of this class hegemony represent the protection of a 
particular group’s interests and directors’ organizational behaviour and influence highlights 
the contribution of the upper class to business (Useem ,1982). As Sana (2009, p.2) observed 
“if elite individuals are always appointed to the BoD they will frequently control corporate 
power”. In addition many directors are selected to the board on the basis of kinship, similar 
background, social reputation, and having the same political beliefs in order to create stronger 
bonds among the business network (Koenig &Gogel, 1982), (Useem, 1982). 
In this study, the class hegemony theory will be used to understand the potential interlocking 
phenomenon which can be occurred within family controlled business groups or some of the 
elite business class in Bangladesh. According to Lester et al. (2006), Kang and Shivdasani, 
(1995); Khanna and Rivkin (2001) the family controlled business group uses board interlocks 
to build and maintain community-level social capital.  
As mentioned earlier, in Bangladesh the company board is generally structured by the 
representation of huge family shareholdings. The significant portion of total share value is 
managed by founding family members, a holding company or cross shareholding, with a very 
small proportion of shares being held by institutional investors (Islam & Khaled, 2005). 
Moreover, in Bangladesh it is apparent that family owned business groups typically dominate 
corporations through interlocking boards (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2009). It is argued that business 
group interlocking is sometimes encouraged because group companies are often vertically 
integrated and the existing directors may share their strategic knowledge regarding the 
present and future projects of the company, which ultimately contributes to company 
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performances (Jayati et al., 2005). Moreover, through intergroup companies interlocking, 
knowledge can be shared in evaluating the companies’ strategic planning. In addition, as 
there is the lack of a clear and strong capital market in Bangladesh, family firms are forced to 
arrange capital by private equity, friends and family through interlocking boards.  
On the other hand, according to Mehta (1955), in some developing economies interlocking 
directorates occur due to a lack of experienced industrial leadership. In Bangladesh there is a 
huge shortage of professionals and skilled business experts. Therefore it can be argued that 
interlocking directorates in Bangladesh might have been influenced by supply constraints in 
the managerial labour market .Therefore family owned business groups may use interlocking 
directorates to tackle the problem of a shortage of expertise by inviting their expert directors 
as directors onto multiple company boards, in order to add value to their businesses. In this 
study it is proposed that class hegemony theory might able to explore all the above mentioned 
characteristics of interlocking directorates in Bangladesh.  
2.3.6 The relationship between firms’ performance and interlocking directorates 
Research on interlocking directorates spans six decades. In the organizational literature, a 
number of studies of financial economics are concerned with interlocking directorates and 
firms’ performance (Fich, 2005). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Pfeffer 
(1972) firms are dependent on external organizations to reduce risk and uncertainty which 
affects performance. They also argued that firms create linkages through interlocking boards 
which buffer firms from environmental fluctuations to make performance secure. Williamson 
(1985) finds that director linkages lower transaction costs, which ultimately improves 
survival. However Fich (2000) posits that board composition had a very small positive 
relationship with firm performance. 
Fich and White (2003) report a positive association between the number of interlocking 
directors and CEO performance and compensation. Hallock (1997) finds that CEOs serving 
in any employee-interlocked firms earn higher salaries. In contrast Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) find no association between director interlock and total compensation.   
There have been stronger associations between the phenomenon of board interlocks and 
company profitability.  Koskinen (2010) finds a significant association between board 
concentration and profitability as a result of interlocking directorates.  Similarly, Yeo, Pochet 
and Alcouffe (2003) observe a positive relationship between the number of interlocks and 
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firm performance. Madhavan (2001), Gulati et al. (2000), Gulati (1999) and Farina (2008) 
explain how interlocking the structure of organizations’ boards could affect the firm’s 
competitive behaviour and performance. According to Schoorman et al. (1981), Haunschild 
and Beckman (1998), Gulati and Westphal (1999), Collin (1998) and Keister (1998), 
interlocking directorates may increase the profitability of a company because they facilitate 
information flows between a company and its partners and financiers and between group 
members as well. Moreover, the presence of high quality directors on the board may also 
contribute to a higher profitability (Rommens, 2007). Kracaw and Zenner (1998) examined 
the negative stock price reactions to bank loan announcements when the bank and the 
borrower have interlocking directorates. Additionally, it was noted that negative reactions are 
less common among larger firms than smaller ones (Fich &White, 2005).   
Further, it is argued that busy directors (directors sitting on many boards) have less time to 
dedicate their responsibilities and are less effective thereby such directors may be responsible 
to decreasing the profitability of organizations (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999); (Ferris et al., 
2003); (Fich &Shivdasani, 2006). According to Silva et al. (2006) intra-group interlocks may 
be used to expropriate value from group members, thereby reducing profitability. Consistent 
with these ideas, Fich et al. (2003) found that interlocking directorates are negatively related 
to the profitability of companies who are not part of that group of companies. Similarly 
another negative effect of interlocking directorates and firm performance was argued by a 
study by Fich and Shivdasni in 2006. According to their analysis it was evident that, among 
the 500 largest U.S companies between 1989 and 1995, boards which included a majority of 
professionals interlocked with other companies had a price-to-book value approximately 4% 
lower than other companies without this practice.  
Heemskerk (2008) argued that, due to internationalization and deregulation of markets, 
pressure on interlocking directorates may create a monopoly among business enterprises 
through dispersed ownership, which may affect consumers. Fich (2000) indicated that 
interlocking relationships do not enhance the value of the firm.  Similarly Non (2007) found a 
negative effect on both current and future firm performance in relation to interlocking 
directorates. Weisbach (1988) argued the firm’s performance and the presence of outside 
directors who had multiple directorships provides evidence in support of a positive role with 
firm performance. According to Khanna and Thomas (2009) these conflicting findings of 
interlocking directorates and firm performance may be due to different extents of analysis 
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and different institutional settings. Therefore interlocking directorates as a board composition 
mechanism have significant scope for further research. 
The study of interlocking directors has been encouraging researchers to define the present 
state of the corporate community and functions in relation to interlocking directorates, 
particularly among corporate governance analysts and academics (Fich &White, 2005). 
International research on interlocking directorates has produced mixed results in terms of its 
relationship to the profitability of organizations. 
2.3.7 Research on interlocking directorates in developing economies 
The phenomenon of interlocking directorates is a widely studied, useful measure of corporate 
governance practice. However most of the research has been limited to data from developed 
countries, with some work only with this issue in developing countries. This section will 
focus on some of the interlocking board research in developing economies such as Thailand, 
Singapore, India, Pakistan, Chile and Brazil. This is discussed below. 
Thailand: 
Considering the scarcity of interlocking board research on Third World country (Peng et al., 
2001) undertook an exploratory research about the patterns of interlocking directorates as 
corporate governance in Thailand. Specifically in their research they explored the interlocks 
network attributes and individual board directors of Multinationals enterprises (MNE) differ 
methodically from those of non-multinational companies in Thailand. In their research they 
explored that compared with non-MNEs; MNEs in Thailand have more densely connected 
interlocks. They also explored the corporate network of Thailand which absorbed more 
central locations in the interlocks network. In their research they found more ethnic Chinese 
directors in their network, and finally they argued about the appointment of more military 
directors in to the board to influence performance (Peng et al., 2001, p.161).  
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Singapore: 
To fill the gap in the interlock literature in developing countries, researchers like Ong et al. 
(2003), Phan et al. (2003) and Zang (1999) have undertaken some research in Singapore. It 
has been found that interlocking directorates are not a recent reality in Singapore and that 
there are significant relationships among interlocking directorates, firm strategies and 
performance (Phan et al., 2003).  It was argued that in any country where a significant 
proportion of commercial and industrial activities are undertaken by corporations, the 
importance of the role played by board interlocks should be taken into careful consideration 
(Phan et al., 2003). Firm size, financial connections, debt and corporate performance affect 
board interlocks in Singapore. Moreover  it was revealed that market capitalisation, board 
size, total assets, return on assets, return on sales, profit before tax and nature of the company 
are significantly correlated with board interlocks in Singapore (Ong et al., 2003, p.322). In 
another study (Zang, 1999, p.861) different levels of networking activities were exhibited and 
firms that are owned by Chinese families have huge assets, a good financial reputation and 
achieve the central position in the Singaporean business network.  
India: 
The structure and extent of interlocking directorates within Indian business groups and their 
performance effects have been analysed and discussed by Reed (2002) and De (2003). Their 
research findings observed that large business groups have a tendency to have more 
interlocks but that diversity proved to correlate negatively: “the more the diverse group is, the 
lesser are the interlocks” (De, 2003, p.1). Finance and trading companies have a higher level 
of interlocks and holding companies occupy significant nodes in the directorial network (De, 
2003). Finally it was noted that directorial interlocks improved the performance of group-
affiliated firms in India (De, 2003, p.1).  
Pakistan: 
In Pakistan there are some study has been undertaken regarding interlocking directorship for 
instance study of Shaikh (2004), Hossain (1985) and Ghani (2005). Some of their research 
explored corporate governance, business group affiliation and firm performance in Pakistan, 
examining business groups’ networks and their impact on corporate governance. It was 
observed that business groups can be negatively perceived by outsider stakeholders: “external 
shareholders perceive firms affiliated with business groups to have relatively lower 
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transparency and weaker corporate governance mechanisms than firms not affiliated with 
business groups” (Ghani et al., 2005,p.2) Finally it was argued that, based on  comparative 
financial performance results, business groups in Pakistan are efficient as they maintain a 
group network to secure better economic performance (Shaikh, 2004),(Hussain,1985).  
 
Chile: 
Several research studies into interlocking boards have been undertaken in Chile (Khanna 
&Thomas, 2009), (Enrione & Zerboni, 2007), (Silva & Paredes, 2006), and (Salvaj & Lluch, 
1970). Though they studied interlocks to different extents, most conceptualized interlocking 
as a normal strategy of the owners of a company, applied to an emerging market business 
environment in order to add value to their business. Finally it was argued that interlocking 
phenomenon has a significant impact on corporate governance issues in developing countries 
like Chile. 
 Brazil:  
 In Brazil there are some research where Social network analysis (SNA) have been used to 
research interlocking boards and examine the existence of associations between the 
positioning of the firm in the network of corporate relationships and its significance (Mendes 
et al.,2011). The results suggested that the pattern of the corporate networks of Brazil created 
from board members and their relevant companies reflects the small-world model, where 
centrally connected companies enjoy better financial performance (Mendes et al., 2011, 
p.522), (Santos & Barros,2009).  
2.3.8 Structure of the corporate interlock network across countries 
The structure of the corporate interlock network is diverse across countries because of 
different corporate models (Au, 2005). Some models identified in the literature are: the 
continental model, the Anglo Saxon model and the Japanese model. In most of the models the 
role of banks and financial institutions has always been highlighted as main actors of the 
corporate network (Au et al., 2005). However the role of banks and financial institutions are 
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heterogeneous across countries. The main reason of the heterogeneity is the different 
economic settings and institutional embeddedness3 (Dacin, Ventrisca & Belal, 1999).  
Each of these models will be briefly described. It is argued that countries practising the 
continental model have weak capital markets (Lincoln et al., 1998).  The weak capital market 
of continental model based countries basically leads to a huge corporate dependence on bank 
borrowing, with the tendency to force local and international banks into an extensive 
participation in corporate networks (Au, 2005). This phenomenon is also true for the 
Japanese model (Lincoln et al., 1998). Therefore the continental and Japanese corporate 
network structures contain bank centred inter-corporate networks (Au, 2005). On the other 
hand, countries that are following Anglo Saxon model have strong capital markets.  As a 
result their corporate networks tend to be differently composed to those the continental and 
Japanese models. In the Anglo Saxon (including the U.S.) economies, capital markets are  
strongly developed and less dependent on bank financing, therefore in their inter-corporate 
network structure banks and financial institutions play a lesser role than other non-banking 
organizations (Au, 2005). 
 
In summary it can be argued that continental (European) countries have formed a corporate 
network which is centred on banks and financial organizations (Au, 2005). These countries 
have an active involvement in mobilizing the capital resources and dominant corporations 
operations through the bank and financial institutions inter-connection (Lincoln et al., 1998). 
In contrast to that, the Anglo Saxon business structure is more at arm’s length and more 
financially motivated (Au, 2005). However the Japanese corporate network, while being 
bank-centred, is highly complex: “Japanese corporate network structure is characterized as a 
keiretsu system which is filled with pervasive trade ties, financial ties, cross holding ties, 
interlocking directorates’ ties and social ties” (Au, 2005, p.20). 
2.4 Social capital and social network analysis  
2.4.1 Introduction to social capital 
According to the most common definition of social capital provided by Putnam (1995, p. 
67) 4 social capital refers to “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and 
                                                 
3 The meaning of embeddedness is the embedding of a person or organization in a set of social relations or 
networks (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999) 
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social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”. In general, social 
capital includes networks together with shared norms, values and understanding that facilitate 
co-operation within or among groups (OECD 2001, p.41).“the social capital of a society 
includes the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions 
among people and contribute to economic and social development” (Grootaert & Van, 2002, 
p.4). Nan Lin (2001) describes social capital from the point of view of economic utilization 
of resources related to business and business networks. According to his analysis, social 
capital is the investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace. 
Therefore the concept of social capital has entered into the corporate arena, which is the basic 
interest of this particular research (Cohen & Prusak, 2001; Cohen & Fields, 1999; Leenders 
& Gabbay, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). 
2.4.2 Levels and dimensions of social capital 
Social capital can be located at different levels such as the individual level, the level of 
informal social group, the level of formal organization, the community level, the ethnic group 
level and even nations (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 1995).Thus social capital 
formation and effects could be analysed at different levels which have been described as the 
Micro level, Macro level and Meso level. 
Micro level5 social capital deals with interpersonal trust and informal relations between 
individuals (Kaldaru & Parts, 2005). Micro level social capital has been categorised further 
into cognitive and structural aspects (Uphoff, 1996). Cognitive social capital includes values, 
beliefs, attitudes, behaviour and social norms of groups and individuals, while structural 
social capital includes the composition and practices of local level institutions (Bain & Hicks, 
1998). Micro level social capital has a huge influence on economic performance. Empirical 
research supports the view that micro level social capital has proved that both trust and local 
                                                                                                                                                        
4The term “social capital” was used with a different meaning by Alfred Marshall in 1890. 
Woolcock (1998) identifies Lydia Judson Hanifan (1920) and Jane Jacobs (1961) as the first 
proponents of the modern concept of social capital. 
 
5 Several studies imply that micro level social capital is mostly determined by external factors 
such as cultural traditions and history, which are persistent over time and hard to change 
(Banfield 1958; Putnam 1993, 2000; Rice and Feldman, 1997). 
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cooperation are associated with stronger economic performance (Kaldaru & Parts, 2005; 
Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). 
Figure 2-3 the forms and scope of social capital  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002, p.4) 
The macro level social capital refers to the institutional context which includes formal 
relationships and structures, such as the rules of law, legal frameworks, the political regime, 
the level of decentralization and the level of participation in the policy formulation process 
(Bain & Hicks 1998). It also refers to the governmental institutions that influence people’s 
ability to cooperate for mutual benefit (Knack, 1999). 
The meso level social capital is based on horizontal and vertical relationships among groups 
and communities. Meso level social capital relates to individuals’ relationships with society 
as a whole (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002). 
From the above discussion it is observed that the concept of social capital has been applied to 
a wide range of social phenomenon and could be located at the level of the individual, the 
informal social group, the formal organization, the community, the ethnic group and even the 
nation (Nahapiet & Ghospal, 1998). It has also been applied to understand family relations as 
well as the relationships within and between communities and organizations (Grootaert et al., 
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2002). According to some researchers, social capital is used to understand the development 
of human capital, creation of trust and cooperation in communities, organizations’ 
performance, and geographic and national network attributions (Putman, 1993; Coleman, 
1988; Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
2.4.3 Social network and social capital 
Different fields and disciplines including sociology, political science, business,  
anthropology, biology, communication studies, economics, geography, information science, 
organizational studies, social psychology, sociolinguistics and economics have emphasised 
different aspects of social capital (Adler &Kwon, 2002). The difference within definitions 
depends on the observations of different social engagements. According to Coleman (1988), 
social capital is a conceptual tool for resolving two conflicting views on how microstructures 
in society generate macrostructures. The first is typically sociological and deals with the 
actions of people who are governed by norms, rules and obligations. The second explains 
social capital from the point of view of economics. According to the economic perspective, 
people are independent and self-interested and act to maximize their own utility (Wellman & 
Berkowitz, 1988). However social capital has also been examined based on the relationship 
between democracy and civil society (Putnam, 2000).  
 
A social network is a social structure consisting of different actors within society, including 
individuals or organizations (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). A social network observes the 
dyadic ties between different actors of society such as people, groups, organizations, or other 
information/knowledge processing entities (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The social network 
literature therefore has documented the implications of the strong interaction of ties for trust 
and trustworthiness (Scott, 1991b). The network literature also argued that close social 
connections permit actors to know one another. It also enables the sharing of important 
information, and the creation of a common point of view. Therefore an actor is likely to be 
perceived as trustworthy by other actors in the network. Moreover researchers have observed 
the possibilities of social networks for building social capital among users. According to 
Adler and Kwon (2002) new forms of social capital will occur in social network sites like 
technologies distribution lists, photo directories, and online support linkages which ultimately 
influence social performance.  
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Some researchers have classified social capital relations as internal, external or a combination 
of both. Internal relations of social capital focus on bonding between insiders or a particular 
group or collective. Thus ties occur between persons, organizations, communities or nations 
(Putman, 1993). However it has been argued that external bonds focus on social capital as a 
resource can be captured through a person’s external links within a network such as is the 
case with an interlocking board (Burt, 1992). Furthermore Adler and Kwon, (2002) argued 
that external links among different actors provide scope and opportunities to leverage 
contacts and resources.  
2.4.4 Theories used to explain social and corporate network 
2.4.4.1 Social cohesion theory  
Social cohesion theory has emerged as a powerful theory to interpret social relations. 
According to Mizruchi (1996), social cohesion is associated with members sharing similar 
interests and with an extensive network of social contacts. The network enables a large flow 
of relevant information.  
As social cohesion is a theory supporting social contacts, it is relevant for describing 
interlocking directorate networks. Interlocking board networks consist of the affiliation 
among directors and companies. According to the Council of Europe, social cohesion is 
“multi-dimensional in nature, not only to inclusion of and participation by all in economic, 
social, cultural and political life but to a sense of solidarity and belonging to society, based on 
an effective enjoyment of citizenship and democracy” (CoE, 2008, p.8). Academics use the 
concept to emphasize the social and economic imperfection that may impact economic 
performance of an economy (Forrest, 2001). Actually social cohesion theory can be used to 
discuss a social platform where the social relations can be analysed from different points of 
view to contribute on social advancement (Forrest, 2001). Thus the theory has the effect of 
influencing policies for the improvement of social cohesion by reducing social and economic 
discrepancies (Forrest, 2001). Social cohesion can be seen as a way of describing bonds that 
are used to prevent competition, collect information and set prices or policies among 
interlocked organizations that are part of a social connection (Watts, 1998; Forrest, 2001). In 
this study, social cohesion theory will be used to analyse attributes in business networks in 
Bangladesh. Moreover the theory will also be used to clarify how a business network, which 
is ultimately a form of social network, contributes to manage and control social capital in 
Bangladesh.  
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2.4.5 Attributes of social network analysis 
Social network analysis (SNA) focuses on ties and the combination of ties to form networks 
among people, groups of people, organization and countries (De Nooy, 2005). Social network 
analysts assume that interpersonal ties matter because through interpersonal ties of 
organizations and countries, behaviour, attributes, information and goods can be transposed 
and transferred. From a methodological point of view, SNA conceptualizes the analysis of 
network of social relations (De Nooy, 2005). 
Through SNA, network data can be organized and examined to capture significant 
organizational processes such as business strategy and planning (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Therefore, SNA enables establishing a link between micro and macro approaches of 
organization behaviour (Pennings, 1980). SNA views organizations as a system of objects 
where people, groups and organizations are joined by a variety of relationships (Tsai 
&Ghoshal, 1998). Some relationships may be direct while some are joined by intermediate 
connections through multiple relationships. In addition, network analysis is also concerned 
with the structure and patterning of these relationships to identify their causes and 
consequences (De Nooy & Mrvar, 2005). 
SNA is an approach of multilevel applicability. At the organizational level it explains the 
communication process among different participants (Lock Lee, 2008). It also works on 
networks of power and political processes (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998.) Similarly SNA can be 
used to analyse careers and socialization. According to Taylor & Walker (2002) SNA could 
be used to investigating the evolving networks of information and influence. At the inter-
organizational level SNA can also be dealt with more explicit relationships between 
organizations (Pennings, 1980). 
2.4.5.1 Social network properties 
In general social networks are self organizing, evolving and complex (Newman et al., 2000). 
These patterns become more apparent as network size increases. However, a global network 
analysis of all interpersonal relationships in the world is not feasible and is likely to contain 
so much information as to be uninformative (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The social network 
perspective emphasizes multiple levels of analysis. Differences among actors are traced to the 
constraints and opportunities that arise from how they are embedded in networks (Lock Lee, 
2008). Moreover the structure and behaviour of networks are grounded in, and enacted by 
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local interactions among actors through different network properties (Wasserman et al., 
1994).  These properties are used for SNA. 
Table 2-2 Network properties used for SNA 
SNA Measurement properties Description  
Network Size and Density  Measures the size of the network by the number of actors 
in the community under study. Density is determined by 
the number of interconnections as a proportion of the 
maximum possible number of interconnections.  
Degree of Centrality  Measures the centrality of an actor in the community, 
based on the number of other actors connected to it. 
Generally, the degree is defined as either ‘inward’ or 
‘outward’, reflecting the relationship direction.  
Reciprocity  Measures the two-way connections between actors.  
Betweenness Centrality  Measures the degree to which an individual actor is on 
the path of connections between other actors.  
Closeness Centrality  Measures the degree to which an actor is connected to 
every other actor in the network, i.e. the distance required 
(number of indirect connections) to reach other actors.  
Cliques and Sub-groups  Groups that can be distinguished by the density of 
connections between the members compared to the rest of 
the network.  
Sources: Wasserman and Faust, (1994); De Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj, (2005). 
Table 2-2 lists some elementary network properties which are used to measure social 
networks and analyse them. According to Lock Lee (2008) the formation of a network is 
determined by the opposition of two forces. The first is the reproduction of network structure 
as a general social resource for network members or actors and the second is the alteration of 
network structure by entrepreneurs for their own benefit. Therefore, for analysing a social or 
corporate network it is necessary to measure all the mentioned actor properties of networks 
and how networks are reproduced. Network size and density, centrality, reciprocity, cliques 
and sub-groups, and the existence of special nodes in the network represent the structural 
characteristics of a network (Lock Lee, 2008). 
2.4.5.2 Network attributes and corporate centrality 
Domhoff (2005) defined corporate centrality as a concept of two components. Corporate 
centrality arises from the extent and number of interlocks between or among organizations. 
These centrality components are measured based on matrix algebra, used by Bonacich (1972) 
and Boolean algebra (Bonacich & Domhoff, 1981) to focus on social dimensions and social 
relations. According to De Nooy & Batagelj (2005, p.59) social relations are very powerful 
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for generating values and behaviour: “Solidarity, shared norms, identity, collective behaviour, 
and social cohesion are considered to emerge from social relations”. Therefore in a corporate 
network study the most important concern is to examine the potential components of the 
network and its degree of centrality, as well as the extent of its internal and external 
relationships and other network properties as mentioned above in Table 2-2, to understand the 
collective behaviour and social cohesion of corporations.  
According to social analysts, people or organizations who match on social characteristics or 
who have similar social and corporate status will interact more frequently. In addition people 
and organizations interacting regularly will develop more commonly shared attitudes or 
identities within a network (De Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj, 2011). 
Research on interlocking directorates is based on a type of network analysis which connects 
persons or individuals into particular events (Scott, 1991). This type of network is usually 
known as an affiliated network or network affiliation. Affiliation networks are two mode 
networks consisting of actors and events (Scott, 1991). In interlocking directorates research 
the affiliation network is also represented by actors and events. The boards of companies can 
be seen to be represented as events whereas the board members are represented as actors 
(Freeman, 1979). In interlocking directorates, members of a BoD are connected through 
shared participation on the board, therefore a network affiliation occurs. While there are a 
large number of networks attributes that researchers of interlocks have explored and 
analysed, for this particular exploratory research the focus will be on the two most commonly 
studied attributes, which are density and centrality. 
2.4.5.3 Density 
In SNA, density refers to the degree to which all possible relations are evident (Scott, 1991). 
This has been explained more technically thus: “Density is the number of lines in a simple 
network, expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible number of lines” (De Nooy, 
Mrvar & Batagelj, 2005, p.63). It is a measure of the overall number of ties that are present in 
a network. Therefore density represents the number of observed interlocks among all possible 
links in a network. In a graphic presentation, density is measured as the average value 
attached to each path across all possible paths (Wasserman et al., 1994).  According to De 
Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj (2005) network density captures the idea of cohesion. Clearly, a 
cohesive network is a social network that contains many ties between people, which yield a 
tighter structure.  
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2.4.5.4 Centrality 
As discussed, as well as the number of ties (density) in a network, an actor’s location within a 
network is also significant (Burt, 1983), that is, how central an actor is within the network. In 
SNA, a point of centrality refers to a point with “a large number of connections with the other 
points in its immediate environment” (Scott, 1991: 84). Actors that are most influential are 
usually in strategic locations (Freeman, L. C. 1979). The three most common measures of 
centrality are network degree centrality, network closeness centrality and network betweeness 
centrality.  
2.4.5.5 Degree centrality 
Degree centrality is a measure of the number of nearby nodes in the network to a particular 
actor (De Nooy & Mrvar, 2005). This is a very simple centrality measurement technique 
since it directly measures activity. An actor with a high centrality measure can be considered 
to be active in the network. The degree of direct contact with other actors in the network is 
also important to consider. Most importantly this measure focuses on the most evident actors 
in the network. 
2.4.5.6 Network closeness centrality 
The closeness centrality is the normalized number of steps required to access every other 
node from a given node in a network (Freeman, 1979).   The concept of closeness centrality 
uses not only neighbours of a node, but also the neighbours of the neighbours are to be 
considered. Nodes that are not directly connected with this given node receive a lower weight 
because the intensity of their relation or their influence is lower (Wasserman et al., 1994). In 
SNA the idea of the closeness also relates to the extent to which one actor (in a node) in any 
network is close to other actors that can interact quickly with others in the network (Freeman, 
1979). Closeness centrality therefore can be seen to describe the connectedness of a node in 
undirected networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). A node that is connected by many short 
paths to other nodes can be interpreted as relatively independent, as opposed to all nodes that 
are less connected by short paths. For calculating the closeness centrality the geodesic 
network of every node to every other node is computed (Freeman, 1979).    
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2.4.5.7 Betweeness centrality  
Betweeness centrality measures the extent to which an actor in a network connects other 
actors in that network (Newman et al., 2010). Betweeness centrality is also a measure of a 
node's centrality in a network and is equal to the number of shortest paths from all vertices to 
all others that pass through that node (Freeman, 1979). Betweeness centrality is a useful 
measure of the load placed on the given node in the network. However dealing with social 
connectivity rather than mere geometrical connectivity, the node's importance to the network 
is also an important factor (Newman et al., 2010).  
2.5 Types of network The study of networks particularly, graph theory, has been the pursuit 
of mathematicians. Generally graph theory has focused on graphs, with no predicted design 
principles (Newman, 2010). In a social network, nodes have also been considered to represent 
people or organisations (both actors) and links are considered to be associated relationships 
between them (Newman, 2010).  
Four different types of network emerged recently: (a) random networks, b) scale free 
networks, c) hierarchical clustering networks and d) small-world networks. Each of the 
networks has different attributes as discussed below: 
2.5.1 Random networks 
 
A random network is a set of people or groups of people, “actors” in the jargon of the field, 
with some pattern of interactions or “ties” between them (Newman, 2010; Albert et  al., 
2000). Friendships among a group of individuals, business relationships between companies, 
and intermarriages between families are all examples of random networks (Bollobais, 2001). 
Figure 2-4 presents a random network graph. 
Figure 2-4 Random network  
 
(Source: Konno (2010) 
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2.5.2 Scale free networks  
A network is classified as scale free because of its extent of connectedness, or in other words, 
its degree distribution trend (Albert & Barabasi, 2000). In scale free network there is a 
significant proportion of isolated actors. For instance, in a scale free network there is a 
probability that a node is selected uniformly and at random (Newman, 2009). Moreover the 
scale free network contains a certain number of links which follow a particular mathematical 
form called a power jaw (Newman, 2009). The most important characteristic of scale free 
networks is the clustering coefficient distribution, which decreases as the node degree 
increases (Albert & Barabasi, 2000). A scale free network could be influenced by a company 
group, where individual directors may have positions on BoDs within that company group, 
but not outside it (Newman, 2010). Figure 2-5 presents a scale free network graph. 
 
Figure 2-5 Scale free networks   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Konno (2010) 
2.5.3 Hierarchical clustering network  
As the name would imply, a hierarchical clustering network is a method of cluster 
analysis which seeks to build a hierarchy of clusters (Newman & Girvan, 2004). In order to 
decide which clusters should be joined or where a cluster should be split, a measure of 
dissimilarity between sets of observations is required (Newman, 2004). Therefore in most 
methods of hierarchical clustering, this is achieved by use of an appropriate measurement 
metric of distance between pairs of observations (Newman, 2010). There are also some 
linkage criteria which specify the dissimilarity of sets as a function of the pair wise distances 
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of observations in the sets (Albert & Barabasi, 2000). A typical example of such a feature is 
the circles of friends or connections in social networks where every member of a clique may 
know every other member. This natural tendency of network clustering is quantified by the 
clustering coefficient (Newman, Watts & Strogatz, 2002).  Figure 2-6 presents the graph of a 
hierarchical clustering network.  
Figure-2.6 Hierarchical clustering networks 
 
 
Source: Konno (2010) 
2.5.4 Small-world networks 
Despite a large network size, there is relatively short distance among some pair of nodes for a 
small-world network (Porekar, 2002). Small-world networks results in the phenomenon of 
strangers being linked by a mutual acquaintance (Newman, 2010). Many empirical graphs are 
well modelled by small-world networks. For example social networks, the connectivity of 
the Internet, wikis such as Wikipedia and gene networks all reveal a small-world network 
characteristic (Newman 2010). Porekar (2002, p.2) describes this network in the following 
way: “Path length is defined by minimum number of edges needed to pass from first point to 
the other. This phenomenon is called the small-world effect and can be observed in society 
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and nature”. However he argued that the small-world concept is not an unusual organising 
attitude, rather it may commonly occur in society (Porekar, 2002). Figure 2-7 presents a 
graph of a small world network. 
Figure-2-7 Small world network 
 
Source- Konno (2010) 
2.6 Development of research context 
From the earlier definition and discussion I arrived at an in depth understanding regarding the 
general board interlocking phenomenon of organizations. From the discussion and literature 
review it is also clear that organizations activate the external relationships among diverse 
organizations through interlocking boards to reduce environmental uncertainties (Mizruchi, 
1996). As organizations are dependent on critical and limited resources, they always seek 
ways to gain access to these critical resources to survive. Interlocking boards are therefore 
considered one of the ways that organizations gain resources.  
The study of interlocking directorates has featured in organizational research for nearly a 
century and this has been encouraging researchers to identify the present status of the 
corporate community and functions in relation to their corporate network (Fich and White, 
2005). However, as mentioned earlier, most of the research based on interlocking directorates 
and corporate network has been undertaken in developed countries (e.g., Stokman, Ziegler 
and Scott, 1985; Mintz and Schwarts, 1985; Scott, 1991b; Gerlach, 1992; Aguilera, 1998; 
Maman, 1999; Au, Peng and Wang, 2000; Peng, Au and Wang, 2001; Heinze, 2004). 
Although there is wide-ranging information in the literature on the network structure of 
directorship interlocks across developed countries, addressing the antecedents and  
consequences of directorship interlock for western organizations, very little attempt has been 
made to deal with this interlocking board network issue for developing countries (Au, 2005). 
Despite of the different traits of interlocking directorates and corporate networks in 
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developing countries, very little is known about the dynamics of these relationships and 
incidence. Thus this study is attempted to explore the existing corporate network literature of 
a developing country, Bangladesh, and contribute to the extant literature. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This is the foundation chapter for the whole thesis. In the first section of this chapter I have 
outlined and discussed the existing literature of interlocking directors and board networks. 
Moreover, literature regarding the interlocking board and firm performance has also been 
discussed. Discussion includes the concepts of strategic ties, cohesion, network path and 
attributes of different corporate networks. In the next part of this chapter the relationship 
between social capital and social networks has been discussed, which is very relevant for this 
research. A further step involved describing the extent of the research agenda and the 
research question and the operationalisation process. The research model to support the 
research question has also been outlined.  The next chapter will discuss in detail the research 
design and method. 
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Chapter 3: The institutional settings of Bangladesh  
3.1 Introduction  
To explore the characteristics of corporate networks of any country it is essential to 
understand the institutional context and social environment of that particular country, because 
this might have a great influence on the networks. In this chapter the institutional settings of 
Bangladesh will be presented in relation to its corporate and social environment. This chapter 
describes the social, corporate, legal and institutional environment of Bangladesh. In Section 
3.2, an overview of Bangladesh will be outlined. Section, 3.3 will be focused on describing 
and analyzing the financial setting of Bangladesh. Section 3.4 will identify the Bangladeshi 
corporate setting. Section 3.5 will discuss the country’s pattern of corporate boards. Section 
3.6 will outline the stock exchange listing patterns of Bangladeshi companies. In Section 3.7 
the limitations of the corporate sector of Bangladesh will be explained. Section 3.8 will 
present the corporate governance policies and practices in of this country. Finally, Section 3.9 
will sum up the chapter with some concluding remarks. In addition to that some relevant 
Bangladeshi rules and regulations have been included in the Appendix section of the thesis.  
In Appendice-5 Corporate governance checklist for companies of Bangladesh has been 
presented. 
3.2 Overview of Bangladesh  
 
Bangladesh is a developing country located in the south eastern part of Asia. It is surrounded 
by India with a small common border with Myanmar in the southeast. Situated on the      
northern coast of the Bay of Bengal, the official name of the country is “People's Republic   
of Bangladesh”.                                                           
    
Figure 3-1 Map of Bangladesh 
Source- www.worldmap.com 
The culture of Bangladesh has a unique history of more than 2500 years. The ancient area of 
Bangladesh has an affluent historical and cultural past, which includes Dravidian, Indo-
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Aryan, and Mongolian, Moghul, Arab, Persian, Turkish and West European cultures 
(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics “BBS”, 2008).  
 
The official language used in Bangladesh is Bangla. English is the second language used for 
higher studies, trade and media purposes. Bangladesh is a Muslim country with nearly 88.3% 
of its people being Muslims. However the population also consists of 10.5% Hindus, .6% 
Buddhist and .3% Christians, with a few other religions coexisting in the country (Dhaka 
Stock Exchange, 2008).  
 
Bangladesh is ruled by a parliamentary form of government. The president is the head of the 
country while the prime minister is the head of the government. The prime minister is 
selected by the president and supported by ministers. The highest judiciary of Bangladesh is 
the Supreme Court. This court consists of the Appellate Division and the High Court 
Division. Justices are appointed to the Supreme Court by the president. The chief justice is 
the head of Supreme Court who is considered to serve as the guardian of the constitution of 
Bangladesh. The chief justice also has the responsibility to ensure justice and implement laws 
and policies to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens of Bangladesh. 
 
Bangladesh is a former British colony with almost every law having been inherited from the 
U.K. Some exceptions are evident regarding family laws such as marriage and inheritance. 
However these laws are based on cultural and religious principles.  
 
Bangladesh is a founding member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). It also holds the membership of some international alliances for various purposes 
such as the D-8, Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation  
(BIMSTEC), Commonwealth of Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and 
the Non-Aligned Movement. The international donor agencies, such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADP), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank have huge influences on this country’s 
policies and strategies. Some countries like the United States, Japan, Saudi Arabia and some 
West European countries also provide huge support and provide guidelines for country 
strategies.  
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Bangladesh has a predominantly agricultural economy. Considered as the gift of nature, the 
agricultural sector contributes about 22% of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
national economy of Bangladesh (BBS Report, 2008). Although a large proportion of the 
population is engaged with this sector, recently there have arisen a large number of industries, 
including ready-made garments, cotton textiles, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, wood products, 
iron and steel, ceramics, cement, plastics and chemicals. Moreover Bangladesh is also 
enriched by natural wealth such as gas and coal. According to a relatively recent report, 
Bangladesh has enormous deposits of natural gas which can be used to develop its economic 
position effectively (IMF, 2008).  
Bangladesh is an overpopulated country. According to the provisional results of the 2011 
Population and Housing Census of Bangladesh, the enumerated population on 15th March, 
2011 was 142,319,000 which made it the 8th most populous nation in the world. Table 1 
shows some other information on the Bangladeshi population, according to different sources. 
Table 3-1 Population of Bangladesh 
 
 
According to Index of Economic Freedom (2008) Bangladesh is one of the most densely 
populated countries of the world, where more than 961 people live per square kilometre. 
According to a World Bank report (2005) Bangladesh has the highest incidence of poverty in 
South Asia and it is the third poorest country of the world as the highest number of poor 
people, after China and India.  In Bangladesh the per capita income in 2010 was 
US$641 (IMF, 2010). According to the United Nation’s Human Development Index, 
Bangladesh is a least developed country (LDC) based on the criteria of low income, human 
resource weakness and economic vulnerability (United Nations, 2006).  
Bangladesh has a rapidly growing market economy (UNPF, 2009). The present rapid 
industrialisation trend is considered the key issue for its economic growth. The country has 
ranked as the 47th largest economy in the world in 2010 in PPP terms and 57th largest in 
nominal terms, among the D -8 economies, with a GDP of US$269.3 billion in PPP terms and 
Source Year Population (millions) 
World 
Population 
Reference 
2010 164 
CIA 
World 
Fact book 
2010 156 
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US$104.9 billion in nominal terms (IMF, 2010).  The manufacturing sector of Bangladesh 
has huge potential. It contributes about 17% of the GDP which is dominated by ready-made 
garments. The ready-made garments sector alone has made a remarkable contribution, 
amounting to 74.2% of total exports in 2004/2005 as compared to only 1.1 per cent in 
1982/1983 (EPB, 2006), and provides employment to about 2 million people, mostly rural 
migrant women (Frost, 2005). With the help of that huge contribution of the struggling rural 
lady, Bangladesh is now recognized as the fifth largest garment exporter to the European 
Union and among the top ten clothing suppliers to the U.S. (IMF, 2010).   
  
3.2.1 Stock exchanges of Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh has two Stock exchanges, Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), and Chittagong Stock 
Exchange (CSE). In Bangladesh, dual listing on both exchanges is allowed and most 
companies listed on the DSE are also listed on the CSE. The DSE is the oldest share market 
of Bangladesh and considered to be the main stock exchange. The DSE is, according to 
Standard and Poor’s Emerging Stock Markets Fact Book 2000, one of the frontier emerging 
markets of South Asia (Islam & Khaled, 2005). 
 
The Chittagong Stock Exchange Ltd. (CSE) began its journey on 10th October 1995. The 
CSE also permits access for public limited companies to be listed on the exchange, just like 
the DSE, by providing the required facilities for the traders, shortly afterwards the CSE has 
introduced a world class automated trading system with satellite based network and enhanced 
connectivity with the DSE and abroad (Choudhry & Taufiq, 1996). To benefit users and 
investors, the CSE has developed internet trading services to trade its listed securities from 
anywhere in the world. The CSE competes with the DSE to provide better service by 
facilitating the listed companies to liquidate their securities with fair and transparent pricing 
(Choudhry &Taufiq, 1996).  
Both stock exchanges are self-regulated with the objective to develop a strong platform for 
investors to raising capital. Moreover they attract non-resident Bangladeshis to invest in the 
Bangladesh stock market to contribute to building a strong economy for this country. From 
Table-3-2 the comparative listings statistics of Dhaka and Chittagong stock exchanges will be 
observed. The information is collected from the monthly review issued by both the stock 
exchanges in year 2010. 
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Table 3-2 Listings statistics of the Dhaka Stock Exchange and Chittagong Stock 
Exchange (as at 31 December- 2010) 
Items Dhaka Stock Exchange Chittagong Stock Exchange 
Total Number of Listed 
Securities 
445  
 
220 
Total Number of 
Companies  
 
218  
 
200 
Total Number of Mutual 
Funds  
 
31  
 
19 
Total Number of 
Debentures  
 
8  
 
1 
Total Number of 
Treasury Bonds  
 
186  
 
- 
Total Number of 
Corporate Bonds  
 
2  
 
- 
Source: DSE and CSE Monthly Review(2010) 
 
 
3.3 The financial setting of Bangladesh 
The financial system of a country consists of a set of organized financial institutions (Allen, 
& Gale, 2001). The main actors in a financial system include a set of markets, individuals and 
institutions (Sullivan et al., 2003). These actors participate in the financial system by 
performing their own specific role, for instance some actors control funds from lenders to 
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borrowers. Some actors create liquidity and money, some provide other financial services. 
According to Allen and Gale (2001, p.520) financial systems are essential: 
 
 “Financial systems are crucial to the allocation of resources in a modern economy. They 
channel household savings to the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among 
firms; they allow inter temporal smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures 
by firms; and they enable households and firms to share risks. These functions are common to 
the financial systems of most developed economies. Yet the form of these financial systems 
varies widely”. 
 
Through this, it is clear that the patterns of financial systems vary, especially between 
developed and developing economies. Further Fry (1995) and Stigliz (1993) argued that the 
financial markets in developing countries are different from those of developed countries in 
terms of their market characteristics and operations, adding that in general most of the 
developing countries have underdeveloped, fragile, unstable, inefficient, fragmented and 
inefficient financial systems. Such is the case for Bangladesh. 
 
In general the financial system of Bangladesh includes the Bangladesh Bank (which is the 
central bank), scheduled banks, non-bank financial institutions, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs), insurance companies, co-operative banks, credit rating agencies and stock exchanges. 
The whole financial system of Bangladesh therefore is comprised of three broad sectors. 
Figure 3-2 will present the financial system of Bangladesh more clearly. 
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Figure 3-2 the financial system of Bangladesh  
Financial System of Bangladesh 
 
Formal Sector Semiformal Sector Informal Sector 
 
 Financial market                     Regulators and Institutions 
 
Money Market 
(Banks, NBFIs, Primary 
Dealers) 
 
 
Foreign Exchange Market  
(Authorized Dealers) 
   
Insurance Development & 
Regulatory Authority  
(Insurance Authority) 
 
Securities & Exchange 
Commission  
(Regulator of Capital Market 
Intermediaries ) 
 
  
 
 
Source - www.Bangladesh bank.com 
 
1. House Building Financial Corporation (HBFC) 
2. Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) 
3. Samabay Bank 
4. Grameen Bank 
 
 
*Banks 
47 Scheduled & 4 Non-
Scheduled Banks 
*NBFIs 
31 NBFIs 
 
Bangladesh Bank 
(Central Bank) 
Capital Market  
(Investment Banks, Stock Exchanges, 
Credit Rating Companies etc.) 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority  
(MFI Authority) 
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 From figure-3-2 it is observed that the formal sector includes all regulated institutions such 
as banks, non-bank financial institutions (FIs), insurance companies, capital market 
intermediaries such as brokerage houses and merchant banks. The semiformal sector includes 
those institutions which are regulated in a different way but do not fall under the jurisdiction 
of the central bank. The insurance authorities and the development and regulatory authorities 
for insurance are some of those in the semiformal sector. In the informal sector, all the 
specialized financial institutions such as the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC), 
Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), Samabay Bank, and Grameen Bank are 
members.  However among the discussed three sectors, the formal sector which is comprised 
of bank, insurance and leasing companies has more significant influence on the overall 
financial system of Bangladesh than any other sectors. The financial system of Bangladesh is 
mainly bank dependent. Though in the recent years, a number of non-banking financial 
institutions (leasing and merchant banks) have been established, the banking sector still 
captures the lion’s share of the financial market of Bangladesh. Table 3-3 provides 
information about the ownership of the Bangladeshi banking sector, giving an indication of 
the influence of the Bangladeshi banking sector over its whole financial system.  It is also 
clear that for several banks the directors have a significant proportion of ownership and 
therefore control. 
Table 3-3 Ownership structure of Bangladeshi banks (in percentages) 
Serial 
No. 
Name of Bank Directors Public Government  Foreign Institutions 
1 AB Bank Ltd.  
 
13.97%  66.8%  0.57%  0%  18.66%  
2 National Bank 
Ltd.  
29.31%  58.6%  0  2.08%  10.01%  
3 The City Bank 
Ltd. 
12.5%  61.35%  0  0  26.15%  
4 IFIC Bank Ltd.  
 
8.62%  58.63%  32.75%  0  0  
5 UCB Bank 
Ltd.  
43.35%  50.42%  6.23%  0  0  
6 Pubali Bank  11.3%  64.15%  0%  0%  24.55%  
7 Uttara Bank  0%  95.77%  0%  0%  4.23%  
8 Eastern Bank  3.43%  85.83%  0%  0  10.74%  
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9 National 
Credit and 
Commerce 
Bank Ltd.  
46.39%  32.09%  0%  0.3%  21.22%  
10 Prime Bank 
Ltd.  
43.13%  35.3%  0%  6.62%  14.95%  
11 Southeast 
Bank Ltd.  
28.88%  47.35%  0%  0%  23.78%  
12 Dhaka Bank 
Ltd.  
56%  22.67%  0  0.24%  21.09%  
13 Dutch Bangla 
Bank Ltd.  
61.32%  13.01%  0  25.67%  0  
14 Mercantile 
Bank Ltd.  
53.68  38.40%  0  0  7.92%  
15 Standard 
Bank Ltd.  
45.2%  34.2%  0  0  20.6%  
16 One Bank Ltd.  51.67%  48.33%  0  0  0  
17 Mutual Trust 
Bank Ltd  
41.59%  27.55%  0  0  30.86%  
18 Premier Bank 
Ltd.  
49%  51%  0  0  0  
19 Bank Asia Ltd.  0  73.22%  0  0  26.78%  
20 Trust Bank 
Ltd.  
60.01%  20.88%  0  0  19.11%  
21 Jamuna Bank 
Ltd.  
62.35%  27.11%  0  0  10.54%  
22 BRAC Bank 
Ltd.  
50%  45.93%  0  0  4.07%  
23 Islami Bank 
Bangladesh 
Ltd.  
42.56%  27.66%  0.001%  22.3%  7.48%  
24 ICB Islamic 
Bank Ltd.  
61.48%  12.45%  0  0%  26.07%  
25 Al-Arafah 
Islami Bank 
Ltd.  
49.33%  34.67%  0  0  16%  
26 Social Islami 
Bank Ltd.  
28.19%  53.64%  0  0  18.17%  
27 EXIM Bank 
Ltd.  
44.98%  26.01%  0  3.02%  25.99%  
28 First Security 
Islami Bank 
Ltd.  
51.67%  48.33%  0  0  0  
29 Shahjalal 
Islami  
46.98%  53.02%  0  0  0  
Source - Dhaka Stock Exchange (as at 31st Dec, 2010) 
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According to Mishkin, (2004, p.29-31) as a financial institution banking firm provide 
financial services to their customers in relatively low transaction cost and offer them 
diversified investment opportunities which enhance their investments and savings capacity. 
In Bangladesh banking sector has huge significance on the overall capital market as well as 
corporate economy. Because of the dominance of bank financing in Bangladesh researchers 
paid huge attention to explore more about the existing phenomenon of the size, composition, 
and ownership structure of Bangladeshi bank (Kutubi, 2011). 
In Bangladesh banking industry has huge control on corporate economy. The above table 3-3 
shows a wide range of management, ownership and board structures pattern of Bangladeshi 
private banks. From the table it is observed that the institutional, government and foreign 
investment is significantly low in the private banking whereas most of ownership is captured 
by directors of that particular bank and public. Moreover this ownership patterns are 
changing bank to bank some banks are hugely owned by directors on the other hand some 
banks have significant ownership from public.   
 
3.4 Corporate settings in Bangladesh 
 
The corporate sector of Bangladesh comprises a few large scale state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), a large number of privatised and privately owned firms, and some joint ventures and 
multinational firms. Most private and public firms are dependent on bank financing. 
Financing for commercial purposes is mostly obtained by borrowing, mainly from banks and 
financial institutions, rather than through equity or capital market in Bangladesh. The shares 
of public limited companies in Bangladesh are not widely held. Very few shares are 
controlled by foreign investors and government and financial institutions (Rashid et al., 
2007).According to Hossain (2005, p.4) the economy of Bangladesh is dominated by large 
family owned, state owned and foreign owned companies whereby the economic power of 
the businesses is concentrated with dominant shareholder groups. This is further described by 
(Rashid et al., 2010). 
   “Apart from a few controlling ownerships by foreign investors and government and 
financial institutions, the public limited companies in Bangladesh are in general mainly 
controlled by family members who are founding sponsors and/or directors, leading to a high 
degree of ownership control.”  
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Most of the family members are founding members of the company and sponsors and/or 
directors, leading to a high degree of family ownership control, which sometimes affects 
performance.  
3.4.1 Boards in Bangladesh 
3.4.1.1 Legislation regarding directors in Bangladesh6 
According to the Company Act 1994 of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (2): 
(f) "Director" includes any person occupying the position of director by whatever name 
called; 
Directors 
90. Directors obligatory - (1) every public company and a private company which is a 
subsidiary of a public company shall have at least three directors. 
(2) Every private company other than a private company mentioned in sub-section (1) shall 
have at least two directors; 
(3) Only a natural person may be appointed a director. 
91. Appointment of directors: - (1) notwithstanding anything contained in the articles of a 
company- 
(a) the subscribers of the memorandum shall be deemed to be the directors of the company 
until the first directors are appointed. 
 
(b) the directors of the company shall be elected by the members from among their number in 
general meeting; and 
 
(c) any casual vacancy occurring among the directors may be filled in by the other directors 
but the person appointed shall be a person qualified to be elected a director  
(d) and shall be subject to retirement at the same time as if he had become a director on the 
day on which the director in whose place he is appointed was last appointed a director. 
In Appendix-3 and 4 the code of conduct of SEC regarding Bangladeshi board and the 
Companies Act (Bangladesh) has been discussed accordingly. 
                                                 
6 see Appendices: 
The Companies Act (Bangladesh), 1994 (Act No. 18 of 1994 An Act) 
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3.4.2 Existing board phenomena in Bangladesh 
The Company Act 1994 provides statutes relating to directors and some of their features of 
Bangladesh. However in Bangladesh the directorial boards have some distinctive 
characteristics. Most of the Bangladeshi company board seats are occupied by family 
ownership. As discussed, the company board is generally structured by the representation of 
family shareholdings. Therefore the significant portion of total share value is managed by 
founding family members and a holding company (or cross shareholding) while a minor 
portion of shares are held by institutional investors (Islam & Khaled, 2005). Similarly, most 
of the companies have executive directors, a CEO and a chairman from the controlling 
family. According to Farooque et al. (2007) on average, the top five stockholders hold more 
than 50% of a firm’s outstanding stocks. Imam and Malik (2007) analysed the ownership 
patterns of 219 companies in Bangladesh from 12 different industries listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE). The report observed that on average, 32.33% of the shares are held 
by the top three shareholders. Similarly, a Bangladesh enterprise institute (BEI) survey 
indicates that the boards for 73% of the non-banking companies listed on the DSE are 
dominated by close family members. This practice was considered by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) as one of the causes for the Asian crisis: “…weaknesses in corporate 
governance in these countries appear to owe much to highly concentrated ownership… 
under-developed capital markets and the weak legal and regulatory framework for investor 
protection” (ADB, 2000, p.2). Chowdhury (2010, p.105-106), argued similarly to the ADB: 
“The over-concentration of family ownership control is the surest sign of a non-monotonic 
relation between firm-age and profitability. For instance, the death of a family patriarch 
and/or a falling-out among feuding family members often leads to disintegration within the 
firm management and adversely affects the profitability and viability of the firm.”   
From the above discussion it can be argued that the Bangladeshi corporate network which is 
created by directorial interlocking is not a simple phenomenon, but this research will be 
significant for Bangladeshi corporate governance.  
The basic motivation for this research is thus based on the argument that the interconnections 
among companies through their directors are a mechanism that can affect corporate strategies 
and decisions that, at the macroeconomic level, can increase or decrease overall market 
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efficiency (Santos et al., 2009). Keeping this in mind it is believed that this research offers 
three main contributions: 
i) It is the first attempt of a systematic exploratory research in this field in Bangladesh, 
therefore contributing to the international literature by providing empirical evidence from an 
emerging country; 
 ii) It offers evidence on the determinants of board interlocking, showing which corporate 
characteristics tend to influence the adoption of this practice to a greater or lesser extent; and,  
 iii)  Evidence will be provided for alternatives to board interlocking, so that this practice may 
have a positive influence on firm value.  
This research is particularly important, since it offers empirical support for regulations or 
recommendations on this subject in codes of best practices for corporate governance of 
Bangladesh. This study therefore will attempt to explore the corporate network of Bangladesh 
and also attempt to focus on the attributes of the network to fill the gaps in knowledge of 
corporate networks of Bangladesh. After analysing all the relevant factors, this researcher 
proposes the following research question for this study: 
“What are the characteristics of the Bangladeshi corporate network”?  
It is expected that through this research question it would be possible to explore the research 
objective, which is to find out the corporate network of Bangladesh and determine the 
characteristics of that network, thus contributing new knowledge to the interlocking board 
literature both nationally and internationally.  
 
3.5 Corporate board patterns in Bangladesh 
 As mentioned above, the typical company board in Bangladesh is generally dominated by 
the representation of family shareholdings, with most of the companies having executive 
directors, a CEO and a chairman from the controlling family. According to Farooque et al., 
(2007) on average, the top five stockholders hold more than 50% of a firm’s outstanding 
stocks. This practice was considered by the ADB to lead to weak corporate governance, and 
thus one factor causing the Asian economic crisis of 2007. According to their report (ADB, 
2000, p.2) “…weaknesses in corporate governance in these countries appear to owe much too 
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highly to concentrated ownership…underdeveloped capital markets and the weak legal and 
regulatory framework for investor protection”.  
As mentioned earlier, the extent of this concentration of ownership is indicated by a study by 
Imam and Malik (2007) that analysed the ownership patterns of 219 Bangladeshi companies 
from 12 different industries listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. The report observed that on 
average, 32.33% of the shares were held by the top three shareholders. Similarly, the BEI 
indicated that the boards for 73 per cent of the non-banking companies listed on the DSE are 
dominated by close family members (Rashid et al., 2010). The institutional, corporate and 
individual block holders in Bangladesh usually join the board as non-executive directors. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that this type of organizational structure creates 
opportunities for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from other shareholders. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) further argued that this situation creates potential agency conflict 
between large owners and other shareholders and this conflict is not driven by the interests 
typical of a relationship between professional managers and shareholders. 
Non-family members have been elected to the boards as external directors most often due to 
loan conditionality from the banks or equity participation (Rashid et al., 2010). Some of the 
external directors have technical or specialized knowledge about the business. Even so, the 
majority of these external director have very little opportunity to exercise their strategic 
knowledge in the decision making process of a board. These nominated external directors 
only perform some routine work for the company, for example attending meetings and 
providing advice which ultimately may prove worthless (Uddin &Choudhury, 2008).  
There is no mandatory provision in Bangladesh regarding the percentages of directors on a 
company board that who should be executive and non-executive. Most of the local companies 
appoint independent directors of their own choice, which means persons who are either a 
friend or someone who may act as per the instruction of the sponsors get more priority than 
any other skilled and experienced person (Islam & Khaled, 2005). The influence of 
institutional investors is not significant in the public limited companies of Bangladesh as 
commonly they do not have a sufficient stake in the company. Therefore the companies are 
mostly controlled, managed and operated by families. 
 
Most of the corporate boards of Bangladesh are relatively large (Belal et al., 2007). Kutubi 
(2011), by looking at Bangladeshi banks, argued that a board with more directors may 
perform better than a smaller board. The research also found a positive relationship between 
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the proportion of independent directors and performance. However Belal et al. (2007) argued 
that the board size is not as important as the quality of board members to measure a board’s 
performance, especially if the large board size is not utilized productively and properly. 
According to Chowdhury, (2004, p.136), the interests of minority shareholders are highly 
ignored and suppressed on most of the Bangladeshi company boards. Furthermore the 
average board member does not possess a sufficient level of education or superior business 
knowledge (Islam & Khaled, 2005). It is a common idea that educated and skilled board 
members have more potential to run a business more successfully than an unskilled or 
nonprofessional family member. However, in Bangladesh, companies still depend on family 
knowledge rather than taking independent professional advice.  
Source Dhaka stock exchange, 2010. 
From the above table 3-4 the ownership patterns of the top 20 Bangladeshi companies is 
observed in terms of market capitalization in 2010. From this table it is evident that the 
directors’ ownership is more prominent than the government’s. Institutional ownership and 
public participation are also not significant. The reasons for this situation have already been 
discussed in the previous section of this chapter.  Though this analysis is based on the top 20 
companies, it is indicative of the more generalised situation regarding the existing company 
ownership pattern of Bangladesh. 
 
Table 3-4 The ownership patterns of the top twenty Bangladeshi companies 
Company name 
Mkt capital 
 (mil.tk.) Directors Govt. Institution  Foreign  
General  
Public 
GP 331904 90% 0 4.70% 0.26%  5.04% 
ICB 99835 0 27% 70.11% 0  2.89% 
TITASGAS 88152 0 75% 0 0  25% 
NBL 84536 30.21% 0 10.09% 1.01%  58.69% 
NHFIL 62886 90.31% 0 0.00% 0  9.69% 
ISLAMIBANK 59317 42.59% 0 8.81% 22.09%  26.51% 
PBL 53363 10.98% 0 20.83% 0  68.19% 
ABBANK 50734 13.90% 0.57% 48.65% 0.02%  36.86% 
BEXIMCO 46974 13.25% 0 0.00% 10.30%  76.45% 
DUTCHBANGL 45855 86.99% 0 4.31% 0.00%  8.70% 
BATBC 42990 65.91% 0.64% 21.59% 0.00%  11.86% 
PRIMEFIN 42048 64.44% 0 12.06% 0.00%  19.50% 
SOUTHEASTB 41597 27.56% 0 53.47% 0.00%  18.97% 
RAKCERAMIC 39485 79.92% 0 6.97% 0.00%  13.11% 
POWERGRID 37347 0.00% 76.25% 18.95% 0.00%  4.80% 
EBL 37795 6.73% 0 9.82% 0.00%  83.45% 
DESCO 36692 0.00% 75% 17.15% 0.60%  7.25% 
BSRM 35379 51.04% 0 34.13% 1.52%  12.95% 
IFIC 30972 8.37% 32.75% 0.00% 0.00%  58.88% 
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3.6 Stock exchange listing patterns of Bangladeshi companies 
A major portion of business organizations in Bangladesh are not listed on stock exchanges. 
According to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) review (2006), out of more than 
2,500 public limited companies in Bangladesh, only 253 companies as of September 2006 are 
listed on stock exchanges. This includes multinational companies (MNCs), state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and banks. Whereas the recent data shows Bangladesh has 58,000 limited 
companies, among those only 504 companies are listed with the stock exchanges (Islam & 
Khaled, 2005). One reason behind these low numbers can be the ineffective and unreliable 
capital market. Because of this insecurity, the capital market is not considered as a preferred 
source of funds for corporations. Stakeholders are more comfortable depositing their money 
in fixed term accounts, even for a small interest gain.  Survey results showed that the stock 
market of Bangladesh has a lower percentage of investment which is on average 17% share 
of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE Review, 2010). Similarly, the stock market has also failed to 
attract the attention of institutional investors, who are reluctant because of the unpredictable 
nature of the share market. Moreover, the institutional shareholders do not have any 
associations and forums to make strong guts to improve the situation, preferring government 
prize bonds or defence bonds (Islam & Khaled, 2005).  
3.7 Challenges of the corporate sector of Bangladesh 
 As discussed earlier, the corporate sector of Bangladesh suffers from a lack of confidence in 
it on the part of investors. To bring an improvement, the main authority should be the 
government but for some unknown reasons that has still not happened in Bangladesh. 
Therefore investors are not confident to invest significantly in shares and securities in the 
corporate sector. It is fair to say that there is huge lack of faith in the business community and 
the stock market (Chowdhury, 2004).  
This claim is supported by evidence from Imam and Malik (2007), who argued that in 
Bangladesh the primary stakeholders in corporate governance are creditors, who have very 
low participation in the share market and consequently very little control to serve and develop 
the corporate governance standards. Investment from mutual funds and pension funds are 
also not particularly significant in contributing to develop the stock market structure in 
Bangladesh (Islam et al., 2008). The Bangladeshi stock market may seem to contribute to the 
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country’s economic growth because of its liquidity. However, this is not the case, as the 
financial institutions are the driving forces for the economic growth of the country 
(Chowdhury, 2004).To solve some of these problems some recent initiatives have been taken 
by the corporate regulatory authority like the Bangladesh Bank (The central bank of 
Bangladesh).In the later section of this chapter discussion provides about the authoritative 
initiatives regarding this.  
Table 3-5 shows a comparative macro economic data for Bangladesh and its neighbours in 
South Asia, with economic, financial and capital market indicators. The table indicates the 
economic performance of Bangladesh, which is far less in terms of national income per capita 
than those of its neighbouring nations.  
Table 3-5 Comparative economic, financial and capital market indicators as of 
December 2010-2011 
Item Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri 
Lanka 
Nepal 
Population (million)  158 1210 187 20 29 
GDP per capita (US $)  
 
1,697 3,703 
 
2,791 
 
5,609 
 
1,328 
 
Number of stock 
exchanges  
 
2 23 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Market capitalisation 
(% GDP)  
 
46.96 93.46 
 
21.84 
 
40.21 
 
30.8 
 
Number of companies 
listed  
504 4,968 
 
830 
 
278 
 
317 
Number of chartered 
accountants  
1,013 
 
161,516 5,078 4,200 7,600 
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Number of commercial 
Bank 
44 88 40 26 31 
Sources: ADB quarterly economic update, September, 2011, The World Bank indicator of capital markets, 
2010, International Monetary Fund Report, 2011,Economic Survey India, 2010, Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Sri Lanka, South Asian Federation of Accountants website, Wikipedia list of population and 
bank  ,Websites for trading economics, market-capitalization-of-listed-companies , South Asian Federation of 
Exchanges websites for number of companies listed data for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka ,Nepal 
are for Dhaka Stock Exchange, Mumbai Stock Exchange, Karachi Stock Exchange and Colombo Stock 
Exchange, Nepal Stock Exchange.  
3.8 Corporate governance policies and practices in Bangladesh  
Corporate governance, as a set of principles, is designed to ensure accountability and 
responsibility and is important for every part of an organization. Figure 3-3 presents a 
conceptual framework of the political economy and poor corporate governance policy of 
Bangladesh. In Appendix-5 the corporate governance checklist for companies of Bangladesh 
has been presented. In that checklist the corporate governance compliance of financial and 
nonfinancial companies has separately outlined. 
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Figure 3-3 Conceptual framework of the political economy and corporate governance 
policy of Bangladesh  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Source: Haque & Arun (2011, p.172)  
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and legal institutions, socio cultural, economic and political environments which constitute 
the corporate governance regime in Bangladesh”. These factors are common for the 
development of corporate governance of all countries. Figure 3-3 presents a conceptual 
framework of the political economy and poor corporate governance policy of Bangladesh. 
This model shows how and why good governance elements (which include the regulatory 
framework, internal controls, auditing, executive remuneration, control structures, board 
structures, audit committees, stakeholder engagement and conflict resolution) are not 
properly functioning in the Bangladeshi corporate and legal setting and culture. This model 
reflects a similar observation presented by the World Bank (2009) regarding the poor 
corporate governance of developing countries. The World Bank (1998, p.67-68) argued: 
“Corporate governance (in East Asian countries) is characterized by ineffective boards of 
directors, weak internal control, unreliable financial reports, lack of adequate disclosure and 
tax enforcement to ensure compliance and poor audits. These problems are evidenced by 
unreported losses and understated liabilities.”  
 
3.8.1 An effective corporate governance model in Bangladesh 
The corporate governance system of Bangladesh has been perceived as a hybrid of insider 
dominated and market based systems (Farooque et al., 2007). Some Bangladeshi corporations 
exercise the market or compliance based model of the U.S. and the U.K. and others exercise 
the insider dominated bank based model of Germany and Japan. Due to these comparisons 
with some developed countries’ corporate governance systems, Bangladesh’s system has 
been considered to be a hybrid. Rashid et al., (2007) argues that the Anglo–American model 
is not appropriate for Bangladesh as laws and rules are not effectively exercisable due to a 
weak judiciary system. For instance there are currently 64 district courts corresponding to 64 
districts in Bangladesh, which are quite insufficient for the 150 million people of the country 
(Mintoo, 2004).Therefore there is an abnormal delay in litigation in Bangladesh, with 
thousands of cases pending in the Supreme Court and no available data for the number of 
cases pending in the district courts throughout Bangladesh. According to Mintoo (2004), 
these judicial delays will span generations “it is estimated that the number of cases awaiting 
trial or adjudication will take over 100 years to clear up unless something extraordinary is 
done immediately” (Mintoo, 2004, p.136). It is a typical practice for some emerging 
economies to adopt the Anglo-Saxon (shareholder) model of corporate governance 
(Mukherjee &Reed, 2002), for example in India, South Africa and South Korea, despite the 
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fact that such a model is based on assumptions of efficient markets and equity financing.  
However Siddiqui (2010) argued that a developing country should adopt a model which 
would be encouraged more by reasons of efficiency rather than because it is regarded as 
legitimate by the donor agency. He argued that in Bangladesh the corporate and economic 
environment is not suitable to adopt the Anglo-American shareholder model of corporate 
governance rather the stakeholder model could contribute on better corporate success.  
3.8.2 The legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance practices of 
Bangladesh 
Researchers like Arun & Turner (2004); La Porta et al., (1998); Mallin (2010); Rossouw, 
(2005) have argued that a country’s legal system has a strong impact on its corporate 
governance practices. This is supported by researchers in Bangladesh as well by Belal (2001); 
Belal &Owen (2007); Joy (2005) and Khan et al., (2009). 
As discussed earlier, Bangladesh being a former British colony most of the existing laws and 
regulations are inherited from British common law. Though the legal system is inherited from 
British laws there are some differences because of the difference of socio cultural values and 
religious guidelines (Belal& Owen, 2007). The local companies of Bangladesh are governed 
by the Company Act 1994, which is based on the 1908 U.K. Companies Act. All domestic 
companies of Bangladesh are incorporated under this act, which governs the interest of 
stakeholders, shareholders and the company. The act also guides the country’s audit system, 
transparency, disclosure procedure and the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to companies 
(Joy, 2005). An outline of this and other relevant laws is provided below. 
The Companies Act 1994:  This is the law which governs incorporated business 
organizations in Bangladesh, in terms of the formation, functioning and termination of 
companies. It also provides guidelines about the relationship of shareholders to a company, 
periodic disclosure and audit requirements. The functions of the Registrar of Joint Stock 
Companies (RJSC) and the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to companies are also 
delineated under this law.   
Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969: This ordinance was set up for issuance of 
securities and capital market regulation in Bangladesh. 
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Bangladesh Bank Order 1972: This order sets up the central bank (Bangladesh Bank), 
which regulates the banking activities of bank companies. 
 Bank Companies Act 1991: The provisions of this act are an addition to the provisions of 
the Companies Act 1994, which supports it.  
 
 Financial Institutions Act 1993: This provides regulations for non-banking financial 
institutions and is mainly governed by the Bangladesh Bank (BB). 
 
Figure 3-4 highlights the corporate governance actors of Bangladesh. 
 
Figure 3-4 the corporate governance actors of Bangladesh 
 
 
 
Source: Uddin & Choudhury, (2008, p. 1033). 
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 Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993:  This regulation provides guidelines and 
required policies and principles to support and act as a guardian of stock exchanges. 
According to Sobhan &Werner (2003, p. 29), the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
the following responsibilities and charter:  
“the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) … (has) broad licensing and regulatory 
powers over capital market stakeholders and intermediaries such as stock exchanges, brokers 
and dealers, merchant banks and portfolio managers, while the issue of securities is regulated 
by the provisions of the Securities and Exchange ordinance (SEO). The SEO provides the 
power to the SEC to make the issuance of securities subject to any condition as it may think 
fit to impose, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1994 or any other 
law in force, which is a very wide-ranging power. Much of the powers of the SEC under 
these laws are aimed at proper disclosure to investors, which is at the heart of good corporate 
governance.” 
 
 Bankruptcy Act 1997: This law is for taking care of companies and shareholders’ interests 
at the time of the winding up provisions of the Companies Act.  
 
Income Tax Ordinance 1984: This ordinance contains provisions for disclosure, audit and 
penalties for contravention of fiscal and revenue issues. 
 
Furthermore there are several subordinate legislative instruments such as orders, rules, 
regulations and circulars issued by the government, Bangladesh Bank, the SEC, the National 
Board of Revenue and other agencies of the government, stock exchanges, chambers of 
commerce and industry and other self-regulatory agencies for good corporate governance. 
There are two professional accounting institutions in Bangladesh: the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB)7 and the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants 
                                                 
7 The Securities and Exchange Rules (1987) require that companies’ financial statements should be audited by a 
Chartered Accountant (CA). ICAB is the professional accountancy body in Bangladesh which certifies CAs and 
regulates the accountancy profession; it also oversees professional ethics and codes of conduct for its members; 
provides specialized training and professional expertise; and fosters acceptance of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) by adopting these as the Bangladesh Accounting 
Standards (BAS) and Bangladesh Standards for Auditing (BSA) respectively (The World Bank, 2009).  
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of Bangladesh (ICMAB)8 .The main task of these two institutions is to issue accounting 
standards for companies’ voluntary practice for ensure better corporate governance 
(Chowdhury &Chowdhury, 1995).  
 
However, in reality many companies in Bangladesh are reluctant to maintain the mandatory 
rules, thus it can be easily imagined what happens for the voluntary ones. For instance many 
companies are reluctant to organize their annual general meetings (AGMs)9 in a timely way, 
which is a basic statutory requirement. This is indicative of the level of corporate governance 
in Bangladesh. In addition to that most of the AGMs’ basic purposes and aims are unclear to 
the general stakeholders. According to the BEI (2003) Report many AGMs are not generally 
used for the any in depth discussion or inspection of financial performance: 
 
“The perception of AGMs amongst the non-banking listed companies surveyed seems to be a 
combination of a necessary evil and a statutory requirement. Generally, shareholder demands 
concentrate either on higher dividends or trivial concerns like better quality food and gifts at 
the AGM and transportation allowances. The main incentive for attendance is the meal served 
at an attractive hotel and, surprisingly, trading activity increases prior to AGMs to reflect that 
interest. There are, in reality, a very limited number of people going to AGMs who actually 
understand the financial statements being presented and, consequently, have little to 
contribute in terms of relevant inputs.” (BEI, 2003, p. 33) 
As argued earlier, in Bangladesh there is no recognized code for corporate governance 
practices. The Companies Act 1994 of Bangladesh does not provide for any formal structure 
of corporate governance. Therefore Bangladesh is still struggling to establish an ‘official’ 
code of corporate governance (Arif et al., 2012). The Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Bangladesh (SEC) has issued a brief corporate governance order which is only applicable 
for the publicly listed firms in Bangladesh (SEC, 2006). Most of the Bangladeshi companies 
therefore do not have any mandatory or ‘best practice’ guidelines to maintain. Moreover the 
adoption of the SEC order is not mandatory; rather, it is applicable on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis, which may bring the desired outcome (Arif et al., 2012).    
                                                 
8 The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB) also regulates the accounting 
procedures of companies and is an autonomous professional body under the Ministry of Commerce.  
  
9 Company Act 1994, Part (iv) 82. Penalty for default in complying with section 81--If default is made in 
holding a meeting of the company in accordance with sub- section (1) of section 81, or in complying with any 
directions of the Court under sub-section (2) thereof, the company and every officer of the company who is in 
default, shall be punishable with a fine which may extend to ten thousand taka and in case of a continuing 
default, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred fifty taka for every day after the first day during 
which such default continues 
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The SEC issues orders for corporate governance of listed companies of Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, issues circulars for corporate governance 
of banking companies. The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute has developed recommendations 
and suggested codes and conduct for good corporate governance practices (BEI, 2004). 
However the basic corporate governance regulations of Bangladesh are still guided by the 
Companies Act 1994 (for corporations), the Banking Companies Act 1991 (for banking 
institutions), the Insurance Act 1938 (for insurance companies), the Income Tax 
Ordinance1984 (for all companies and public enterprises), the Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance 1969, and the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 (for all public limited 
companies), together with various orders creating the public sector corporations and other 
governmental bodies (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008).  
3.9 Conclusions  
This chapter explained the corporate governance situation of Bangladesh in some detail. The 
chapter began with a historical, political, economic and social background. This was followed 
by an outline of some relevant economic issues, followed by a rigorous discussion of the 
corporate governance practices and problems of the country. The economic and financial 
backgrounds of the country have also been presented in this chapter with some comparative 
analysis with other countries in the region. Finally some recommendations have been 
suggested to develop Bangladesh’s corporate governance status. As mentioned before, this is 
a crucial chapter for the whole study, providing the opportunity for academics and 
practitioners to gain a more in-depth understanding regarding the corporate setting of 
Bangladesh.  
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Chapter 4 Research design and method 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the research approach and steps taken to explore the corporate network 
attributes of Bangladesh are described. Firstly the research philosophy and approach chosen 
are discussed and justified (Section 4.2). After this the research design and method (Section 
4.3) are presented, including the constructs and measures used to undertake the research, and 
loading the data matrix followed by a description of the study period, units of analysis and 
sampling approach are also discussed. The data source is outlined, the data collection method 
the data analysis are also outlined. Finally conclusions presented. 
As this research explores the corporate network attributes of Bangladesh, social network 
analysis (SNA) is used as a key technique to operationalise the network constructs for the 
dependent variables which has been discussed in section 4.3.5. SNA is used to focus on the 
ties among companies through directors who are sitting the board of different companies.  
According to social network analysis, interpersonal ties are of significant importance (De 
Nooy et al., 2005) because they transmit behaviour, attitudes, information and resources. 
Firstly a background to SNA, its development and network measures is provided. 
Finally argument will be provided regarding data arrangement and the loading of the data in 
section 4.3.7 (further discussion and analysis will be presented on chapter 5 and in Appendix-
1). 
4.2 Justification of research paradigm and methodology 
4.2.1 Different research philosophies 
Research refers to a scientific and systematic search for knowledge by investigating relevant 
information on a specific topic (Kothari, 1990). Research is an art of scientific investigation 
(Kothari, 2006). Research paradigms and approaches have developed to a point where 
investigators or inquirers have many choices in them to search knowledge (Cresswell, 2009).  
To search for knowledge, researchers must adopt a research philosophy or approach to build 
new knowledge or an epistemology (Trochim, 2001). According to Kothari, (1990, p.8) 
selection of an appropriate research approach is a way to systematically solve the research 
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problem. It is necessary for the researcher to understand the philosophical paradigms of 
different research methods in order to choose the most appropriate research methods (Smith 
et al., 2006). Research paradigms are considered as a fundamental orientation to theory and 
research (Kothari, 1990).  There are three main research paradigms: these are positivism, 
interpretivism, and realism.  
The concept of Positivism is involved with the relevance of the methods to the study of social 
reality (Cavana et al., 2001). In this research researchers assume that there is a set of 
universal reality which could be discovered. A positivist approach has the tendency to ignore 
the subjective practice of the unexpected, meaning it only studies the objective features of an 
act (Lather, 2006). Most positivist researchers start with some idea of social reality and 
explore law-like generalizations similar to those produced from the physical and natural 
scientists (Saunders et al., 2003).  Thus positivism is always connected with the position 
which validates the significance of following the natural sciences.   
According to Cavana et al. (2001, p.8) the conclusions of positive approach research are 
based on empirical evidence which is capable of replication. He argues that through positive 
approach other researchers should be able to perform the research in the same way and 
conclude with equivalent research outcomes. Moreover Cavana et al.(2001) signify the 
careful and disciplined steps in assembling and analysing  research data to make sure the 
reliability, consistency and replicability of the outcomes. Positive research uses deductive 
interpretation which begins with a theoretical position and moving towards solid empirical 
evidence (Cavana et al, 2001, p.8). However there are some criticisms of positive approach. 
Some researchers argued that positive research is superficial as it attempts to reduce all 
aspects of human endeavour to numbers. Some critics of positivism argue about its lack of 
observe for the subjective position of individuals. According to them positivism observes 
human behaviour as passive, controlled and determined by external environment (Cohen et 
al., 2000). 
There are some empirical studies where positivist researchers often use quantitative methods 
to analyse financial data .These financial data includes ratios, profit margins, earning per 
share, return on assets, Tobin’s’ Q, return on equity etc to determine corporate financial 
performances (Smith, 2009, p.63). In corporate governance research various quantitative 
measures have been used to understand board contacts, board composition, board size and 
attributes. For this particular governance study thus positive research paradigm will be used 
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with the help of quantitative data analysis method to capture the corporate network of 
Bangladesh as a best suitable way of solving the research problem. 
Interpretivism can be referred as the social constructionism and is an alternative view to 
positivism (Smith et al., 2006). An interpretivist approach considers that there is no objective 
reality that can be constructed by human beings who experience a phenomenon of interest 
(Smith, 2009, p.63). Interpretivism argues that there can be multiple versions of reality 
constructed by human beings who experience a phenomenon of interest (Cavana et al., 2001). 
According to this social philosophical approach, researchers give importance to their own 
beliefs and values to give adequate justification for a research problem (Smith et al., 2006). In 
this approach, researchers focus on highlighting the real facts and figures according to the 
research problem. 2001). Interpretive approach also allows the researcher to discover the 
socially constructed meaning of society (Smith et al., 2006). Interpretivist researchers interact 
with the subjects to understand meaningful social activities rather the external random 
behaviour of people (Newman, 1999).  While the greater part of research into board interlinks 
has been undertaken via a positivist method, currently some researchers have used an 
interpretivist approach to focus on board dynamism (Sonnenfeld, 2004).   
  
Realism is another research paradigm applied by researchers that mainly concentrate on the 
reality and beliefs that exist in a particular environment (Scott, 2005). One definition of 
realism has been provided by Phillips (1987, p.205): 
“The view that entities exist independently of being perceived or independently of our 
theories about them”. 
Schwandt (1997, p.133) further argued that 
“scientific realism is the view that theories refer to real features of the world. ‘Reality’ here 
refers to whatever it is in the universe that causes the phenomenon I perceive with our 
senses”.  
This research approach is mainly discussed with reference to two main views: direct realism 
and critical realism (Scott, 2005). According to direct realism an individual feels, sees, and 
hears phenomena. On the other hand, critical realism highlights the attitude that one a mind 
that can only acquire knowledge of the external world by critical reflection on awareness and 
its world (Scott, 2005). 
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Positivism is concerned with a single and material reality and interpretivism concerned with 
multiple realities, realism is dealt with multiple perceptions about a single reality (Healy and 
Perry, 2000).Realist researchers observe our knowledge as a result of social conditions 
(Dobson, 2002). However there are ongoing philosophical debates over realism. It has been 
argued that realism runs counter to the scientific requirement of replicability: “scientific 
realism is a majority position whose advocates are so divided as to appear a minority” 
(Leplin, 1984, p.1).  
Nevertheless, some alternative positions argue there is a real world with which I interact 
(Scott, 2005). Realism takes issue with the belief that reality itself is a product of the 
knowledge derivation process (Dobson, 2002).  Fundamentally, it has been complicated for 
researchers to adopt realism as a research approach for corporate governance and most 
importantly for investigation of the BoD phenomenon. Because the main objective of realist 
researchers are to observe facts as a result of social conditions one reason why that approach 
might not suitable is the confidentiality of board meetings, with restrictions on outsiders’ 
access making research complex to perform.  
4.2.2 Approach to this research 
 
For this particular research a positivist research approach has been adopted. As discussed, the 
concept of positivism is directly associated with the idea of the tendency to ignore the 
subjective practice of the unexpected, meaning it only studies the objective features of an act, 
thus it supports objectivism (Lather, 2006).  Moreover, fundamentally, there are causal and 
measurable realities that manage corporate governance and corporate behaviour. In a 
positivist approach, causes determine effects, and researchers aim to directly observe, 
quantify and objectively measure and predict relationships between variables (Hammersley et 
al., 2009). As this research is concerned with the BoD’s network and exploration of the 
network’s attributes based on different corporate governance elements, my basic focus would 
be measuring the interrelationships that might be presented. Therefore attention would be 
given to measuring the number of ties created by board interlocking, which in itself creates 
corporate network. Moreover for further analysis network betweeness and closeness features 
will also be explored. For the research purpose, most of the board and company membership 
information will be collected from published annual reports, which are considered as 
replicable data sources. As positivist research is based on empirical evidence which is 
capable of replication, this research thus could be characterized as having a positivist 
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research, as objective and replicable data sources were used.  Furthermore, the Bangladeshi 
corporate network will be mapped, measured and analysed objectively and reliably by using 
SNA techniques. Correspondingly, to explore the network attributions, corporate governance 
variables and performance measurement tools will be used, which will also be collected from 
publicly available data sources. In addition to understand the assumptions of research, 
researchers need to contrast them in several dimensions (Guba &Lincoln, 1990) which is also 
the author’s motivation and aim in this research. This research is aligned with a positivist 
approach as the BoDs’ networks measures and their attributes data are specific quantitative 
data (Cavana et al., 2001) which can be best analysed and explored by adopting the positivist 
paradigm.  
In conclusion a positivist paradigm will be applied to perform this research as it will 
appropriately assist me to secure my research task, identify the steps and ensure consistency 
(Cavana et al., 2001).  
 
4.3 Research design and method 
4.3.1 Overview 
In this section all the research steps that have been undertaken to perform this research are 
discussed. The rationale of variables selection, data and sample selection and research period 
selection are discussed. Next, all the constructs and the data collection procedure are 
discussed. The details of the software packages used will also be highlighted. Uploading of 
data matrix is also discussed in this chapter.  
 
Figure 4-1 shows the key steps that have been used in this research. SNA has been used to 
determine the network for this study. For the performance measurement, both accounting 
based and market based measures have been used, as they are available from public sources.  
Moreover an empirical test was performed to explore the relationship between the size of 
firm’s network of BoDs and the firm’s performance to get in depth understandings about the 
network.  Some statistical techniques were used to analyse the network and performance 
attributes. Some other potentially relevant descriptive factors were also documented to 
provide further information as background for the whole analysis.  
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Figure 4-1 Key steps of the research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2   Research steps undertaken for this study 
For this particular research all the required research steps to be performed are considered the 
most appropriate research steps according to Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran (2001). These 
steps include justification of the research purpose, exploration the type of the study and 
researcher’s expected contribution from this research. This research also justifies the applied 
variables which will be used to analyse the research problems. Moreover the background of 
study, time horizon, accurate sampling arrangement and measurement of variables, data 
collection and data analysis technique are discussed. As mentioned earlier, the basic purpose 
of this investigation involves exploring corporate networks therefore it could be generalised 
to the population involved (Cavana et al., 2001). Exploratory research is usually used to find 
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the most likely explanations regarding some observed problems. Moreover this type of 
research is often used for formulating a problem for more precise investigation, discovering 
new ideas, establishing priorities for further research, screening of alternatives, increasing the 
analyst's familiarity with the problem area and also for clarifying concepts (Zikmund, 2003). 
 
To explore the network firstly requires mapping it.  Then to understand the significance of the 
attributes of that network, it is necessary to test how the network impacts firms’ performance. 
In this study SNA techniques will be used for the network mapping purpose and regression 
analysis, the correlation table and descriptive analysis will be used to develop information 
about the attributes. Some common corporate governance variables will be selected based on 
their relevance to the study, based on selections in some of the relevant literature. Finally to 
test the network, attributes variables will be segregated and used as dependent and, 
independent with some control variables. 
  
According to Zikmund (2003) by using a quantitative research method, an existing event or 
phenomenon can be scientifically explored. Similarly, it has been advocated that a 
quantitative method is a reliable and objective way to be able to generalise a finding (Yin, 
2009). A quantitative method ensures the proper selection of relevant variables for the 
research (Zikmund, 2003).  
However there are some limitations of this method, for instance it might analyse data in a less 
detailed way than a qualitative method. In spite of that the quantitative techniques have been 
employed here as they best suit my research purpose. The archival (company annual report) 
data collection method, using annual company reports, was used because it was more 
appropriate for the criterion of goodness of fit to develop relevant models for the research 
(Yin, 2009).  
To determine the corporate network created by interlocking boards and to analyse that in 
relation to relevant variables of corporate governance requires personal level data on the 
directors of the selected company. The study demands the familial relationship of the board 
members who are sitting on same board or interlocking board. For this study that data was 
collected from the top 100 companies’ annual report and also from some publicly available 
websites of Bangladesh.  
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4.3.3 Evaluation criteria 
Evaluation criteria for a research project must ensure the capability and systematic impact of 
that research (Daft & Lewin, 1996). The purpose of the proposed research is consistent with 
the positivist epistemology as it tends to “operationalise theoretical relations…quantifying 
phenomena…allowing for the generalisation of findings” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 36). The objective 
of this research is to explore the existent phenomenon of the interlocking directorates and 
their created network scenario in Bangladesh and also the attributes of the network. As per 
my understandings and knowledge this is the first systematic study which will explore the 
corporate network phenomenon of Bangladesh. Thus this particular study tends to move 
beyond the conceptual framework of traditional inquiry which prevails in Bangladesh 
regarding corporate network. This study takes a positivist epistemological position by setting 
research criteria which include validity, reliability and objectivity (Kopala & Suzuki, 1999). 
From the validity point of view, this study records how things really are in the world (Yin, 2009).  
In archival or secondary data based research, bias and error introduced by the researcher can 
be significant threat to reliability and validity (Carey, 1993). In this study, this issue is 
addressed by giving proper attention to the accuracy of the data collection process. Finally, 
the objectivity criterion is maintained by ensuring the value freeness of research (Easterby et. 
al., 1991). This means the researcher imposes minimal interference when collecting and 
analysing the required data.  
 
4.3.4 Study period and sample selection  
As the research interest is to explore the corporate network of Bangladesh and its attributes 
comparing company performance and family and inter-board relationships of directors, it 
must be a company level analysis. Firstly the research focuses on the network of companies 
which is created through interlocking boards. Then, to explore the features of that network, 
performance and some co relational variable analysis will be done.  
 
The sample of firms used in this study is publicly listed companies of an emerging economy 
of Asia namely Bangladesh.  I studied Bangladeshi firm because Bangladesh has been 
undergoing economic reforms and institutional transitions to a market economy in the past 
forty years. An important product of this strategic transition can be argued to be the 
emergence of interlocking directorates, where a director sits on multiple directorate boards of 
corporations. Moreover the smaller population of publicly listed companies of Bangladesh 
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allowed us to more reliably justify the population of board interlocks in Bangladesh. The top 
100 listed companies of Bangladesh for the year 2010 based on market capitalization was 
selected because a wide-ranging data set for this period was available. Some other reasons 
also motivated to select that sample. One of those reason is most of the top 100 listed 
companies of 2010 have history of stable operations therefore their corporate governance 
structures are more established. Moreover the publicly listed companies are required to report 
such information as the background of their director’s financial and corporate information. 
However to collect the annual reports of most companies required a trip to Bangladesh, 
where most annual reports were collected from the Dhaka Stock Exchange, while some were 
collected from street sellers as they were not available on websites and any other known 
sources. This necessitated the choice of 2010 as the year of study. 
 
In Bangladesh annual reports are considered as the major means of information through 
which company information is communicated and collected. There are no centralised 
information sources available to collect board and company information very quickly, only 
individual annual reports. In most developed countries a reference book called “Who is Who”  
is maintained, from where company information with the name of the directors and some 
relevant personal information is provided, which would have been really helpful for this 
research. But developing countries still lag behind in terms of this issue. In addition, in 
Bangladesh company websites are still not informative in this respect. Therefore the author 
needed to rely on hand collected annual reports to collect data paying close attention and 
consideration as to whether the source of the data was reliable so that there would be little 
chance of error or a lack of integrity of the data.  
 
A content analysis of annual reports has been used for this research. The Osiris data base has 
been used to collect the data. As some data were not available from Bangladeshi data sources 
other useful international data sources were also relied on. Finally only the top 95 companies’ 
data for 2010 was collected, because the other 5 company reports were not available.  
 
To measure interlocks the researcher recorded how many times each director’s name 
appeared in the sample, which director occupied more than one seat and in which company 
this seat was occupied, thus allowing the mapping of interconnected companies. For each 
company, the size of the BoD, the proportion of inside (family) compared with outside 
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directors and the total number of companies with at least one shared board member was 
recorded. 
 
 
4.3.5 Constructs and measures and model specification 
According to (Cavana et al., 2001) research questions are the most critical part of any 
research, defining the whole process and guiding arguments and inquiry. Research questions 
are also important to specify the research model and to operationalise each construct within 
the study (Cavana et al., 2001). Thus the research question and the model that is used to 
answer are discussed below.  
The basic objective of this particular research is to explore the corporate network of 
Bangladesh and its characteristics, therefore using the research question: 
 
 What are the characteristics of the Bangladeshi corporate network?   
 
Most operational research studies involve the construction of a mathematical research model 
(Cavana et al., 2001). This is a collection of logical and mathematical relationships that 
represents aspects of the situation under study (Cresswell, 2009) and describe important 
relationships between variables; include an objective function with which alternative 
solutions are evaluated, and constraints that restrict solutions to feasible values (Cresswell , 
2009). 
For developing a research model it is crucial to ensure that all significant variables are 
included and the insignificant variables are omitted from the model as variables that are 
redundant and irrelevant can conceal the real effects of significant variables through 
multicollinearity (Zikmund, 2003).  
 
The conceptual model of this study is presented as a building block of this research. The 
model comprises three categories of variables and an error factor. Through this model I have 
proposed that there is an association between company network and company performance as 
well between other control variables. The variables which are used in that model include the 
dependent variable (i.e. the network of company) and the independent variable (i.e. company 
performance) and control variables. In this research to developing the research model the 
objective was to ensure that all the important variables are included and unimportant and 
irrelevant variables are omitted.  The error factor of the analysis represents changes in the 
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dependent variable that cannot be explained by the independent variable and the control 
variables. The variables which are used for this particular research are defined and discussed 
below. 
 
Company network (CN) is the dependent variable used in the model and represents the 
primary variable of interest (Cavana et al., 2001). In this research the company network size 
will be measured and all other variables in the model are assumed to affect the degree, the 
centrality and the closeness of the network. Justification and operationalisation of this 
variable will be discussed in detail in Section 4.3.5.1 of this chapter. 
 
Company performance (Perf) is the independent variable of interest to this research which 
is expected to influence the dependent variable in either a positive or negative way. This 
variable will be operationalised in several ways to obtain alternative measures. The 
operationalisation and justification of using this variable will be discussed in detail in Section 
4.3.5.2. 
 Control variables are variables that are constant and unchanged in an experiment (Cavana 
et al., 2001).  In a model, the control variables represent other independent variables expected 
to influence the dependent variable, in addition to the selected independent variable (Hair et 
al., 1998). Eight control variables have been used, which are commonly used in corporate 
governance research and these are expected to influence network size. The control variables 
are: 
  
Company size (Coysize)  
Board size (Bdsize) 
Board independence % (Bdindep) 
CEO duality (Chairindep)  
Percentage of family members (Family %) 
Family controlled firm (Familycont) 
Isolated firm (Isolated) 
Sub connected firm (Subcon) 
A detailed discussion regarding these control variables will be presented in section 4.3.5.3 
together with their operationalisation and justification. 
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Using the abbreviated variable names the full regression equation is: 
 CN= ƒ (Pref) + Coysize + Bdsize + Bdindep + Chairindep + Family % + Familycont+ 
Isolated+ Subcon + E  
 
Specification of significant variables is very important step of a research. In addition to that it 
is also important to accurately measure variables. The details and justification of variable 
selection will be discussed in Sections 4.3.5.1 to 4.3.5.3. 
 
4.3.5.1 Dependent variable (size and centrality of network) 
As the research objective is to explore the corporate network attributes of Bangladeshi firms, 
the network’s degree, centrality and betweeness should be measured based on directors 
interlocking with different boards. The dependent variables were constructed through the use 
of SNA. There is some important network research where Social network analysis (SNA) was 
used to measure interlocking board network. Keep those research objective and aim in my 
mind in this research I have adopted two very commonly used network measurement tools; 
that are network centrality and network degree. These two measures are very well accepted in 
corporate network research (Laurence, 2008). 
 
SNA focuses on network ties and the combination of those ties to form associations among 
people, groups of people, organization and countries (De Nooy et al., 2005). Social network 
analysts assume that interpersonal ties matter because through interpersonal ties of 
organizations and countries there are lots of things can be transformed with one another. For 
example behaviour, attributes, information and goods. In a methodological point of view 
social network analysis conceptualizes the analysis of network of social relations (De Nooy et 
al, 2005). Social network analysis is an approach which represents multilevel applicability of 
forming social relations. At the organizational level it explains the communication process 
among different participants (Weimann, G.1983). It can be used on network of power and 
political processes (Lin, Ensel, & Vaughn, 1981).  SNA can also be used to analyse careers 
and socialization (Montgomery, 1992). According to Tichy et al, (1979) social network 
analysis could be used to investigating the evolving networks of information and influence. 
At the interorganizational level, SNA has developed a variety of measures that can be used to 
classify the nature of relationships between people in a group, organizations and society 
(Tichy et al., 1992). A number of network measures have been developed in SNA (Scott, 
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2000) to analyse, categorize and illustrate network structure characteristics and their cohesion 
(Kevin, 2009). These measures are of two main types: whole of network measures and 
network attribute measures (Scott, 2000). The two different measures have two different 
utilities. The whole of network measures are helpful to compare two networks and will 
emphasize the structural differences between the networks, on the other hand attribute 
measures are significant to describing the network under review. For this study I will focus 
on the network attribute measures as we are not comparing two networks rather our main 
focus is to describe the corporate network of Bangladesh.  
SNA is a technique used by researchers to measure social networks. As discussed there are 
two primary measures to analyse networks: network degree and centrality. Network degree is 
a measure of the number of nearby nodes in the network of a particular actor (De Nooy et al., 
2005). It is a simple network measurement technique since it directly measures activity. An 
actor with a high network degree measure can be considered as active networker. The direct 
contact with actors in the network is also important to consider. Most importantly this 
measure focuses on the most frequently networked actors in the network. While the number 
of ties (degree) for any actor within the network is important, the location (centrality) of that 
actor within the network is equally important (Burt, 1992). According to Peng et al. (2001, p. 
165) “in social network analysis a point of centrality refers to a point with a large number of 
connections with the other points in its immediate environment”. Therefore the best 
connected points in a network can be considered as the most central, having the most 
essential connections.  
In the intercorporate network, ties can be undirected and reciprocal (De Nooy et al., 2005). In 
the undirected network if Director X knows Director Y then automatically Director Y knows 
director X. In this research the undirected network has been identified, with “who knows 
who” being the acknowledgment, not the quality of the relationship. In this research board 
connections are defined as the degree scores of all the directors who are serving on the same 
company board.  The mathematical equation used here is: 
Board connections =     Director ties (degree) 
Where n=number of directors on the board. 
In this research, board connection represents a board’s total connectedness through 
interlocking BoDs. The top 95 companies were used to determine the network (see 
Appendix-2) which was measured by capturing multiple relations within it. That is to say, ties 
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between directors of the same and different boards are captured to map the network. For this 
study Pajek 10 software has been used, which has been described thus: “The main motivation 
for development of Pajek was the observation that there exist several sources of large 
networks that are already in machine-readable form. Pajek should provide tools for analysis 
and visualization of such networks: collaboration networks, organic molecules in chemistry, 
protein-receptor interaction networks, genealogies, Internet networks, citation networks, 
diffusion (AIDS, news, innovations) network, data-mining (2-mode networks), etc” (Batagelj 
& Mrvar, 2011, p.3). 
4.3.5.1.1 Measurement of social network analysis (SNA) 
SNA collects data on relationships from nodes or actors in the network (De Nooy et al., 
2005). Actors do not necessarily have to be people rather they can describe firms or 
organisations (Laurence, 2008). Linkages or ties between firms could represent contractual, 
joint venture or alliance relationships (Nooy et al., 2005). Once the connection information 
has been obtained, specialised computer software can be used to display the network of 
connections obtained from the collected data.  
For this study, using Pajek11 software, both nodes and ties can be given attributes. For 
example, if nodes are people they could be identified by their company location and 
directorship positions or their directorial membership in the organisation. After that 
identification, attention could be given to finding tie attributes like strength of relationship, 
frequency of communication and nature of relationship. Then the analysis of the network can 
take many forms. A visual inspection of the network graph generated by Pajek can provide a 
quick assessment of the dominant patterns that might exist. While graph-based measures can 
identify clusters or cliques, thus determining the relative density of the network, identifying 
the longest and shortest paths between nodes, and identifying different centrality measures 
for individual nodes (De Nooy et al., 2005).  
 
In this research the three main forms of centrality measure are connectedness (degree), 
closeness to all other existing nodes in the sample (closeness) and relative positioning on 
                                                 
10 Batagelj and Mrvar Pajek 2.05, Program for Analysis and Visualization of Large Networks, Reference 
Manual, List of commands with short explanation version 2.05 September 24, 2011, 
11 Pajek is a program, for Windows, for analysis and visualization of large networks having some thousands or 
even millions of vertices. 
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main paths in the network (betweeness).  These have been used to explore the corporate 
network of Bangladesh.  
 
Moreover after reaching this step, the next step will be to interpret the network. For example, 
what does a high centrally connected node mean? This research focuses on the node level of 
the firm and tries to explore which ties and paths and which locations is less or more frequent 
than others in the network (Laurence, 2009). Thus for this research, the firms’ network paths 
will be analysed to gain an evaluation of their individual and collective pattern of 
connections.  
For this particular analysis, the Pajek software takes node and link information as input, as 
well as any attribute data attached to nodes or links (De Nooy et al., 2005). Through this 
software component the network is stored in a matrix form with the nodes as the axes and the 
links represented as cells within the matrix (Laurence, 2009). As with most network analysis 
research, in this study the software is used to calculate the number of connections, the 
centrality of the connections and also the betweeness of the network actors, and to visualize it 
through mapping of those connections. Figure-4.2 shows an example to illustrate the network 
processing through Pajek. 
Figure 4-2 Matrix representation of a network 
 
 
Source: De Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj (2005) 
 
The above matrix shows the internal presentation of a network with nodes labelled ‘A’, ‘B’, 
‘C’ and ‘D’. The cells denote a linkage if a ‘1’ is present. Note that links can be bi-
directional, e.g. A- B and B-A (Laurence, 2009). Moreover the Pajek software draws the 
sociogram that is represented by the matrix (Laurence, 2008).  The bi-directional links are 
shown with arrowheads at both ends of the link (De Nooy, 2005). A visual demonstration is 
evident in Figure 4-3 where the nodes reflect the attribute of network paths, also known as 
ties.  
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Figure 4-3 Sociogram representation of a network 
 
 
 
Source: De Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj (2005) 
 
In summary, the four-step SNA process used in this thesis is illustrated in Figure 4-4. In this 
figure it is observed that to generate a corporate network the first step would be to identify 
the top 100 companies’ BoD for 2010. Then the strength of ties will be calculated which is 
the frequency of ties. In the third step, Pajek software was used to calculate the network ties. 
Finally centrality scores are also calculated using the software to explore connections of each 
position in a network. 
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Figure 4-4 Process to generate corporate network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.5.2 Independent variables (Performance of firm) 
Mehra (2004, p. 3) explained corporate governance “as a blend of laws, policy and practice 
aimed to maximize shareholders’ return”. Thus considering the various features of 
performance and identifying the relevant measures are significant issue in studying corporate 
governance (Rashid et al., 2007, p.186). According to corporate governance literature, there 
is no well established consensus regarding the measurement of a company’s financial 
performance (Daily, et al., 1993; Dalton, et al., 1999; Johnson, 1996). Researchers mainly use 
a performance tool based on their research focus and data availability. The tendency therefore 
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has been towards multiple indicators of a firm’s performance (Daily &Dalton, 1993). Two 
main groups of performance measures which were identified by Ghalayini & Noble in the 
late 1980s.These are accounting based performance measures and market based performance 
measures (Petra, et al., 2005). Accounting based performance measures are based on 
historical performance (Fisher, 1988; Baker, et. al., 2000). Sloan (2001) argues that 
accounting information provides an important source of independently verified information 
about the performance of managers. Similarly, according to Hutchinson & Gul (2004) 
accounting based performance measures such as earnings before interest and tax, return on 
shareholders’ equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) may be a more accurate measurement 
of firm performance as they illustrate results of managers’ actions. Other popular accounting 
based measures include profit margin or return on sales, earnings per share or price earnings 
ratio. Some accounting based measures use asset valuation through adjustments to provide 
updated information of performance (Boyd, 1994).  
The next performance measure is market based performance measure which is different from 
the accounting based measure in some respect. In this regards Wiwattanakantang (2001, 
p.334) argues that not all agency costs are reflected in the accounting based performance 
measures. Therefore market based performance measures are also used. In this measure the 
overall value of a firm is evaluated by its financial market position. According to Kaplan and 
Norton (1992), traditional accounting based financial measures may give misleading 
information about innovation. Therefore the market based performance measures have 
received popularity (Hermalin &Weisbach, 1991; Demsetz &Villalonga, 2001).   
 
Although each kind of performance measure has its strengths and weaknesses, researchers 
should adopt measures very cautiously to ensure the robustness of their data. For a 
developing country like Bangladesh where the accounting standards are not well established, 
earnings are easily manipulated by the management.  Where there is a bias associated with 
accounting standards, optional reporting choices affect the level of earnings, so performance 
measure selection is a very crucial issue to consider for such economy based research. With 
this in mind, two measures have been adopted as independent variables. One is accounting 
based, ROA, and other is market based, Tobin’s Q. The formulas for these are: 
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Return on Asset (ROA) 
ROA= Net profit after tax (before abnormal items) /Average total assets 
Return on assets (ROA) is a financial ratio that shows the percentage of profit which a 
company earns in relation to its overall resources (Albrecht, 2005). It is commonly defined as 
net income (profit) after tax divided by average total assets. Unlike other profitability ratios, 
such as return on equity (ROE), ROA measurements include all of a business's assets: those 
which arise out of liabilities to creditors as well capital paid in by investors (Gray et. al., 
2007). Average total assets are used rather than net assets to ensure reliability of the 
calculation. ROA is used internally by companies to follow asset use over time, to monitor 
the company's performance in light of industry performance, and to look at different 
operations or divisions by comparing them one to the other (Kim, 2005). The information on 
net profit after tax and average total assets was collected from the company annual reports 
and the ROA was manually calculated.  
 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
Tobin’s Q is a ratio developed by James Tobin (1969) to hypothesize that the combined 
market value of all the companies on the capital market should be about equal to their 
replacement costs. Tobin Q is an important market based measure of performance employed 
to explain various corporate phenomena. The Q ratio is calculated as the market value of 
a company divided by the replacement value of the firm's assets: 
Tobin’s Q = Total market value of firm / Average total assets  
In the formula, the total market value of a firm denotes the aggregate of all issued shares, 
securities and other debts of the company. Tobin’s Q is widely used as a proxy for firm 
performance when studying the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) conclude that firms with more shareholder 
rights are better governed since these firms have a higher Tobin’s Q. Yermack (1996) also 
analyses board performance using Tobin’s Q, while Anderson and Reeb (2003) employ 
Tobin’s Q to examine the governance of family firms. Therefore Tobin’s Q was used in this 
research study to explore the performance of a firm in relation to the corporate network. The 
market value of the firm was collected from its annual report to calculate TQ. 
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4.3.5.3 Control variables 
Control variables represent other independent variables which are also expected to influence 
the dependent variable in addition to the selected independent variable, company 
performance. Eight control variables have been used in this study, which are all commonly 
used in corporate governance research as they are also expected to influence network size and 
company performances.   
 
Company size (Coysize): Company size is a significant variable for corporate governance 
research. Company size is a measure of the total assets of a company; therefore it can 
obviously affect company performance. It was argued by Boone et al., (2007) that as firms 
become larger and more diversified, the size of the board increases. Firm size is, therefore, 
taken as a proxy for the complexity of the firm and the need for a higher amount of advice to 
the board (Booth & Deli, 1999). Some studies have found positive and some negative 
associations between company size and other variables like ROA or TQ (Kim, 2005; Kiel, 
&Nicholson, 2003). For this study, the total assets as at the end of the 2010 financial year as 
reported in the annual report were used. 
 
Board size (Bdsize): Board size is commonly considered an important demographic element 
of corporate governance research (Dalton et al., 1999). In a general sense board size means 
the number of members sitting on the board. Identification of what board size is appropriate 
is a contentious issue in corporate governance research. Therefore the recognition of what 
constitutes effective and efficient boards, in terms of the number of directors, has been a 
matter of continuing debate (Yermack, 1996; Dalton & Daily 1999; Adams et al., 2008). 
 
There are several studies evident that larger companies have larger boards. Some studies 
show evidence that a large board size positively affects company performances. It is also 
argued that large boards may be more useful to firms on the grounds of better availability of 
advice to the CEO and greater monitoring of management (Adams & Mehran, 2003; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Coles et al., 2008). However other studies have provided mixed results 
regarding company performance and board size. Some scholars have been in favour of 
smaller boards (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) support 
small boards suggesting that larger groups face problems of too much social association.  
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Nevertheless board size may be very useful to use as a corporate governance variable, 
especially as a descriptor of the BoD, which is why this research has adopted it as a control 
variable. It has been measured as the number of board members sitting on the board of 
directors. As mentioned earlier, in some Bangladeshi companies, the company secretary is 
also considered to be a board member, however these are very few. In such instances the 
secretary has been included in the BoD for all measurement purposes. As previously 
discussed, this is an exploratory research therefore no prediction was made about the 
direction of this relationship.  
Board independence % (Bdindep): Board independence is considered an important variable 
in corporate governance research (Dalton &Daily, 1999). In this research board independence 
was operationalised as the proportion of outside directors, by dividing the number of outside 
directors by board size. Where the board consisted entirely of outside directors the ratio was 
measured as 1, which represents 100%. On the other hand, there was no outside director on a 
board then the proportion was represented by 0, meaning a fully dependent board with insider 
directors. Board independence values were continuous, ranging from 0%, denoting a non-
independent board and 100% denoting a fully independent board.  
CEO duality (Chairindep): CEO duality refers to the situation where the CEO also holds 
the position of the chairman of the board. Some firms allow their CEO to hold the position of 
chair of the BoD while other firms choose to split those two positions between two different 
individuals. According to Huse (2007), CEO duality is considered to be an indicator of 
management power. In a theoretical debate, Boyd (1995, p. 309) argued that neither agency 
nor stewardship theory can predict the consequences of CEO duality: 
“Duality can have a positive effect under certain industry conditions and a negative effect 
under other conditions”.  
For this study, CEO duality has been selected as a control variable with a dummy value. 
Where the chairperson is independent from the management team (i.e. the CEO does not hold 
the position of the chairman of the board, a value of 0 was assigned and a value of 1 was 
given when the same person held the two positions of that is chairperson and managing 
director. 
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Percentage of family member (Family %): Percentage of family members was used as a 
control variable for this research to analyse whether companies with more family members 
dominating board have better connections with other firms or not. To operationalise this 
variable the family relationship of the board members was identified based on their name and 
the BoD’s profile was studied where these relationships were acknowledged. For some 
companies the company websites were used as a source of reliable information about familial 
relationships. Finally some other reliable websites with authentic information regarding this 
issue were examined, together with newspaper data. Finally, after collecting this information, 
a value was assigned on a percentage basis to measure how many board members have 
family relationships within that board. Family % was measured as the number of family 
members sitting on a board divided by the total number of board members. The formula that 
was used was:                                         
Percentage of family members on a board = number of family members sitting on the 
board / total number of board members sitting on the board  
Family controlled firm (Familycont):  Family controlled firm was used as a control 
variable in this study because of the intention to explore the network’s attributes regarding 
family relationships. To classify firms as family dominated, data was hand collected from the 
companies’ annual reports and from websites detailing the companies’ board membership.  
Family membership was classified into 4 categories. Dummy variables were created for the 
number of family members on the board where 1 is equal to: ≥ 2, ≥ 3, ≥4, ≥5; and 0 is equal 
to any other number of family members. Family domination is also calculated as the 
percentage of family members on the board (family members divided by board size). The 
final measures for family control were: 
a dummy variable of 1 if the company has ≥ 3 directors who are family members or the board 
has ≥ 25% family members on the board; 0 otherwise.   
These various measures will assist in making the decision about whether a firm is family 
controlled.   
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Isolated firm (Isolated): This control variable is to identify the network characteristics. This 
control variable is to identify any firm which is isolated from the network .To classify the 
network location of firms, a dummy variable is created. In this research firms which were not 
part of the network were named as isolated firms and were valued as a 1, otherwise 0 was 
assigned as dummy value.  
Sub connected firm (subcon):  This is also a control variable to test the network attributes 
based on the location of firms on the network. This control variable describes those firms 
who have connections with each other but do not have any connection to further firms on the 
network.  This means that they have a reciprocal relationship with one firm only.  For sub 
connected firms a dummy variable was created where firms with one connection to another 
firm were assigned a value of 1 and all other firms were assigned 0. 
4.3.6 Data sources and data collection 
4.3.6.1 Overview: Bangladeshi stock exchanges rank only up to 20 companies based on 
market capitalization rather top 100. Moreover in Bangladesh there were no other sources 
available to collect the top 100 companies data based on their market capitalization. 
Therefore the Osiris database (which is an international database for company financial 
information) was used to collect the top 100 companies data, based on market capitalization 
in 2010. From the database there were possible to successfully obtain data of top 95 
companies (see Appendix-2). Moreover as it was not possible to get all the annual reports 
from the company and other websites; a trip was made to Bangladesh to collect the annual 
reports directly from the companies. All the data thus were collected through secondary data 
sources.  
The secondary data collection sources may have advantages and disadvantages. The main 
advantage of using an archival or secondary data source is, it has already been gathered and 
arranged by someone on whom a researcher can rely. According to Zikmund (2003), such 
data is relatively available and inexpensive to obtain, however it may be out of date. There 
may also be problems in the definition of terms, and because of this, in measurement and the 
accuracy of information, when using various secondary data sources because of a lack of 
precise comparability (Zikmund, 2003). Moreover in secondary data source there may be 
problems for measurement and accuracy (Zikmund, 2003).Taking this into account, in this 
analysis the data were collected very carefully to avoid error and hand collection meant it was 
easier to analyse and ensure its accuracy. In particular for this study the data would be outside 
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the scope of the thesis to undertake this any other way, especially due to working within 
systems which relied on a hybrid of both manual and electronic records. 
4.3.7 Data matrix preparation and upload  
The data matrix was uploaded into SPSS (Version-16) for the main statistical analysis. SPSS 
is a sophisticated piece of software used by social scientists (Coakes, Steed, & Price, 2008).  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter commenced by outlining different research philosophies, followed by the 
reasoning behind why one has been chosen which best resolves the research question of this 
study. All research processes undertaken have been discussed in this chapter, together with 
their rationales. The data collection process has also been outlined. Finally variable 
measurement and data transformation was discussed.  
In Chapter 5, the analysis of the data will be undertaken.  A multiple process consisting of 
three steps will be used to investigate the research question: 
(1) Reviewing data and correcting errors within the data  
(2) Understanding and describing the data  
(3) Performing inferential statistics, correlations and regressions, to answer the research 
question.  
These will be done in sequence.  
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Chapter 5 Analysis and Findings 
 5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the analysis of the data results used to explore my research question is 
presented and discussed.  
A multiple process consisting of three steps is used to investigate the research questions: 
(1) Reviewing data and correcting errors within the data  
(2) Understanding and describing the data  
(3) Performing inferential statistics, correlations and regressions, to answer the research 
question.  
These are performed in the above order.  As discussed in Chapter 4 multivariate regression 
analysis was used to examine the relationships among the variables which describe the 
corporate network attributes of Bangladeshi firms. 
Before attempting the data analysis it is important to understand the data distribution and 
correlations. The normal distribution of data is used to describe random variables (Hair et al., 
2010) and the mean and the standard deviation can then be applied (Hair et al., 2010). 
For this study multivariate regression provided the main analysis, hence it was necessary to 
screen the data first. This is essential for ensuring the validity and reliability of the results. In 
the next section the data screening and descriptive statistics will be discussed before 
proceeding to more detailed analysis.  
5.2 Data screening and descriptive statistics  
Data screening is required to ensure that there are no errors in the data (Tabachnick &Fidell, 
2001). Hence some routine pre-analysis screening procedures are used to assess the 
normality, linearity and homoscedasticity of the data (Coakes et al., 2008). It is argued that 
normality of data is a prerequisite for many inferential statistical techniques (Tabachnick, 
2011). There are several techniques for determining the normality of a dataset. Researchers 
normally use a histogram, stem leaf, box plot, normal probability plot and detrended plot to 
assess the normality of data (Hair et al., 2010). In addition, kolmogorov, skewness and 
Kurtosis statistics should be examined (Coakes et al., 2008). 
92 
 
5.2.1 Pre analysis screening 
Issues in performing pre-analysis screening include (1) data accuracy, (2) missing data 
analysis, (3) data distribution and (4) observing the outliers in the data.  
Firstly, data accuracy refers to whether the data values stored for an object hold the correct, 
consistent and unambiguous values (Hair et al., 2010). Data accuracy is concerned with 
ensuring whether the data on which the analysis is based is accurate and reliable (Hair et al., 
2010).  As discussed in Section 4.3.6.1 for this research, data has been extracted from 
recognised and reliable public sources thus no further data auditing procedures have been 
undertaken. However, to avoid the potential data errors which could occur in data conversion 
particularly at the time of using MS-Excel, the data has been checked with its source.  
Secondly, missing data arises when some case values are omitted from the matrix. In this 
research, as all the data were hand collected there were no missing data for the sample firms. 
Thirdly, for pre-screen analysis, it is very important to check how the data is distributed. 
Proper data distribution can ensure the correct statistical results for quantitative research. 
Moreover proper data distribution can also ensure proper regression analysis when the 
regression analysis is used to make statistical assumptions from the data.  For this research, 
data was analysed using standard descriptive statistics through SPSS; moreover frequency 
distributions were also generated for analysis purposes through SPSS. Data normality was 
primarily evaluated and reviewed by descriptive statistics which are evident in Table 5.2. 
Moreover, histogram and normal probability plots were generated to understand the accuracy 
of data in terms of normality. 
Finally, pre-screen analysis must deal with outliers, which represent extreme values in the 
data and can have a severe impact on statistical analysis.  Outliers might deal with either a 
single variable, called a univariate outlier or with two or more variables, called multivariate 
outliers (Tabachnick &Fidell, 2001). Outliers were identified by examining the distribution of 
the variable, specifically through histograms and normal probability plots. Once outliers have 
been identified, there are several strategies were used to reduce their impact on the analysis.  
The researcher considered how many variables might be responsible for the outliers. If the 
variable is highly correlated with others or is not critical to the analysis, deletion is 
recommended (Lunneborg, 1994). For this research project, some extreme outliers were 
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observed and after examining their potential effects on different variables the case was 
deleted, not the variable, to reduce their extreme effect on the analysis.  
Next, data skewness and Kurtosis were examined. Skewness is a statistical measure of 
symmetry (balance) or lack of balance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In a statistical 
distribution if the graph looks the same to the left and right of the centre point or the median 
it would called a symmetrical or balanced data set and therefore not skewed. On the other 
hand Kurtosis is a statistical measure to observe the normality of a distribution (Coakes et al., 
2008). The data distribution may look peaked or flat (Coakes et al., 2008). Data sets with 
high kurtosis have a tendency to have a distinct peak near the mean while those with low 
Kurtosis tend to have a flat peak near the mean (Coakes et al, 2008). In the dataset for this 
study, the values for all the variables did not follow a normal distribution and many variables 
showed a high degree of skewness and kurtosis. These distributions can be partially attributed 
to the presence of outliers in the data which cause the tail of the distribution to be skewed and 
also result in a density of scale, therefore heightening the distribution to a peak. 
For my data analysis it was observed from the primary descriptive table that there were some 
outliers that made the distribution abnormal. As discussed, the distribution of values did not 
conform closely to a normal distribution therefore skewness and Kurtosis was displayed.  
From the graphical presentation via the histogram, it was evident that the majority of 
frequency values generated from SPSS showed some degree of skewness in variables. To 
reduce the abnormality cases with extreme outliers were selected. As they had a very 
insignificant effect over other values, they were deleted. Specifically, the Islami Bank case 
was deleted to normalize the distribution of firms’ size. For board size abnormality, National 
Credit and Commerce Bank (NCC) were deleted. The Singer Bangladesh case was deleted to 
normalize ROA. Finally NHFIL was deleted to normalize the distribution of Tobin’s Q. After 
these deletions, the sample size was reduced. The revised descriptive results are presented in 
Table 5-2. After the deletion process, the performance measures of ROA and TQ had a 
normal distribution. For the rest of the variables, no transformations were required as they 
seemed normally distributed without outliers and the histogram showed a normal probability 
distribution. 
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5.3 Descriptive statistics 
As mentioned earlier, in this study, the dependent variables were network degree, network 
closenessness and network betweeness. The independent variables used for the performance 
measurement were:  Return on assets (ROA), and Tobin’s Q (TQ). Moreover in this study 
some control variables were used: board size, firm size, board independence, family 
controlled firm, CEO duality. For further analysis of network attributes dummy variables 
were created: Family controlled firm dummy, isolated firm dummy, and sub connected 
dummy. The measurement techniques for these variables are explained in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Definitions and measurements of variables  
Variable Definition Measurement 
Dependent variable:    
Network Degree 
 
Network degree is a 
measure of the 
number of 
connections in the 
network ((Nooy et 
al., 2005). 
12Value from Pajek software.  Degree 
centrality represents ties in a network 
measured as: cd(x) = degree of unit x.  
Numeric, decimal. 
Network Closeness  
 
Closeness describes 
the connectedness 
of a node in 
undirected networks     
(Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). 
13Value from Pajek software.  Closeness 
centrality represents ties in a network 
measured as: cc(x)=1/(ΣyɛU(d(x,y)) 
Numeric, decimal. 
Network  
Betweeness  
 
 
 
 
 
Betweeness 
measures the extent 
to which an actor in 
a network connects 
other actors in that 
network (Newman 
et al., 2010). 
14Value from Pajek software. Freeman (1977) 
defined the centrality measure of unit x 
according to betweeness in the following way: 
cB(x) = Σ    =     # of shortest paths between y 
and z through unit x /# of  shortest paths 
between y and z 
             y<z      Numeric, decimal.                         
                                                 
12 Such measures are called absolute measures of centrality. Absolute measures cannot be used to compare centralities of networks with 
a different number of units. Therefore such measures are normalised to get a measure interval from 0 to 1, where 0 means the smallest 
possible and 1 the highest possible centrality. Measures normalised in this way are called relative measures of centrality (A. Mrvar: 
Network Analysis using Pajek) 
 
13 Where d(x; y) is the graph theoretic distance (length of shortest path) between units x and y, U is the set of all units. If the network is 
not strongly connected, we take only reachable vertices into account, but we weight the result with the number of reachable vertices. The 
most central units according to closeness centrality can quickly interact with all others because they are close to all others.(A. Mrvar: 
Network Analysis using Pajek) 
   
14 In the case of communication networks the distance from other units is not the only important property of a unit. More important is 
which units lie on the shortest paths among pairs of other units. Such units have control over the flow of information in the network. 
The idea of betweenness centrality measures is the unit is central if it lies on several shortest paths among other pairs of units. (A. 
Mrvar: Network Analysis using Pajek)  
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Variable 
 
Definition 
 
Measurement    
 
 
Independent 
variable:   
ROA Return on Assets Net profit after tax/ Average total assets 
TQ Tobin’s Q Market capital/ Average total assets 
Control variables:     
Company size   Total assets 2010 The average of total assets 2009 and 2010 
Board size Size of the board of directors  Number of persons sitting on a board   
Board 
independence % 
Proportion of 
outside directors  
 Number of outside directors divided by board 
size 
CEO duality Independence of board leadership 
Coded “1” if the firm has  CEO duality and 
“0” otherwise 
Percentage of 
family members 
% family members 
who are sitting on 
the same board 
Number of family members sitting in a board 
divided by board size 
Family 
controlled firm 
Firm controlled by 
family members 
 Coded “1” if the firm controlled by family 
member and “0” otherwise 
Isolated firm 
No connection with 
other firms in the 
entire network 
Coded “1” if the firm is not part of the 
network and “0” otherwise 
Sub connected 
firm 
Reciprocal 
connection with one 
firm only in the 
entire network 
Coded “1” if the firm is connected with only 
one other firm and “0” otherwise 
There are no missing data for the top 94 companies. The results of the descriptive analysis 
and normalised distribution are shown in Table 5-2. As the research objective was to explore 
the corporate network of Bangladesh and the attributes of the network with some 
performances measure, and as this was exploratory research, there was no hypothesis to 
analyse. Value for network attributes was generated using Pajek software. Three network 
values were generated: network degree, betweeness and closeness. The top company boards 
were analysed to explore their corporate network attributes.   
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Table 5-2 Descriptive statistics  
Variables N Mean Median S.D Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
 
ROA 94 .064 .034 .092 -.136 .6356 2.9 14.4 
Tobin’s Q 94 2.01 1.30 2.19 .194 12.7 2.3 6.6 
Board size 94 10.15 9 4.7 3 27 1.44 2.15 
Firm size (Assets 
tk. mil.) 
94 31739 5202 50,858 128 330785 2.787 11.87 
Board 
independence  
94 6.35 .00 8.5 0 40  1.4 1.9 
Network degree 94 2.51 1 3.4 0 13 1.63 1.95 
Network 
closeness 
94 .032 .021 .032 0 .099 .402 -1.32 
Network 
betweeness 
94 .002 00 .007 00 .03 3.27 10.15 
% of family 
members on the 
board 
94 26.88 20 30.62 0 100 .891 -.345 
Dummy  
Variables         
CEO duality  94        
Family controlled 
firm  
94        
 Isolation 94        
Sub connection 
 
94  
 
      
 
Transformed variables – extreme outliers deleted 
ROA 90 .064 .034 .092 -.136 .6356 1.1 2.1 
Tobin’s Q 90 2.01 1.30 2.19 .194 12.7 1.7 3.0 
Board size 90 10.15 9 4.7 3 27 1.3 1.7 
Firm size (Assets 
tk. mil.) 
90 31739 5202 50,85
8 
128 330785 1.3 .5 
 
The descriptive statistics displayed in Table 5-2 show the average ROA is .064, ranging from 
-.136 to .6356. In the case of TQ, the average performance measure is 2.01, ranging from 
.194 to 12.7. The average board size is 10.95, with the maximum number of board members 
being 27 and minimum being 3. Firm size, which is measured using the total assets of 2010, 
has a mean of 31739 million BDT (BDT is the currency of Bangladesh), a maximum value of 
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330785 million BDT and a minimum of 128 million BDT. The mean of board independence 
is 6.35 % ranging from 0 to 40%. 
Theoretically network degree denotes the number of direct ties to a node (De Noey, 2005). 
The descriptive table above shows the network degree mean is 2.51, ranging from 0 to 13. 
This shows the highest number of company interlocks is 13 and the lowest is 0 where there 
are no interlocked boards. The mean for network closeness is .032, ranging from 0 to .099. 
Closeness of network represents the total distance to all members in a network. The firm with 
a higher closeness value represents higher closer relationships, and hence more centrality 
within the network and vice versa. Betweeness measures the extent to which an actor in a 
network connects other actors in the network and this is related to the location of a firm in 
between other firms. Betweeness is represented by the number of times that the shortest paths 
pass through a node in a network. The mean network betweeness was .002 with a range from 
0 to .03. For the family member percentage variable, meaning the number of family members 
as percentage of the number of board members, there was a mean of 26.88 %, and the range 
was from 0 to 100%. For the variable of CEO duality, from the 94 sampled firms, 6% have 
CEO duality.  For the family controlled firm variable, 49% of firms were found to be family 
controlled. The calculations for variables are explained below.   
To classify another two dummy variables which are isolated firms and sub connected firms, 
value was inserted in the following way. For Isolated firm dummy a dummy value of 1 was 
inserted for the firms who are not part of the main network otherwise zero value was assigned 
to the case. For the isolation variable, 47% of firms were found to be classified this way.  For 
the sub connection variable, dummy variable was created where firms with connections with 
each other but not part of the network were assigned a value of 1 and all others as zero. 
Descriptive results for this dummy shows 16% of companies were connected with each other 
from the sample firm who are named as sub connected dummy according to the corporate 
graph of Bangladesh. This analysis might prove helpful to provide a clearer picture of the 
corporate network characteristics of Bangladeshi firms. 
Table 5-3 provides the classification of family controlled firms of Bangladesh. This study 
uses the top companies, in terms of their market capitalization for year 2010, out of 235 
companies in Bangladesh. While the basic reason behind the year selection was the 
availability of data availability, most of the company reports were hand collected. Although 
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the data could be criticised as outdated, for this research purpose it can be generalised across 
time. 
To classify firms as to whether they are family dominated, data was hand collected from the 
company annual reports and from websites detailing the companies’ board membership. 
Family membership was classified into 4 categories: 
 
Number of family members on the BoD, 
Percentage of family members on the BoD, 
≥ 3 family members on the BoD, and 
≥ 25% of family members on the BoD 
 
Dummy variables were created for the number of family members on the board where value 
1 was equal to: ≥ 2, ≥ 3, ≥4, ≥5; and 0 otherwise. Family domination was also calculated as 
the percentage of family members on the board (family members divided by board size). The 
final measures for family controlled are the assignation of a dummy variable of 1 if the 
company had ≥ 3 directors who were family members or if the board had ≥ 25% family 
members on the board; a dummy of 0 was given otherwise.  These various measures assist in 
determining whether a firm was family controlled.   
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Table 5-3: Classification of family dominated firms of Bangladesh 
 
Company No. of family  
members 
Board size % of family members Family controlled 
firm 
GP 0 10 0 0 
ICB 0 12 0 0 
TITASGAS 0 9 0 0 
NBL 8 14 57 1 
NHFIL 0 12 0 0 
ISLAMIBANK 0 17 0 0 
PBL 0 14 0 0 
ABBANK 0 14 0 0 
BEXIMCO 3 8 38 1 
DUTCHBANGL 2 8 25 1 
BATBC 0 10 0 0 
PRIMEFIN 0 11 0 0 
SOUTHEASTB 8 17 47 1 
RAKCERAMIC 2 6 33 1 
POWERGRID 0 8 0 0 
EBL 0 10 0 0 
DESCO 0 10 0 0 
BSRM 5 6 83 1 
IFIC 0 12 0 0 
NCCBANK 4 27 15 1 
EXIM BANK 2 25 8 0 
     
PADMAOIL 0 7 0 0 
BANKASIA 7 17 41 1 
ONEKBANKLTD 0 11 0 0 
MERCANBANK 0 22 0 0 
BXPHARMA 2 10 20 0 
BRACBANK 0 7 0 0 
RUPALIBANK 0 12 0 0 
HEIDELBCEM 0 10 0 0 
STANDBANKL 0 22 0 0 
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Company No. of family  
members 
Board size % of family members Family controlled 
firm 
DHAKABANK 6 20 30 1 
MARICO 0 7 0 0 
BERGERPBL 0 8 0 0 
CITYBANK 2 13 15 0 
PREMIERBAN 6 15 40 1 
SQUARETEXT 9 10 90 1 
TRUSTBANK 0 9 0 0 
SINGERBD 0 11 0 0 
AFTABAUTO 7 7 100 1 
SIBL 6 19 32 1 
ALARBANK 2 19 11 0 
MTBL 0 13 0 0 
UNIONCAP 3 13 23 1 
ICBIBANK 0 6 0 0 
RNSPIN 2 6 33 1 
SHINEPUKUR 2 4 50 1 
PHOENIXFIN 2 13 15 0 
DBHFC 0 10 0 0 
BAYLEASING 2 10 20 0 
BATA 0 5 0 0 
ACI 7 10 70 1 
SALAMCRST 0 3 0 0 
MIDASFIN 0 11 0 0 
RECKITTBEN 0 7 0 0 
ACTIVEFINE 0 7 0 0 
PREMIERLEA 4 12 33 1 
EHL 2 6 33 1 
MAKSONSPIN 3 8 38 1 
APEXADELFT 3 7 43 1 
OLYMPIC 5 5 100 1 
ACIFORMULA 5 7 71 1 
SUMMITPOWER 9 12 75 1 
OCL 11 13 85 1 
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Company 
No. of family  
members 
Board size % of family members Family controlled 
firm 
 
PRAGATILIF 
 
6 
 
21 
 
28 
 
1 
GOLDENSON 0 7 0 0 
     
BXSYNTH 2 8 25 1 
ARAMIT 2 10 20 0 
IBNSINA 0 9 0 0 
AMBEE 5 7 71 1 
KOHINOOR 4 8 50 1 
DACCADYE 6 8 75 1 
DELTASPINN 2 6 33 1 
ECABLES 0 10 0 0 
RANFOUNDRY 5 9 56 1 
QSMDRYCELL 5 6 83 1 
AGNI 0 6 0 0 
HRTEXT 6 7 85 1 
FUWANG 0 7 0 0 
DAFFODIL 3 5 60 1 
SAMORITA 4 12 33 1 
BDCOM 2 8 25 1 
APEXFOOD 4 6 67 1 
INTECH 3 7 43 1 
ANWARGAL 10 11 90 1 
AZIZPIPE 0 6 0 0 
INFORMATION 0 12 0 0 
KAYQUE 3 7 43 1 
STANDARDCER 4 10 40 1 
GEMINI 7 7 100 1 
IMAMBUTTON 0 6 0 0 
DULAMIA 0 7 0 0 
DESH 3 5 60 1 
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5.4 Analysis of correlation matrix 
It is very important to the calculate the significance level when analysing a correlation 
matrix, as this is considered a major source of information about the reliability of the 
correlated variables (Coakes et al., 2008). Significance of a correlation coefficient will 
change depending on the size of the sample from which it is being computed (Coakes et al., 
2008).  Moreover the test of significance is based on the assumption that the distribution of 
the residual values for the dependent variable is required to follow the normal distribution 
pattern. Similarly, the variability of the residual values must be considered to be the same for 
all values of the independent variable (Coakes et al., 2008).  For this particular research a 
two-tailed Pearson correlation was run to test the correlation between variables. Bivariate 
correlations of the major variables are shown in Table 5-4. The table shows several 
statistically significant (p < 0.5; 2-tailed) correlations, but not to the level that might cause 
multicollinearity or singularity issues (Tabachnick & Fiddell, 2001). This was confirmed by 
collinearity tests undertaken during the regression tests.  Table 5-4 also reports the inter-
correlations among the variables.  
To interpret the correlation, the coefficient and the significance value (p) was examined. 
Firstly, the correlation table shows that all the dependent variables (network degree, 
closenesss and betweeness) are positively correlated with each other. Next, the correlation 
table shows that there are significant negative correlations between the dependent variable of 
network closeness and the independent variable of which is Tobin’s Q. The table also shows 
significant positive relationship between the dependent variable of network degree and the 
control variable of CEO duality. It is evident that there is a significant positive correlation 
between the dependent variable of network betweeness and control variable of board size. As 
would be expected, all the dependent variables (network degree, network closeness and 
network betweeness) are negatively correlated with the dummy variable of isolation.  
 Results of the correlation table also show that the two independent variables (ROA and TQ) 
are positively correlated with each other.  ROA and TQ are positively correlated with board 
independence, while TQ is also negatively correlated with board size and firm size. Other 
control variables have certain relationships with each other.  Board size is negatively 
correlated with board independence but positively correlated with firm size. Board 
independence is negatively correlated with firm size. Firm size is negatively correlated with 
the percentage of family members, and the construct of family controlled firms.  As would be 
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expected, the percentage of family member variable and the family controlled firm variable 
have a significant positive correlation with each other. Finally for the isolation variable and 
the sub connected firms variable a positive correlation with each other was observed.  
5.4.1 Discussion 
As mentioned above, results show there is a significant positive correlation between CEO 
duality and network degree, meaning that firms having CEO duality have more ties with each 
other and are better connected with each other than firms who do not have CEO duality. 
From the correlation table it is evident that a significant negative relationship exists between 
isolated firms and network degree which means firms who are not part of the network are not 
connected with other firms. As network degree represents the network connections of any 
company which is connected through interlocked directors sitting on multiple boards, it is 
expected that firms who are not part of the connections of that network will surely have a 
significant negative correlation with network degree. The same is true for the other two 
dependent variables (network closeness and network betweeness). As expected, the opposite 
is also in evidence in that the correlation table shows significant positive correlations among 
network degree, closeness and betweeness.  
As explained earlier, network closeness describes the connectedness of a node in undirected 
networks where the most central units can quickly interact with all others because they are 
close to all others.  However in this study, the correlation table shows a significant negative 
correlation between network closeness and TQ. This can be explained by the fact that firms 
who are closely located to each other may have firm performance than firms who are not 
closely connected. It can also be argued that the closely networked firms do not necessarily 
interact quickly or readily with those firms which are close to them. As expected, network 
closeness is negatively correlated with isolation.  
 
A significant positive correlation exists between network betweeness and board size, meaning 
firms having a big board have the shortest paths passing to and through the other firms on the 
network. More specifically, as betweeness refers the situation where an actor in the network 
is located at a node providing the shortest route to reach the other players, regardless of the 
direction of the relationship, from the correlation it is evident that firms with a large board 
size frequently reach each other through the shortest route of the network made by 
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interlocking directorates, thus exhibiting betweeness centrality. As is expected, a significant 
negative correlation exists between network betweeness and isolation.  
 
The independent variables of ROA and TQ are significantly positively correlated with each 
other. Moreover, ROA is positively correlated with board independence, meaning firms who 
have a more independent board have better ROA performance and vice versa. This is also 
true for TQ, which is significantly positively correlated with board independence. 
 
 However TQ has a negative correlation with board size and firm size, meaning firms with 
bigger boards and firms with more total assets have less performance as measured by TQ 
than firms with small boards or those with lower total assets. 
 
The correlation table shows a significant negative relationship between board size and board 
independence, meaning firms with bigger boards have less independent directors and vice 
versa. In addition a positive correlation exists between board size and firm size, meaning the 
bigger the firm, the bigger the board.  
 
However significant negative correlation exists between firm size and family controlled firm, 
meaning the big firms have less family members on their boards than small firms. The 
percentages of family controlled firm are positively correlated with the family controlled 
firms, as expected.  
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Table 5-4 Correlations table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Degree  
1 
                        
2 Closeness  
.73** 
1                       
3 Betweeness  
.23* 
.48** 1                     
4 ROA 
.042 
-.022 .12 1                   
5 TQ 
-.11 
-.21* -.09 .50** 1                 
6 Board size 
.015 
.16 .21* -.02 -.34** 1               
7 Board 
independen
ce 
-.06 
-.11 -.17 .22* .25* -.35** 1             
8 CEO duality 
.51** 
.19 -.07 .04 .01 -.06 .03 1           
9 Firm size 
-.11 
-.08 .05 -.16 -.43** .57** -.24* -.00 1         
10 % of family 
members 
.05 
-.04 .001 -.08 .03 -.17 .01 .02 -
.28** 
1       
11 Family 
controlled 
firm 
.07 
.009 .07 -.02 -.00 -.11 .00 .08 -.24* .83** 1     
12 Isolated 
Firm 
-.54** -.76** -.33** .01 .14 -.06 -.01 -.17 .10 .02 -.11 1   
13 Sub 
connected 
firm 
-.15 -0.18 -.15 .06 .11 .15 .011 -.12 .09 -.11 -.11 .28** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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5.5 Regression analysis  
In order to further explore correlations, multiple regression analysis was used. “Multiple 
regression is an expansion of bivariate correlation” (Coakes et al., 2009, p.141). The 
regression result signifies the best prediction of a dependent variable from several 
independent variables (Coakes et al., 2009). In research regression analysis is used when 
independent variables are correlated with each other and also correlated with dependent 
variables (Coakes et al., 2009). This research explores the network attribution using multiple 
confirmatory regressions to test the strength of the relationships between the variables.  
Regression models are run to test the association between the dependent and independent 
variables (predictors) and regression analysis is a powerful technique to explain the 
relationship indicated by  the adjusted R2 value (Cavana et al., 2001), which is an indication 
of the extent of how significantly the independent variables and the control variables 
collectively change the dependent variable. In statistics, the coefficient of determination R2 is 
the proportion of variability in a data set that is accounted for by a statistical model 
(Tabachnick et al., 2001). That is, regression analysis shows how much of the change in the 
dependent variable can be accounted for with the other variables in the research model. The 
results are reported separately for the independent variables and the control variables tested in 
the model. Results are analysed based on the p value (significance) and coefficient (slope) 
(Cavana et al., 2001).  The beta coefficient, which is the standardised beta, specifies the 
direction of the relationship within the variables.  The reliability of coefficients depends on 
the degree of significance of the p value. For this research all independent variables have 
been entered into the regression analysis at once because the intention was to examine the 
relationship between the whole set of predictors and the dependent variables, as 
recommended by (Coakes et al., 2009) for a standard regression model.  
5.6 Multivariate findings 
5.6.1 Results of regression 
Regression results are reported in the next three tables for the three network measures which 
are network degree, network closeness and network betweeness. Table 5-5 presents the 
regression analysis of the determinants of network degree where company performance 
measures and some other control variables have been regressed against the network degree. 
Table 5-6 shows regression analysis of the determinants of network closeness where some 
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company performance measure like ROA and TQ and some governance variables have been 
regressed against network closeness. Lastly in Table 5-7 regression analysis is evident for the 
network betweeness which was also regressed against company performance, company size, 
board size, board independence, CEO duality, percentage of family members sitting on the 
board, family controlled firm, isolated company and sub connected company. As mentioned 
before the two performance measures used were ROA and TQ for year 2010. Three different 
models are used for the regression analysis, which measures the network attributes of the top 
companies of Bangladesh. All other predictor (independent) variables were also used in the 
models in the same manner. Each table reports the results of all the different regressions and 
for each regression model the adjusted R2   has been reported. 
Table 5-5 Regression analysis of the determinants of network degree 
The table below reports the results of the following regression model.  This model measures 
the determinants of network degree. 
Network degree = ƒ (performance) + Coysize + Bdsize + Bdindep + Chairindep + Family% + 
Familycont + Isolated+ Subcon + E 
*** Significance at 1% confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significance at 5% confidence level using two-tailed test  
Variable Expected Sign Beta Coefficient (β) Significance 
ROA ? .112 .241 
TQ 
? -.151 .154 
Company size ? -.139 .203 
Board size 
? .009 .931 
Board independence % ? -.103 .239 
CEO duality ? .441
*** .000 
Percentage of family members    
 
? .215 .151 
Family controlled firm       ? -.216 .143 
Isolated firm 
 
? -.479*** .000 
Sub connected firm 
 
? .051 .548 
No. of firms (N) 90   
Adjusted R2 .451   
F statistic 8.312   
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* Significance at 10% confidence level using two-tailed test  
Indicating significance at the ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 levels, respectively (two-tailed for signed predictions, 
two-tailed otherwise). Models were estimated using logistic regression. 
“?” indicates a two tailed test was applied as no direction of relationship was predicted. β is the coefficient estimation. 
Table 5-5 above shows the regression results regarding analysis of the determinants of 
network degree with company performance, company size, board size, board independence, 
CEO duality, board with family members’ percentage, family dominated firm, isolated firm 
and finally firm.  
The regression results show that the independent variables do not significantly predict the 
dependent variable of network degree; however some of the control variables were 
significantly regressed by the dependent variables which can be statistically presented as: 
 F= (10, 79) = 8.312, p<0.01. 
From the regression table it is observed that CEO duality was significantly associated with 
network degree. As mentioned earlier, Moreover sub connected and isolated firms are 
obviously also negatively associated with the network degree. However, rest of the variables 
are not significantly associated with network degree, thus they are not significant predictor.  
From the model summary it is observed that both independent variables together explain 45% 
of the variance (R2) in network degree, which is significant as indicated by the F value of 
8.312. An examination of the T value indicates that independent variables contribute to 
predict the network degree.  
The second regression model is presented in Table 5-6. This shows regression results for the 
determinants of network closeness with company performance, company size, board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, board with family members’ percentage, family 
dominated firm, isolated firm and finally sub connected firm.  
The regression results show that the independent variables do not significantly predict the 
dependent variable of network closeness, however some of the control variables are 
significantly regressed by the dependent variables which statistically be presented as: 
F= (10, 79) = 14.084, p<0.01, p<0.05 
From the regression table it is observed that company size and family controlled firm have a 
significant negative association with network closeness. As expected, sub connected and 
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isolated firms are also negatively associated with network closeness. However the remaining 
variables are not significantly associated with network closeness, thus they are not considered 
as significant predictors. From the model summary it is observed that both independent 
variables together explain almost 60% of the variance (R2) in network closeness which is 
significant as indicated by the F value of 14.084. An examination of the T value indicates that 
independent variables contribute to predicting the network closeness. 
Table 5-6: Regression analysis of the determinants of network closeness. 
This table reports the regression results of the following regression model.  This model 
measures the determinants of network closeness. 
Network closeness = f (Performance) + Coysize + Bdsize + Bdindep + Chairindep + Family 
% + Familycont + Isolated+ Subcon + E    
Variable Expected Sign  Beta Coefficient (β) Significance 
ROA ? .057 .488 
TQ ? -.154 .090 
Company size ? -.185
** .049 
Board size ? .135 .141 
Board independence % ? -.101 .178 
CEO duality ? . 104 .130 
 
Percentage of family members 
? .098 .163 
 
Family controlled firm 
? -.201* .115 
 
Isolated firm ? -.729
*** .000 
 
Sub connected firm ? 
.030 .679 
 
Number of firms (N) 
90   
 
Adjusted R2 
.595   
 
F statistic 
14.084   
*** Significance at 1% confidence level using two-tailed test  
** Significance at 5% confidence level using two-tailed test, 
* Significance at 10% confidence level using two-tailed test  
Indicating significance at the ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 levels, respectively (one-tailed for signed predictions, two-tailed 
otherwise). Models are estimated using logistic regression. 
“?” indicates a two-tailed test was applied as no direction of relationship was predicted.  β is the coefficient estimation. 
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Table 5-7: Regression analysis of the determinants of network betweeness 
This table reports the results of the following regression model: 
Network betweeness = f (performance) + Coysize + Bdsize + Bdindep + Chairindep + Family 
% + Familycont + Isoloated +  Subcon + E       
Variable Expected Sign  Beta Coefficient (β) Significance 
ROA ? .211
* .084 
TQ ? -.063 .636 
Company size ? .008 .951 
Board size ? .133 .324 
Board independence % ? -.147 .185 
CEO duality ? -.135 .190 
Percentage of family member    
 
? -.015 .938 
Family controlled firm       ? .073 .695 
Isolated firm 
 
? -.303*** .008 
Sub connected firm 
 
? -.101 .351 
Number (N) 90   
Adjusted R2 .117   
F statistic 2.184   
*** Significance at 1% confidence level using two-tailed test 
 ** Significance at 5% confidence level using two-tailed test  
 * Significance at 10% confidence level using two-tailed test  
Indicating significance at the ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 levels, respectively (one-tailed for signed predictions, two-tailed 
otherwise). Models are estimated using logistic regression. 
“?” indicates a two-tailed test was applied as no direction of relationship was predicted. 
  β was the coefficient estimation. 
 
The third regression model, presented in Table 5-7, shows the regression results for the 
determinants of network betweeness with company performance, company size, Board size, 
Board independence, CEO duality, Board with family members percentage, Family 
dominated firm, Firm with not connected with network and finally Sub connected firm. The 
regression results show that the independent variables significantly predict the dependent
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variable of network betweeness. Moreover, some of the control variables are also 
significantly regressed by the dependent variables, which can be presented statistically as: 
F= (10, 79) = 2.184, p<0.1 
From the regression table it is observed that the independent variable of ROA has a 
significant positive prediction on network betweeness. Naturally, isolated firms are also 
negatively regressed with network betweeness. However rest of the variables are not 
significantly associated with betweeness thus they are not considered as significant 
predictors. From the model summary it is observed that both independent variables together 
explain almost 12% of the variance (R2) in network betweeness which is indicated by the F 
value of 2.184. An examination of the T value indicates that independent variables contribute 
to predicting network betweeness.  
5.7 Descriptive measure and analysis of Bangladeshi corporate network 
As mentioned earlier, as well as regression analysis descriptive data analysis was chosen as a 
step in the network exploration process. In this network study of Bangladesh, first the 
network was mapped with the use of the Kamada-Kawai15 algorithm in Pajek16 software as 
discussed before. The graphs are reported in Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2. In Table 5-1 a 
definition of the three dependent variables used as centrality measures is presented. Figure 5-
1 displays the whole interlocking directorate network used by both firm and directors level 
(operationalised by the names of the top Bangladeshi companies’ directors and the names of 
those companies) which was constructed automatically by the software. Whereas Figure 5-2 
presents the whole corporate network of Bangladesh for 2010 based on the top companies’ 
interlocking directorates, at the level of firm not the level of director, which was the focus of 
Figure 5-1.  
 
 
                                                 
15  
Kamada T, Kawai S. (An algorithm for drawing general undirected graphs, Information Processing Letters 
1989; 31: 7-15.) 
 
16
 Batagelj V, Mrvar A. Pajek -analysis and visualization of large networks. In: Junger M, Mutzel P, eds. Graph 
drawing    software. Berlin: Springer, 2003:77-103. 
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Figure 5-1 Graph of the whole interlocking directorate network of Bangladesh for 
201017 
 
                                                 
17 Kamada T, Kawai S. (An algorithm for drawing general undirected graphs, Information Processing Letters 
1989; 31: 7-15.) 
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Figure 5-2 the corporate network of Bangladesh for 2010 
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The formal network shown in Figure 5-2 represents the relationship between the top 
companies who share their directors on each others’ boards in the year 2010. This network of 
the top companies represents the majority of Bangladesh’s listed capital and has significant 
economic power.  
5.7.1 Bangladeshi network type 
Figure 5-2 represents a scale free network. It is observed that the presented network is an 
undirected network having scale free degree distribution because of its degree distribution 
tendency (Albert et al., 2000).For instance in a scale free network there is a probability that a 
node is selected uniformly and at a random basis (Newman, 2002). Moreover a scale free 
network contains a certain number of links which follow a particular mathematical form 
called a power jaw (Newman, 2009). According to Konno (2010, p.5) “in a scale free 
network there are a small number of vertices with very large degrees that are called ‘hubs’. 
Generally speaking, the two networks differ from each other in that hubs are present in one 
while being absent in the other”. Another important characteristic of scale free networks is 
the clustering coefficient distribution, which decreases as the node degree increases (Albert et 
al., 2000). From Figure 5-2 the clustering coefficient distribution is evident, which decreases 
as the node degree increases. Moreover the network contains a certain number of undirected 
network links which is the basic characteristic of scale free network. The Bangladeshi 
corporate network graph (Figure 5-2) exhibits nodes which are selected randomly and have 
undirected scale free degree distribution. Thus it is clear that this observed network has a 
random undirected degree distribution tendency, which provides a strong argument for 
classifying it as a scale free network. 
In the next section the attributes of corporate network in relation to performance are explored. 
Since no previous study has focused on the corporate interlock network in Bangladesh, it was 
considered useful to discuss the network using as many different observations as possible. 
Once the data was cleansed and mapping was undertaken, correlation and multiple regression 
analysis were used and some key network statistics were computed.  
5.7.2 Network characteristics 
In this section network characteristics will be presented visually in Table 5-8, Table 5-9, 
Table 5-10, and Figures 5-3 to 5-12 and discussed. 
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Table 5-8 Centrality measures used for interpreting network  
Measure                      Description  
Network Degree                      Number of direct ties to a node  
Network Closeness          Total distance to all members  
Network Betweeness   Times that the shortest paths pass through a node (potential boundary 
spanner)         
Source: De Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj (2005) 
 
The above table presents the centrality measures which are used in this research to interpret 
the Bangladeshi network. These three measures are used as dependent variables to observe 
their impact over selected independent corporate governance variables as explained above.  
Table 5-9 provides the descriptive network statistics by decile of company size, based on 
total assets in 2010. From the table it is evident that the companies who hold the 4th top 
position by decile of company size have the greatest mean network degree (4.1). Most of the 
responding companies in that decile are from same group of companies. From this 
observation it can be argued that companies belonging to a business group have many more 
interlocking directorates than stand-alone companies. Moreover, it can be argued that board 
members of group companies are inclined to be strongly interlocked with board members of 
parent companies. For network closeness the highest mean which was .047 held by the 3rd 
decile. Next for the network betweeness the highest mean was .0054 held by the 6th decile 
followed by .0042 held by the 3rd decile. 
Table 5-9 Descriptive for decile analysis of company size and company network 
Company 
decile 
Response 
number 
Firm size 
(Mil. BDT) 
(Mean) 
Network 
degree 
(Mean) 
Network 
closeness 
(Mean) 
Network 
betweeness 
(Mean) 
Top 9 146216 1.6 0.029 0.003 
2nd 9 85939 1.3 0.019 0.002 
3rd 9 57282 3.1 0.047 0.0042 
4th 9 22289 4.1 0.027 0.001 
5th 9 10003 3.1 0.044 0.0008 
6th 9 4746 3.2 0.039 0.0054 
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7th 9 2804 3.3 0.039 0.003 
8th 9 1245 3 0.0341 0.001 
9th 9 630 2.4 0.031 0.0036 
10th 9 249 0.88 0.0247 0.003 
Bottom 4 72 0.11 0.005 0 
Total 94     
 
From Table 5-10 a comparison of industry type and company network variables are observed. 
The industry type list was taken from the DSE website. Firms which do not belong to any 
particular industry type which are under the miscellaneous group have more interlocks, with a 
network degree mean of 8.3, although these tend to be from the same business group (group 
of companies). This finding is supported by Rommens (2007, p.1) who argued that group 
companies have more interlocks when they are engaged in an internal capital market and 
when they are affiliated with a diversified business group within different industries. This 
argument is true for Bangladeshi corporate culture due to its particular capital generation 
process. Aramit Ltd and Beximco Ltd are typical of this situation and interlock directors with 
each other’s boards most frequently. It can be argued that in Bangladesh the business group 
has more interlocks than firms who do not form part of the same group of companies. Figure 
5-2 also demonstrates this point.  
Table 5-10 also shows that cement industry has an interlocking network degree mean of 6 
which is the second highest. The next highest is that of tannery with 5.  On the other hand the 
IT sector and engineering sectors have the lowest network degree mean values which are .2 
and .91 respectively.  
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Table 5-10 Descriptive analysis for industry and company network dependent variables 
Industry   Response 
number 
 
 
 
 Firm 
size  
(mil tk)  
(Mean) 
 
 
 
Network  
   degree  
(Mean) 
 
 
 
   Network  
   between- 
   ness    
(Mean) 
 
 
 
        Network  
       closeness  
           (Mean) 
Telecommunication  1  109502  0  0  0 
Bank industry  24  98335  1.9  0.03  0.003 
Fuel and power  5  38632  1.6  0.012  0.001 
Financial institutions   9  12845  3.1  0.044  0.006 
Miscellaneous  3  11423  8.3  0.049  0.0005 
Cement  2  7182  6  0.067  0.0008 
Service and real estate  3  5592  2.3  0.037  0 
Pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals 
 
 
11  4439  4.7  0.04  0.003 
Ceramics  3  4136  4  0.035  0 
Food and allied industries  4  3820  1.25  0.02  0 
Engineering  12  3119  0.91  0.02  0.002 
Tannery industries  3  3098  5  0.062  0.004 
Insurance  1  2589  4  0.08156  0.0331931 
Textiles   8  2367  1.25  0.031  0.0004 
IT SECTOR  5  237  0.2  0.01  0 
Total                                                       94 
In the next section more analysis will be done to explore the corporate network attributes of 
Bangladesh. From Figure 5-3 to Figure 5-12, decile analyses will be presented to describe 
further aspects of board size and company network degree. While three network measures 
were taken (network degree, betweeness and closeness) for this comparative analysis only 
network degree was used. 
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Figure 5-3 Comparison of firms’ percentages of board family members and firms’ 
degree of interlocking network connections 
 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the top firms who have family members on their boards compared with 
their board interlocking as measured by network degree.  
Figure 5-4 to Figure 5-12 present the comparative analysis of board size and connectedness 
degree based on decile analysis. Results were interesting as it is observed that some large 
company having large board have very low connectedness in terms of directorial interlocking 
whereas some company having very small board have very high directorial interlocking 
connections with other companies. For some companies results were just opposite, where 
company having large board contain more interlock and vice versa.  
Figure 5-4 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (top decile) 
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Figure 5-5 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (2nd decile) 
 
Figure 5-6 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (3rd decile) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
Figure 5-7 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (4thdecile) 
 
Figure 5-8 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (5th decile) 
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Figure 5-9 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (6th decile) 
 
Figure 5-10 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (7th decile) 
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Figure 5-11 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (8th decile) 
 
 
Figure 5-12 Decile analysis for board size and network degree (9th decile) 
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Table 5-11 Patterns of interlocking directorates in Bangladesh for top 100 companies18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cumulation ratio = total number of directors’ seats/ total number of directors 
 
From Table 5-11 the pattern of the Bangladeshi corporate network is evident. It was observed 
that the total number of directors was 877 for the top 100 company boards in 2010, while the 
number of directors’ seats was 958. 81 directors sat on more than one board. The percentage 
of interlocking directors which is 9%, the Cumulation ratio was calculated to understand the 
interlocking directorate pattern of Bangladeshi corporate network more rigorously. 
5.8 Conclusions: 
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis and a discussion of key findings related to the 
research questions. This chapter has provided the results of the empirical research conducted 
was then calculated for this thesis. A description of the data distributions for the raw variables 
used was provided, followed by a section on how the data was transformed and prepared for 
the statistical tests of the study. The results of the multiple regression analyses used to test the 
relations of the relevant variables were also presented in Section 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. 
Moreover, in this chapter an analysis of the data has been conducted to explore the attributes 
of the network measures in association with some predicted variables. As discussed before, 
this is a study of exploration without any prior hypothesis in a relatively uncharted 
                                                 
18 The data for Bangladesh is based on the author’s own calculations 
19 Definition of variables is taken from Scott (1991) 
Variables19 Top 100 
Total number of directors 877 
Total number of directors’ seats 958 
Total number of interlocking 
directors 
81 
Percentage of interlocking 
directors. 
9% 
Cumulation ratio 
 
1.09 
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underdeveloped country setting borrowing from literature which is mostly contextualised in 
developed countries. For the analysis total consistency with a planned and theoretically 
justified methodological procedure has been maintained, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Inferential statistics were used to test the associations among the predicted data and variables. 
Multiple regression tests have been performed for in depth understanding about the model. 
Finally the corporate network graph has been drawn with the help of network software and 
the network type and its features have been discussed. 
In the next chapter the research findings will be evaluated and the conclusion of this thesis 
will be given, highlighting the significance of the study. Chapter 6 presents a summary of the 
study followed by a discussion of the corporate governance literature in association with 
network literature based on interlocking directors. Moreover in the next chapter the limitation 
of the study and areas for future research will also be focused on. Finally the last part of the 
next chapter presents the original contributions and implications of this thesis.  
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Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This research focused on the Bangladeshi corporate network and its attributes. To highlight 
the network structure of Bangladesh, this study focused on the phenomenon of Bangladeshi 
BoDs’ interlocking networks. Furthermore to explore the networks’ features this study 
analysed whether the company’s size, location and closest path of directors’ connection with 
each other in a network have significant influences on company performance, taking into 
account other corporate governance and network variables which include board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, percentage of family members sitting on the board, whether it is 
a family controlled firm, an independent company, a holding company with subsidiaries, or a 
subsidiary of another company. 
To explore the interlocking directors’ network, firstly the social network analysis (SNA) 
technique was adopted in order to visualize the network. The SNA software “Pajek” was used 
for this purpose. The obtained network was found to be an undirected one, having a scale free 
degree distribution tendency. Moreover the network possesses the degree of distribution that 
strongly controls independent behaviour based on the network size. The undirected network 
also conceived short path lengths and highly clustered objects (Clauset et al., 2007). 
The next research objective was to analyse the network attributions in terms of relation to 
company’s performances and influences upon the family dominated firm and with other 
corporate governance variables. Correlation analysis was used to interpret the relationship of 
the relevant variables. To explore this more deeply regression analysis was executed, using 
three models to identify the network influences upon the independent and control variables as 
discussed in chapter 5.  
From the correlation and regression analysis it was observed that there is a significant 
positive correlation between CEO duality and the extent of their network affiliations. This 
means firms having CEO duality have more ties with each other and they are better 
connected with each other than firms who do not have CEO duality. Moreover it was 
observed that a significant negative correlation exists between network closeness and Tobin’s 
Q which is a market based measure of firm performance. This means firms who are more 
closely located to each other in a corporate network have a worse market based performance 
than firms who are not closely located. More specifically, in Bangladesh the network analysis 
 
 
126 
 
results indicate that closely connected companies are associated with lower company 
performance as measured by market based measures of Tobin’s Q.  However no significant 
associations were evident regarding company network and accounting based performance 
measures that is used for this study was Return on asset.  
In this final chapter the research findings will be discussed as they relate to the research 
question and the existing literature on corporate networks. Next it will be shown how these 
findings contribute to the body of network knowledge and to the understanding of BoDs and 
to corporate governance in Bangladesh. As per the author’s knowledge, this will be the first 
systematic study regarding corporate networks of Bangladesh. Finally in this final the key 
findings of the research will be summarised and their implications will be discussed. The 
limitations of the research, recommendations for future research will be highlighted and some 
concluding remarks will be made.  
Section 6.2 provides a summary of the overall findings obtained from the empirical testing 
presented in Chapter 5. In Section 6.3 the theoretical bases, research question and aims, and 
methods will be reviewed, together with a synthesis of the key findings. Section 6.4 addresses 
limitations from the research study relating to the methodology adopted. This includes 
observations on the extent of generalisation that could potentially be achieved from this 
research. Finally recommendations for future research are included in Section 6.5, together 
with concluding comments in Section 6.6. 
6.2 Summary of overall research findings 
 
6.2.1 Discussion on research idea 
The fundamental idea behind this research was to consider a BoD as an important and 
strategic source of critical resources for a company (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In this study it 
was also assumed that the acquisition of critical resources on a BoD is for the purpose of 
activating external relations with the most influential actors important to a firm’s 
environment (Mizruchi, 1996). Moreover, the theoretical base of this study deals with the 
strength of board connectedness, i.e. its contribution to the creation of a corporate network 
through interlocking BoDs. More particularly, more strongly connected boards have more 
potential to acquire more social capital (Nicholson et al., 2004). Furthermore this research 
was also to explore corporate network attributes, therefore relying on the argument provided 
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by Windolf (2002), which is that the structure of corporate networks is formed by the 
traditions, culture, and institutions of a country.  
Since no previous study focused on the corporate network of Bangladesh based on 
interlocking directorates, the researcher’s first aim was to illustrate the patterns of such a 
network. Before proceeding to further analysis the author attempted to explore the corporate 
network pattern by developing an extensive understanding about the interlocking directorate 
phenomenon of Bangladesh. Following this, key network statistics were calculated to observe 
the attributes of the network. To operationalise the research, ties between companies through 
interlocking directors were identified. This is justified on the basis that this network is a 
major identifier of social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The social network analysis 
technique was applied in order to describe the structure of the network, through the following 
indicators: i) number of connections of each actor (degree) and ii) centrality of each actor in 
the network (betweeness), iii) closeness of all other existing actors in the network. Moreover, 
by using the social network analysis it was observed that the Bangladeshi corporate network 
is not highly centralized.  Rather it has an undirected scale free pattern having independent of 
the network size, have short path lengths that are highly clustered which is a crucially 
important attributes to be aware of when doing business or describing how business is 
conducted in Bangladesh. 
6.2.2 The corporate network and the performance of firms of Bangladesh 
In this study the corporate network created by interlocking board connections of top 100 
listed companies’ directors in Bangladesh was analysed. Three regression models were used  
to examine the influences of the obtained network over the firms’ performance, taking into 
account other corporate governance and network variables, such as include company size, 
board size, board independence, CEO duality, percentage of family members sitting in the 
board, whether it is a family controlled firm, an independent company, a holding company 
with subsidiaries, or indeed a subsidiary of another company, whether it is a company who is 
part of  the  corporate network or sub network etc.  
The significant results demonstrate a significant negative correlation between network 
closeness and TQ.  Thus in context in Bangladesh the network analysis results indicate the 
closely connected companies are associated with lower company performance when market-
based measures are used. However no significant associations were evident regarding the 
company network and accounting based performance measures. This analysis is consistent 
with some previous studies (Silva et al., 2006; Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Fich and Shivdasni, 
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2006; & Non, 2007) who found that interlocking directorates are negatively related to the 
profitability of companies. However there was no consistent relationship observed between 
Return on asset and corporate network.  
6.2.3 The corporate network, CEO duality and isolated firms of Bangladesh 
This study observes that there is a significant positive correlation between CEO duality and 
network degree. This means firms having CEO duality have more connections with each 
other and than firms who do not., which  is consistent with the research of Zajac (1996,p.524) 
who has identified the CEO and BoD relationship as crucial to the maintenance of board 
composition and interlocks: 
“…internal organizational politics in the CEO-board relationship can significantly affect the 
selection and retention of directors and the formation and dissolution of board interlocks”. 
There is another result of relationship between corporate network and connected firms 
evident that there is a significant negative relationship exists between isolated firm and 
network degree which means firms who are not part of the network are not connected with 
each other and vice versa. 
 
6.2.4 The corporate network and board size of Bangladeshi firms 
Another finding from the analysis was a significant positive correlation between corporate 
network and board size, meaning firms having large boards have the shortest paths passing 
through to the other firms in the network. More specifically, as betweeness centrality refers to 
how often an actor in the network is the shortest route to reach the other players, regardless of 
the direction of the relationship, from the correlation it is evident that firms with a large board 
size frequently reach each other through the shortest route in the network via interlocking 
directorates. This finding is consistent with research by Peng (2001). 
 
6.2.5 The corporate network and business groups of Bangladesh 
The decile analysis of network results suggests that the companies belonging to a business 
group have many more interlocking directorates than stand-alone companies. Moreover, the 
results show that group companies are inclined to be strongly interlocked with other board 
members of parent companies, thus having more intra-group interlocks. This finding is 
consistent with Rommens (2007, p.1) who argued that group companies have more interlocks 
when they are engaged in an internal capital market and when they are affiliated with a 
diversified business group within different industries. For the Bangladeshi corporate culture, 
 
 
129 
 
the business group participate in an interlocking directorate strategy in order to generate 
capital.  
 
6.2.6 The corporate network and family controlled firms of Bangladesh 
 In this study regression analysis showed a significant negative relationship between family 
controlled firms and the corporate network, meaning that family controlled firms have less 
interlocking directorates than those who are not controlled by a family. This finding is 
consistent with studies where family controlled firms are considered to be influential within 
the corporate network because their influence is due to generational and governance factors 
but not through interlocking directorates in the corporate network (Lester, 2006). 
 
6.3 Implications of the thesis 
 
6.3.1 Implications for theory 
 
Initially the proposed theory was based on resource dependency, given the institutional 
background in Bangladesh where the capital market is weak, unstable, inefficient and 
imperfect for the stakeholders to take the risk of investment (Fry, 1995; Stigliz, 1993). There 
are also some problems in the labour market of Bangladesh regarding the level of expertise, 
skill and professional knowledge, which also makes the corporate sector unstable (Beverly et 
al., 2009). Thus all these factors might force many firms to concentrate on making 
interorganizational relationships through interlocking directorates.  
 
However this study was unable to provide strong empirical support for the proposed theory in 
chapter 2. The negative association between Tobin’s Q and the closeness of the network 
suggests that the market is not prepared to pay a premium for companies who are closely 
connected in a corporate network. However, this was not reflected in the accounting based 
measures in the contemporaneous year, which is 2010.  
 
From this observation it can be argued that shareholders of a developing country may be 
willing to pay a premium for companies they consider well administered rather well 
connected through directors (Kevin, 2010). Moreover directorship interlock may be   
considerable concern for a developing economy, where the capital market is weak, thus 
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shareholders may consider that companies who have more interlocks may have the tendency 
to enhance legitimacy risk (Selznick, 1949).  
 
This research finds support for the class hegemony theory which was proposed to explain the 
characteristics of social class in relation to interlocking directorates. In Section 2.2.4 it was 
argued that in Bangladesh it is apparent that family owned business groups typically 
dominate corporations through interlocking boards (Sarkar &Sarkar, 2009). It is argued that 
business group interlocking is sometimes encouraged because group companies are often 
vertically integrated and the existing directors may share their strategic knowledge regarding 
the present and future projects of their company, which ultimately contributes to improving 
on company performance (Jayati et al., 2005). Moreover, through intergroup companies, 
interlocking knowledge can be shared in evaluating the companies’ strategic planning. As 
there is not a strong capital market in Bangladesh, family firms are forced to arrange capital 
by private equity, friends and family through interlocking boards. The results of this research 
also support the suggestion that companies belonging to a business group have many more 
interlocking directorates than stand alone companies.   
 
Finally this study was unable to find support for the social cohesion theory. This theory was 
proposed for this thesis as it was argued that social cohesion is associated with members 
sharing similar interests, with an extensive network of social contacts. The network enables a 
large flow of relevant information. Interlocking board networks might consist of affiliations 
among directors and companies due to social cohesion. However results found no evidence to 
support the theory. As this study unable to find the significant relationship between family 
controlled firm and corporate network degree, closeness and betweeness.  
 
6.3.2 Implications for practice 
The results of this thesis show that investors in financial markets do not value well-connected 
directors or well-connected boards. As discussed in Section 6.3.1, investors may consider that 
companies who have more interlocks may have the tendency to enhance legitimacy risk. As 
the Bangladeshi stock market is not yet as efficient in terms of information sharing and 
analysing as some other stock markets, investors may be reluctant to invest in those 
networked companies. Therefore financial market investors and market regulators need to be 
guided by proper authorities to create a congenial atmosphere for investment and make the 
share market strong.  
 
 
131 
 
 
On the other hand, companies in the same business group find interlocking crucial to strategic 
decision making. From this study it is evident such companies have more interlocks when 
they are engaged in an internal capital market and when they are affiliated with a diversified 
business group within different industries. For the Bangladeshi corporate culture, business 
groups are participating in the interlocking directorate strategy for the capital generation 
process. Directors from the same group of companies are aware of the importance to their 
network of business connections. In addition, such directors may seek to develop their social 
connections outside of the intercorporate network. The research results support these entire 
mentioned phenomenon.  
 
6.3.3 Implications for methodology 
 According to Peng (2001, p.162) access to good quality information to investigate business 
interlock is easily available: 
“Methodologically interlock research based on a developing country relies on relatively easy-
to-access, large sample archival data and rigorous quantitative methods to generate results 
that are replicable and falsifiable”. Moreover Scott (1991b) also supports the observation of 
Peng regarding the methodological implication of interlocking directorates for developing 
economy. In this research therefore such issues have been taken care of. The methodology 
adopted in this research provides a contemporary measure for inter corporate ties which can 
be easily replicable for future researchers. Moreover this research will motivate future 
interlock researchers to analyse the corporate network by utilizing social capital theory and 
social network analysis as those theories can successfully serve the research purpose. 
However multiple dimensions are always welcome in research and thus inevitably 
researchers have the flexibility to choose their method based on their own research objective.  
 
6.4 Limitations 
1) Although in this study corporate network measures show variability, there was generally 
an observed significant correlation within the variables. However, the pattern of findings was 
not supportive enough to measure the network betweeness and closeness more efficiently. 
 
2) This study only captures data on the top 100 companies’ directors, which could weaken an 
understanding of the associations of indirect ties.  This would occur where the top100 
directors also served on the boards of other listed or unlisted companies not in the top100.  
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Significant associations may occur in the formal network outside of those sample companies. 
Therefore as the sample was limited to the top 100, that could be considered to be one of the 
restrictions of this research. To deal with the limitation would require a broadening of the 
study by including all companies in Bangladesh, however for research at this level, this is 
beyond the scope of a researcher in terms of the investment of resources and time. 
 
3) This study was unable to find support for all proposed theories, which might be considered 
to be a limitation of this study.  However, the opposite could also hold true, in that support 
for two and not the third is an indicative research result in itself. 
 
4) Limitations are also observed in the data collection process. Most were collected from 
secondary archival data sources; therefore there was some inadequacy of data. However 
publicly available archival data sources may not have captured all the necessary information 
useful to portray the corporate network more comprehensively or consistently. 
 
5) This study was conducted using 2010 data because of its availability. Therefore it could be 
criticized on the grounds that the data was not contemporary.  
 
6) In this study the relationships within the corporate network were analysed and attributes of 
that network were explored by using some performance variables, corporate governance 
variables and network variables for the year 2010. Thus the results of this analysis can 
possibly be used across other years for the same population of interest.  However, this 
research design does not allow for changes over time to be analysed.  
 
7) As discussed in Section 6.2.2, using the accounting based performance measure of ROA 
failed to demonstrate any significant result, which was opposite to expectations.   
 
8) The data collection process was based on a much narrower and sometimes superficial 
dataset. As a consequence, results are limited as they provide numerical descriptions rather 
than a detailed narrative.  
 
9) Like other governance research this research has potential endogeneity problems. 
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10) Finally the researcher concentrated only on one type of interorganizational relationship, 
board membership, but the analysis of the Bangladeshi corporate network should be enriched 
by adding data about ownership ties, supplier relations and customer relations among banks 
and firms. 
 
Although acknowledgement of these limitations is important for any research and may lessen 
the research value these limitations do not detract from the overall significance of the 
findings or implications of this research. 
 
6.5 Directions for future research  
The limitations that were described in Section 6.4 may provide opportunities for future 
research.  These limitations delineate restrictions on more extensive and rigorous analysis and 
further potential findings of this research. In particular, the author has been unable to 
extensively explore the answer to my leading research question due to inconclusive and 
inconsistent results. Moreover it is hoped more research is undertaken regarding corporate 
networks for both developing economies, to contribute to improving their corporate 
governance structure.  
 
A longitudinal study could be done which could help to strengthen claims about cause and 
effect relationships (Cavana et al., 2001, p. 122) to investigate the relationship between 
BoDs’ contacts and company performance over time. Such data can be used to analyse 
network data and performance more extensively. 
 
Future research may also take a different approach to measuring company performance. This 
could include developing combined measures of accounting performance (Boyd, 1990), to 
obtain more relevant and consistent findings. 
 
Future researchers should examine how directorship interlock influences general political 
issues, government policies and corporate strategies of a developing market economy. 
 
Finally it would also be beneficial to use qualitative methods such as interviews and surveys 
to complement quantitative techniques. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
According to Mizruchi (1996, p.280) there is a practical purpose for interlock research in the 
promotion of corporate governance: “If interlocks are to be worth studying it is essential that 
they be shown to have consequences for the behaviour of firms”.  
This particular study has been focused on the formation of a Bangladeshi corporate network 
context. In particular, through this research interlocks have been significantly explored as an 
important strategic behaviour of firms in a developing economy.  This thesis has investigated 
intercorporate connections of BoDs based on the developing economy of Bangladesh.   
 
This study relates to directors of the top 100 listed companies based on market capitalization 
for the year 2010. According to this researcher’s knowledge, this is the first systematic study 
regarding this issue, thus the research question was “What are the characteristics of 
Bangladeshi corporate networks?” Through this research question the author was to explore 
the Bangladeshi corporate network and its effects on firms’ performance, taking into account 
some positive governance and network variables which might suggest a systemic vision of 
governance that contributes to defining governance mechanisms and BoDs in Bangladesh.  
 
A second contribution is methodological. A quantitative methodology was relied on which 
has seldom been employed to explore developing economy corporate network. The network 
methodology used in interlocks research often demands large scale, high quality data which 
are usually only available in developed countries, not in a Third World country.  Therefore 
considering such a study to be challenging, this researcher has taken advantage of a hand 
collected comprehensive and archival based data set to perform this research. Analysis of 
results is replicable, can be compared with the findings from other relevant studies and can be 
used for future study. Moreover, through understanding social capital and through the 
application of social network analysis to explore human relationships within corporate 
networks, this study may have some limitations, nevertheless it is this researcher’s belief that 
some future researchers may fill the gaps within this study. 
 
Finally, as interlocking directorates are considered an important feature when investigating 
corporate governance, considerable research still needs to be done to understand in this area 
in emerging economies or developing countries in general. If this work can provoke more 
researchers to move forward to undertake interlocking network research on developing 
economies, a further important mission of this research will have been accomplished. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix-1 
  
Director-connections database (tables) 
 
1.  Positions table (attributes) 
 
• Person No., a unique code assigned to every company director from the Person’s table. 
 
• Company ID., a unique  code used by the Dhaka  Stock Exchange  (DSE) 
to identify a company.  All Top 100 Bangladeshi companies are 
assigned a unique listing code 
• Year, 2010 in all cases.  This is the year that the relationship was current. 
 
• Source (of data), Company annual report for 2010. 
 
 
 
 
2.  People table (attributes) 
• Person Id 
• Person_Number; a unique integer assigned to every person/ company director 
• Surname; the director’s surname 
• Firstname; the director’s first-name or initials 
• Date of Birth;  not populated. 
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Appendix-2 Top 95 companies based on Market capitalization 2010 
     
DSE Code Company name 
Mkt cap 2010 
(tk.m) 
Board 
size 
Board 
ind. 
GP GRAMEENPHONE LTD 331904 10 10% 
ICB INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF BANGLADESH 99835 12 0% 
TITASGAS TITAS GAS TRANSMISSION & DIST. CO. LTD. 88152 9 0% 
     NBL NATIONAL BANK LIMITED 84536 14 0% 
     NHFIL NATIONAL HOUSING FINANCE AND INVESTMENTS LTD 62886 12 0% 
ISLAMIBANK ISLAMI BANK BANGLADESH LIMITED 59317 17 6% 
PBL PUBALI BANK LIMITED 53363 14 0% 
ABBANK AB BANK LTD 50734 14 7% 
BEXIMCO BANGLADESH EXPORT IMPORT CO. LIMITED 46974 8 0% 
DUTCHBANGL DUTCH-BANGLA BANK LIMITED 45855 8 12% 
BATBC BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO BANGLADESH CO. LTD. 42990 10 30% 
PRIMEFIN PRIME FINANCE AND INVESTMENT LTD 42048 11 9% 
SOUTHEASTB SOUTHEAST BANK LIMITED 41597 17 0% 
RAKCERAMIC RAK CERAMICS (BANGLADESH) LIMITED 39485 6 17% 
POWERGRID POWER GRID COMPANY OF BANGLADESH LTD 37347 8 0% 
EBL EASTERN BANK LIMITED 37795 10 10% 
DESCO DHAKA ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED 36692 10 0% 
BSRM BSRM STEELS LIMITED 35379 6 17% 
IFIC 
 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INVESTMENT AND COMMERCE 
BANK  30972 12 0% 
NCCBANK NATIONAL CREDIT AND COMMERCE BANK LTD. 30989 27 4% 
EXIM BANK EXPORT IMPORT BANK OF BANGLADESH LIMITED 27649 25 0% 
     PADMAOIL PADMA OIL COMPANY LTD 26569 7 14% 
BANKASIA BANK ASIA LIMITED 25725 17 0% 
ONEKBANKLTD ONE BANK LIMITED 23767 11 9% 
MERCANBANK MERCANTILE BANK LIMITED 23626 22 0% 
     BXPHARMA BEXIMCO PHARMACEUTICALS LTD 23480 10 10% 
BRACBANK BRAC BANK LIMITED 22948 7 14% 
RUPALIBANK RUPALI BANK LIMITED 21706 12 0% 
HEIDELBCEM HEIDELBERG CEMENT BANGLADESH LTD. 20858 10 0% 
STANDBANKL STANDARD BANK LIMITED 20478 22 5% 
DHAKABANK DHAKA BANK LIMITED 20293 20 0% 
MARICO MARICO BANGLADESH LIMITED 20683 7 29% 
BERGERPBL BERGER PAINTS BANGLADESH LIMITED 19868 8 13% 
CITYBANK CITY BANK LTD 19605 13 0% 
PREMIERBAN PREMIER BANK LTD (THE) 18773 15 0% 
SQUARETEXT SQUARE TEXTILES LIMITED 17036 10 10% 
 
 
   TRUSTBANK TRUST BANK LTD (THE) 16722 9 0% 
     SINGERBD SINGER BANGLADESH LIMITED 16087 11 0% 
AFTABAUTO AFTAB AUTOMOBILES LIMITED 15027 7 14% 
SIBL SOCIAL ISLAMI BANK LTD 15777 19 0% 
ALARBANK AL-ARAFAH ISLAMI BANK LTD. 15625 19 0% 
MTBL MUTUAL TRUST BANK 15015 13 0% 
UNIONCAP UNION CAPITAL LTD 13426 13 8% 
ICBIBANK ICB ISLAMIC BANK LIMITED 12895 6 0% 
     RNSPIN R. N. SPINNING MILLS LTD 12812 6 0% 
SHINEPUKUR SHINEPUKUR CERAMICS LIMITED 10578 4 0% 
PHOENIXFIN PHOENIX FINANCE AND INVESTMENT LTD 9929 13 0% 
DBHFC DELTA BRAC HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION LTD 5748 10 0% 
BAYLEASING BAY LEASING & INVESTMENT LTD 9071 10 0% 
BATA BATA SHOE COMPANY (BANGLADESH) LIMITED 8945 5 40% 
     ACI ADVANCED CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD 7228 10 0% 
SALAMCRST S. ALAM COLD ROLLED STEELS LTD 6654 3 0% 
MIDASFIN MIDAS FINANCING LIMITED 6048 11 0% 
RECKITTBEN RECKITT BENCKISER (BD) LTD 5736 7 0% 
ACTIVEFINE ACTIVE FINE CHEMICALS LTD 5488 7 0% 
PREMIERLEA PREMIER LEASING & FINANCE LTD 4801 12 8% 
EHL EASTERN HOUSING LTD 4673 6 0% 
MAKSONSPIN MAKSONS SPINNING MILLS LTD 4653 8 25% 
APEXADELFT APEX ADELCHI FOOTWEAR LTD. 4523 7 14% 
OLYMPIC OLYMPIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED 4176 5 0% 
ACIFORMULA ACI FORMULATIONS LIMITED 4194 7 0% 
SUMMITPOWER SUMMIT POWER CO. LTD. 3895 12 0% 
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OCL OCEAN CONTAINERS LIMITED 3437 13 0% 
PRAGATILIF PRAGATI LIFE INSURANCE LTD 3430 21 0% 
GOLDENSON GOLDEN SON LIMITED 3171 7 14% 
BXSYNTH BEXIMCO SYNTHETICS LIMITED 3089 8 13% 
ARAMIT ARAMIT LIMITED 2921 10 10% 
APEXTANRY APEX TANNERY LTD 2259 6 0% 
ARAMITCEM ARAMIT CEMENT LIMITED 2227 6 16% 
IBNSINA THE IBN SINA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY LTD 1777 9 11% 
AMBEE AMBEE PHARMACEUTICALS LTD 1660 7 14% 
KOHINOOR KOHINOOR CHEMICAL COMPANY (BANGLADESH) LTD 1549 8 0% 
DACCADYE THE DACCA DYEING & MANUFACTURING LIMITED 2592 8 25% 
DELTASPINN DELTA SPINNERS LIMITED 1417 6 16% 
ECABLES EASTERN CABLES LTD 1378 10 0% 
RANFOUNDRY RANGPUR FOUNDRY LTD 1312 9 0% 
     QSMDRYCELL QUASEM DRYCELLS LTD 1655 6 16% 
AGNI AGNI SYSTEMS LTD 1171 6 16% 
HRTEXT H R TEXTILE MILLS 1108 7 14% 
FUWANG FU WANG FOODS LIMITED 1081 7 14% 
DAFFODIL DAFFODIL COMPUTERS LTD 994 5 0% 
     SAMORITA SAMORITA HOSPITAL LTD 922 12 8% 
BDCOM BDCOM ONLINE LIMITED 447 8 13% 
APEXFOOD APEX FOODS LTD 574 6 17% 
INTECH INTECH ONLINE LTD 545 7 0% 
ANWARGAL ANWAR GALVANIZING LTD 418 11 0% 
AZIZPIPE AZIZ PIPES LTD 394 6 17% 
INFORMATION INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK LTD 374 12 8% 
KAYQUE KAY & QUE BANGLADESH LTD 228 7 0% 
STANDARDCER STANDARD CERAMIC INDUSTRIES LTD 207 10 0% 
GEMINI GEMINI SEA FOOD LTD 345 7 0% 
IMAMBUTTON IMAM BUTTON INDUSTRIES LTD 162 6 0% 
     DULAMIA DULAMIA COTTON SPINNING MILLS LTD 148 7 0% 
DESH DESH GARMENTS LTD 97 5 20% 
 
Appendix-3 Code of conduct of SEC regarding Bangladeshi board 
 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Jiban Bima Tower  
10, Dilkusha (15th, 16th and 20th Floor)  
Dhaka-1000  
  NOTIFICATION  
Dated the 20th February, 2006  
No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08: Whereas, the Securities and Exchange Commission (herein after referred to as the "Commission') deems it fit that 
the consent already accorded by the Commission, or deemed to have been accorded by it, or to be accorded by it in future, to the issue of capital by the companies 
listed with any stock exchange in Bangladesh, should be subject to certain further conditions, on 'comply or explain' basis, in order to enhance corporate 
governance in the interest of investors and the capital market; 
Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (XVII of 1969), the Commission hereby 
supersedes its earlier Order No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-06 dated the 9th January, 2006 and imposes the following further conditions to the consent 
already accorded by it, or deemed to have been accorded by it, or to be accorded by it in future, to the issue of capital by the companies listed with any stock 
exchange in Bangladesh: 
Provided, however, that these conditions are imposed on 'comply or explain'basis. The companies listed with any stock exchange in Bangladesh should comply 
with these conditions or shall explain the reasons for non-compliance in accordance with the condition No.5. 
The Conditions: 
                 1.1. Board's Size 
  
The number of the board members of the company should not be less than 5 (five) and more than 20 (twenty):  
Provided, however, that in the case of banks and non-bank financial institutions, insurance companies and statutory bodies for which separate 
primary regulators like Bangladesh Bank, Department of Insurance etc. exist, the Board of those companies should be constituted as may be 
prescribed by such primary regulators in so far as those prescriptions are not inconsistent with the aforesaid condition. 
  
  
  
 
 
 
163 
 
 
1.2.Independent Directors 
All companies should encourage effective representation of independent directors on their Board of Directors so that the Board, as a group, 
includes core competencies considered relevant in the context of each company. For this purpose, the companies should comply with the 
following:- 
(i) At least one tenth (1/10) of the total number of the company's board of directors, subject to a minimum of one, should be independent directors. 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause "independent director" means a director who does not hold any share in the company or who holds less 
than one percent (1%) shares of the total paid-up shares of the company, who is not connected with the company's promoters or directors or 
shareholder who holds one percent (1%) or more than one percent (1%) shares of the total paid-up shares of the company on the basis of family 
relationship; who does not have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, with the company or its subsidiary/associated companies, 
who is not a member, director or officer of any stock exchange, and who is not a shareholder, director or officer of any member of stock exchange 
or an intermediary of the capital market. 
(ii) The independent director(s) should be appointed by the elected directors. 
  1.3 Chairman  of the Board and Chief Executive 
  
The positions of the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of the companies should preferably be filled by different  
Individuals. The Chairman of the company should be elected from among the directors of the company.  
The Board of Directors should clearly define respective roles and responsibilities of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer. 
1.4. The Director's Report to Shareholders   The directors of the companies should include following additional statements in the  
Directors' Report prepared under section 184 of the Companies Act, 1994:-  
(a) The financial statements prepared by the management of the issuer company present fairly its state of affairs,  
the result of its operations, cash flows and changes in equity. 
(b) Proper books of account of the issuer company have been maintained. 
(c) Appropriate accounting policies have been consistently applied in preparation of the financial statements and that the accounting  
estimates are based on reasonable and prudent judgment. 
(d) International Accounting Standards, as applicable in Bangladesh, have been followed in preparation of the financial statements  
and any departure there from has been adequately disclosed. 
(e) The system of internal control is sound in design and has been effectively implemented and monitored. 
(f) There are no significant doubts upon the issuer company's ability to continue as a going concern. If the issuer company is not 
 considered to be a going concern, the fact along with reasons thereof should be disclosed. 
(g) Significant deviations from last year in operating results of the issuer company should be highlighted and reasons thereof should be explained. 
(h) Key operating and financial data of at least preceding three years should be summarised. 
(i) If the issuer company has not declared dividend (cash or stock) for the year, the reasons thereof should be given. 
(j) The number of Board meetings held during the year and attendance by each director should be disclosed. 
(k) The pattern of shareholding should be reported to disclose the aggregate number of shares (along with name wise details  
where stated below) held by:- 
(i)Parent/Subsidiary/Associatedcompaniesandotherrelatedparties(namewisedetails); 
(ii) Directors, Chief Executive Officer, Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer, Head of Internal Audit and their spouses and minor children’s 
Name wise details. 
(iii)Executives; 
And 
 
(iv) Shareholders holding ten percent (10%) or more voting interest in the company (name wise details). 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause, the expression "executive" means top five salaried employees of the company, other than the Directors, 
Chief Executive Officer, Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer and Head of Internal Audit. 
 
 
2.00  CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO), HEAD OF INTERNAL AUDIT,  AND COMPANY SECRETARY 
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2.1  Appointment  
   The company should appoint a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), a Head of Internal Audit and a Company Secretary. The Board of Directors 
should clearly define respective roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO, the Head of Internal Audit and the Company Secretary.   
2.2  Requirement to Attend Board Meetings 
   The CFO and the Company Secretary of the companies should attend meetings of the Board of Directors, provided that the CFO and/or the 
Company Secretary should not attend such part of a meeting of the Board of Directors which involves consideration of an agenda item relating to 
the CFO and/or the Company Secretary. 
 3.00  AUDIT COMMITTEE: The company should have an Audit Committee as a sub-committee of the Board of Directors. The Audit 
Committee should assist the Board of Directors in ensuring that the financial statements reflect true and fair view of the state of affairs of the 
company and in ensuring a good monitoring system within the business. The Audit Committee shall be responsible to the Board of Directors. The 
duties of the Audit Committee should be clearly set forth in writing. 
3.1  Constitution  of Audit Committee 
  (i) The Audit Committee should be composed of at least 3 (three) members. 
  (ii) The Board of Directors should appoint members of the Audit Committee who should be directors of the company and should include at least 
one independent director. 
(iii) When the term of service of the Committee members expires or there is any circumstance causing any Committee member to be unable to hold 
office until expiration of the term of service, thus making the number of the Committee members to be lower than the prescribed number of 3 
(three) persons, the Board of Directors should appoint the new Committee member(s) to fill up the vacancy(ies) immediately or not later than 1 
(one) month from the date of vacancy(ies) in the Committee to ensure continuity of the performance of work of the Audit Committee. 
3.2  Chairman of the Audit Committee  
  (i) The Board of Directors should select 1 (one) member of the Audit Committee to be Chairman of the Audit Committee. 
(ii) The Chairman of the audit committee should have a professional qualification or knowledge, understanding and experience in accounting or 
finance. 
3.3  Reporting of the Audit Committee  
3.3.1 Reporting to the Board of Directors 
(i) The Audit Committee should report on its activities to the Board of Directors. 
(ii) The Audit Committee should immediately report to the Board of Directors on the following findings, if any:- 
(a) Report on conflicts of interests; 
(b) Suspected or presumed fraud or irregularity or material defect in the internal control      system; 
(c) Suspected infringement of laws, including securities related laws, rules and      regulations; and 
(d) Any other matter which should be disclosed to the Board of Directors immediately. 
3.3.2 Reporting to the Authorities 
If the Audit Committee has reported to the Board of Directors about anything which has material impact on the financial condition and results of 
operation and has discussed with the Board of Directors and the management that any rectification is necessary and if the Audit Committee finds 
that such rectification has been unreasonably ignored, the Audit Committee should report such finding to the Commission, upon reporting of such 
matters to the Board of Directors for three times or completion of a period of 9 (nine) months from the date of first reporting to the Board of 
Directors, whichever is earlier. 
3.4  Reporting to the Shareholders and General Investors 
   Report on activities carried out by the Audit Committee, including any report made to the Board of Directors under condition 3.3.1 (ii) 
above during the year, should be signed by the Chairman of the Audit Committee and disclosed in the annual report of the issuer company. 
  4.00  EXTERNAL / STATUTORY AUDITORS 
 The issuer company should not engage its external/statutory auditors to perform the following services of the company; namely:- 
(i) Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions; 
(ii) Financial information systems design and implementation; 
(iii) Book-keeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements; 
(iv) Broker-dealer services; 
(v) Actuarial services; 
(vi) Internal audit services; and 
(vii) Any other service that the Audit Committee determines. 
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5.00  REPORTING THE COMPLI ANCE  IN THE DIRECTOR'S REPORT 
The directors of the company shall state, in accordance with the annexure attached, in the directors' report whether the company has complied with 
these conditions. 
Status of compliance with the conditions imposed by the Commission's Notification No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08 dated 20th 
February,2006issued under section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969: 
(Report Under Condition No 5.00) 
Condition No  Title  
Compliance Status  
(Put √ in the appropriate column)  
Complied Not Complied  
 
Explanation for non-compliance with the condition 
1.1       
1.2 (i)       
1.2(ii)       
1.3       
1.4 (a)       
1.4(b)       
1.4(c)       
1.4(d)       
1.4(e)       
1.4(f)       
1.4(g)       
1.4(h)       
1.4(i)       
1.4(j)       
1.4(k)       
2.1       
2.2       
3.0       
3.1 (i)       
3.1 (ii)       
3.1 (iii)       
3.2 (i)       
3.2 (ii)       
3.3.1(i)       
3.3.1(ii)(a)       
3.3.1(ii)(b)       
3.3.1(ii)(c)       
3.3.1(ii)(d)       
3.3.2       
3.4       
4.00 (i)       
4.00 (ii)       
4.00 (iii)       
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4.00 (iv)       
4.00 (v)       
4.00 (vi)       
4.00 (vii)       
                                            By order of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
 
    
 
  
Appoi   
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Appendix-4 Board of Bangladesh: 
The Companies Act (Bangladesh), 1994 (Act No. 18 of 1994 An Act) 
 
According to Company Act 1994 of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (2) 
(f) "Director" includes any person occupying the position of director by whatever name called; 
Directors 
90. Directors obligatory - (1) Every public company and a private company which is a subsidiary of a public company shall have at least three directors. 
(2) Every private company other than a private company mentioned in sub-section (1) shall have at least two directors; 
(3) Only a natural person may be appointed a director. 
91. Appointment of directors: - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the articles of a company-- 
(a) the subscribers of the memorandum shall be deemed to be the directors of the company until the first director are appointed. 
(b) the directors of the company shall be elected by the members from among their number in general meeting; and 
(c) any casual vacancy occurring among the directors may be filled in by the other directors but the person the appointed shall be a person qualified to be elected a 
director under clause  
(d) and shall be subject to retirement at the same time as if he had become a director on the day on which the director in whose place he is appointed was last 
appointed a director. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the articles of a company other than a private company not less than one third of the whole number of directors shall be 
persons whose period of office is liable to determination at any time by retirement of directors’ rotation. 
92. Restrictions on appointment or advertisement of director - (1) A person shall not be capable of being appointed director of a company by the articles and shall 
not be named as a director or proposed director of a company in any prospectus issued by or on behalf of the company or in relation to any intended company or 
in any statement in lieu of prospectus filed by or on behalf of a company unless before the registration of the articles or the publication of the prospectus, or the 
filing of he statement in lieu of prospectus, as the case may be, he has by himself or by his agent authorised in writing - 
(a) signed and filed with the Registrar a consent in writing to act as such director; and 
(b) in the case of companies having a share capital – 
(i) signed the memorandum for a number of shares not less than his qualification shares; or 
(ii) taken from the company and paid or agreed to pay for his qualification shares; or 
(iii) signed and filed with the registrar a contract in writing to take form the company and pay for his qualification shares; or 
(iv) made and filed with the Registrar any affidavit to the effect that a number of shares not less than his qualifications share are registered in his name. 
(2) On the application for registration of the memorandum and article, if any, of a company, the applicant shall file with the Registrar a list of the persons who 
have consented to be directors of the company, and, if this list contains the name of any person who has not so consented, the applicant shall be liable to fine not 
exceeding two thousand taka: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the appointment of the chief executive, by whatever name called, of any 
insurance company or a banking company as a director of that company if the article; thereof provides for such appointment. 
93. Consent of candidate for directorship - (1) Every person, proposed as a candidate for the office of a director shall sign, and file with the company, his consent 
in writing to act as a director, if appointed. 
(2) A person shall not act as a director of the company unless he has, within thirty days of his appointment, signed and field with the Registrar his consent in 
writing to act as such director. 
94. Disqualifications of directors - (1) A person shall not be capable of being appointed director of a company, if - 
(a) he has been found to be of unsound mind by a competent court and the finding is in force; or 
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent; or 
(c) he has applied to be adjudicated as an insolvent and his application is pending; or 
(d) he has not paid any call in repect of shares of the company held by him, whether alone or jointly with others, and six months have elapsed from the last day 
fixed for the payment of the call; or 
(e) he is a minor. 
(2) A company may in its articles provide additional grounds for disqualification of a director. 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
Appendice-5 Corporate governance checklist for companies of Bangladesh 
1. Corporate governance checklist for Banking companies of Bangladesh 
 Disclosure Item Legal Reference Disclosure Quantitative 
Information 
(If Any) NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minima
l 
Moderate Adequate 
I. Ownership Structure and Investor Rights 
I.A Transparency of Ownership 
1 1 The number of authorized ordinary shares   ×   Not Applicable  √ 
2 2 The par value of each ordinary share  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
3 3 The number of issued, subscribed and fully paid ordinary shares  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
4 4 Shares issued for cash or non-cash (bonus share)  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
5 5 Review of shareholders by type - % of equity holding by Sponsors, 
Govt., Institutions, Foreigners and General Public 
LR NO. 20(2) ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
6 6 Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held by 
parent/subsidiary/Associated companies and other related parties 
CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
7 7 Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held by directors, 
CEO, Company Secretary, CFO, Head of Internal Audit and their 
spouses and minor children 
CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
8 8 Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held by executives CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
9 9 Distribution schedule of each class of equity security for categories 
like less than 500 shares, 501 to 5,000 shares,… … ,over 1,000,000 
share 
LR NO. 37(3) ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
I.B Ownership Concentration 
10 1 The number and identity of shareholders holding 10% or less  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
11 2 The number and identity of shareholders holding 10% or more CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
I.C Shareholder Rights 
12 1 Availability and accessibility of AGM agenda  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
13 2 Date and location of AGM  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
14 3 AGM notice sent at least 14 days before the AGM?  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
15 4 Availability and  accessibility of  proxy form/  Proxy form sent  with 
annual report 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
16 5 Is there any requirement for a proxy appointment to be notarized/ 
signature by witness 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
17 6 A review of last shareholder meeting (such as minutes)  ×  √   ×    
18 7 Disclosure of the company's policy/ strategy to facilitate effective 
communication with shareholders and other stakeholders 
 ×  √   ×    
19 8 Disclosure of company’s policy on ensuring participation of 
shareholders in the AGM and providing reasonable opportunity for 
the shareholder participation in the AGM 
 ×  √   ×    
20 9 The existence of Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best 
Practice 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
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21 10 The details of Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best Practice  ×  √   ×    
22 11 Existence of a code of business conduct and ethics / core values  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
23 12 The contents of a code of business conduct and ethics/ Disclosure of 
statement of ethics and values, covering basic principles such as 
integrity, conflict of 
 ×  √   ×    
24 13 Dissemination/communication of the statement of ethics & business 
practices to all directors and employees and their acknowledgement 
of the same 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
25 14 Board's statement on commitment to establishing high level of ethics 
and compliance within the organization 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
26 15 Information on effective anti-fraud programs and controls, including 
effective protection of whistle blowers, establishing a hot line 
reporting of irregularities etc. 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
27 16 A formalized dividend policy  ×  √       
II. Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure 
28 1 Company mission/vision statement disclosure  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
29 2 Identification of business objectives and areas of business focus 
disclosed/ Objective statement 
 ×  √       
30 3 General description of strategies to achieve the company's business 
objectives 
 ×  √       
31 4 Information  on  business  operations,  competitive  position,  and  
other  non- financial matters 
 ×  √       
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5(a) Does the company have a separate report of the board of directors 
describing their responsibilities in reviewing the firm's financial 
statement? 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 5(b) Board of directors' responsibilities in reviewing the firm's financial 
statement disclosed in the notes 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
      √  33 6 Board’s statement on fairness of financial statements CG Condition 1.4 
(a) 
×  √ Not Applicable  × 
34 7 Board's statement on maintenance of proper books of accounts CG Condition 1.4 
(b) 
×  √ Not Applicable  × 
35 8(a) Board's statement on consistent adaptation of appropriate accounting 
policies and estimates 
CG Condition 1.4 
(c) 
×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 8(b) Statement  on  consistent  adaptation  of  appropriate  accounting  
policies  and estimates in the notes to the financial statements 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
36 9(a) Board's statement on compliance with relevant accounting standards CG Condition 1.4 
(d) 
×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 9(b) Statement on compliance with relevant accounting standards in notes  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
37 10 Principal Accounting Policies  ×  √   ×    
38 11 Statement on significant changes in accounting and valuation 
principles and impact of alternative accounting decisions 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
39 12(a) Board's statement on risk and uncertainty for use of estimates and 
judgments 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 12(b) Statement on risk and uncertainty for use of estimates and judgments 
in notes 
 ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
40 13(a) Directors' statement on ability to continue as going concern CG Condition 1.4 
(f) 
×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 
 Disclosure Item Legal Reference Disclosure Quantitative 
Information 
(If Any) 
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minima
 
Moderate Adequate 
 13(b) Statement on ability to continue as going concern in the notes  ×  √ Not Applicable   × 
41 14 Board's statement on significant deviation from last year operating 
 
CG Condition 1.4 
 
×  √ Not Applicable   × 
42 15 Financial and operating results for at least last three years CG Condition 1.4 
 
×  √ Not Applicable  √ 
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43 16 Information on related party transactions: BAS 24 ×  √    
 16(a) Names of related parties  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 16(b) Primary lines of business of related party  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 16(c) Natue of relationship  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 16(d) Nature of transactions  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 16(e) Value of transactions in current year  ×  √ Not Applicable  √ 
 16(f) Balance at year end  ×  √ Not Applicable  √ 
44 17 Related party disclosures: BRPD Circular # 
14 
×  √   
 17a Directors' interests in different entities  ×  √   
 17ai Name of directors  ×  √ Not Applicable  × 
 17aii Status in the bank  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 17aiii Name(s) of the firms in which directors have interests  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 17aiv Status in those entities  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 17av Percentage of holding/interest in the concern  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
 17b Significant contracts where bank is a pary & wherein directros have 
interests 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
 17c Shares issued to directors and executives without consideration or 
exercisable at discount. 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
 17d Information on lending policies to related parties  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 17e Information on business other than banking business with any related 
concerns of 
  
BCA'91: 18(2) ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 17f Investments in the Securities of Directors and their related concerns  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
45 18 Dividend information and disclosure for non-payment CG Condition 1.4 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
46 19 Information on foreign currency transaction/exposure BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
47 20 Information on financing and management of the staff pension fund BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
48 21 Credit rating information BRPD Circular 
 
×  √  ×    
49 22 Compliance with minimum capital standards BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
50 23 Information about future plans BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √  ×    
51 24 Evaluation of annual work-plan BRPD Circular # 
16 
×  √  ×    
52 25(a) Chairman’s statement about events occurring after the Balance Sheet 
d  
LR NO. 37(5) ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 25(b) Events after the Balance Sheet date in the notes  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
53 26 Separate Corporate Governance statement/ separate section for 
  
×  √ Not Applicable × 
54 27 Compliance with SEC notification CG Condition 5.0 ×  √ Not Applicable × 
55 28 Awards or external recognition for governance quality  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
III. Board and Management Structure and Process 
56 1 Number of directors on the board CG Condition 1.1 ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
57 2 List of directors on the board (names/titles)  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 
58 
 
3 
Reconstitution of the board every year /Appointment and rotation of 
the board members 
CA 1994 Sec. 
91(2) 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
59 4 Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
 
60 
 
5 
Details about directors (other than name/title)- year of birth, 
academic and professional qualification etc. 
×  √      
61 6 Date of joining as directors on the board  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
62 7 Details about current employment/positions of directors  ×  √      
63 8 Details about previous employment/positions of directors  ×  √      
64 9 No. of directorships held by individual board member BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
65 10 Role and functions of the board BRPD Circular # 
16 
×  √      
66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Does the company clearly distinguish the roles and responsibilities of 
the board and management? 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
67 12 Number/appointment of Independent Directors on the board CG Condition 
1.2(i) 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
68 13 Name(s) of Independent Director(s)  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
69 14 Affirmation of the board on independent director's independence/ 
does the company state in the annual report the definition of 
"independence" for identifying independent directors in public 
communications? 
×  √      
70 15 Details  about  independent  director  (other  than  name/title)-  year  
of  birth, academic and professional qualification etc. 
×  √      
71 16 Date of joining as independent director on the board  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
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72 17 Details about current employment/positions of Independent director  ×  √      
73 18 Details about previous employment/positions of independent director  ×  √      
74 19 The chairman and CEO positions held by same/related/unrelated 
 
CG Condition 1.3 ×  √      
75 20 Chairman of the board is a non-executive director  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
76 21 Chairman of the board is independent  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
77 22 Responsibilities of the chairman of the board of directors disclosed BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √      
78 23 Biography of the CEO supplied BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √      
79 24 Responsibilities of the CEO BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √      
80 25 Appointment/rotation of adviser BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
81 26 Biography of the adviser BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √      
82 27 Responsibilities of the adviser BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √      
83 28 An audit committee has been established CG Condition 3.0 ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 Disclosure Item Legal Reference Disclosure Quantitative 
Information 
(If Any) 
NO 
  
YES  Comprehensiveness 
 
 
Moderate Adequate 
84 29 Number of directors on the audit committee CG Condition 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
85 30 Number of independent directors on the audit committee CG Condition 
3.1(ii) 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
 30(b) Existence of non-executive directors on the audit committee  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
86 31 Names of all members in the audit committee provided  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
87 32 Chairman of the audit committee is an independent director  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 32(b) Chairman of the audit committee is a non-executive director  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
88 33 Chairman of the audit committee is not also the chairman of the 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
89 34 Qualification of the chairman of the audit committee CG Condition 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
90 35 Qualification of audit committee members BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
91 36 Rotation of audit committee members BRPD Circular # 
12 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
92 37 The audit committee has a formal charter/ Disclosure of audit 
committee's roles and responsibilities 
CG Condition 3.0 ×  √  ×    
93 38 Disclosure of audit committee report in the annual report CG Condition 3.4 ×  √ Not Applicable × 
94 39 Audit committee report signed by the Chairman of the audit 
 
CG Condition 3.4 ×  √ Not Applicable × 
95 40 Number of audit committee meetings during the year BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
96 41 Attendance in the audit committee meetings  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
97 42 Overview of last audit committee meeting/ activities during last year  ×  √  ×    
98 43(i) An executive committee has been established  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
 43(ii) A management committee has been established  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
99 44 Number of directors on the executive/management committee  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
100 45 Names of all members in the executive/management committee 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
101 46 Role and functions of the executive/management committee are 
 
×  √      
102 47 Number of executive/management committee meetings during the 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
103 48 Attendance in the executive/management committee meetings  ×  √ Not Applicable  √ 
104 49 Establishment of a credit committee  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
105 50 Role and functions of the credit committee  ×  √      
106 51 Names/Number of members in the credit committee  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
107 52 Biography of the chairman of the credit committee  ×  √      
108 53 Establishment of Asset Liability Management Committee (ALCO)  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
109 54 Role and functions of ALCO  ×  √      
110 55 Names/Number of members in ALCO  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
111 56 Biography of the chairman of ALCO  ×  √      
112 57 Appointment of a CFO CG Condition 2.1 ×  √ Not Applicable × 
113 58 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO CG Condition 2.1 ×  √    × 
114 59 Appointment of head of internal audit CG Condition 2.1 ×  √ Not Applicable   
115 60 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the head of internal CG Condition 2.1 ×  √    × 
116 61 Appointment of a company secretary CG Condition 2.1 ×  √ Not Applicable   
117 62 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the company 
 
CG Condition 2.1 ×  √    √ 
118 63 No. of board meeting during the year CG Condition 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
119 64 Disclosure of aggregate board attendance in the board meeting  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
120 65 Attendance of individual director in the board meeting CG Condition 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
121 66 Attendance of CFO and company secretary in the board meeting CG Condition 2.2 ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
122 67 An overview of board meeting (procedure and/or issued discussed)  ×  √    × 
123 68 Director remuneration (cash) SE Rules ’87: 4 ×  √ Not Applicable  √ 
124 69 Director remuneration (non-cash) SE Rules ’87: 4 ×  √ Not Applicable  √ 
125 70 Share option given to directors and executives BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
126 71 Managerial remuneration (cash)  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
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127 72 Managerial remuneration (non-cash)  ×  √ Not Applicable √ 
128 73 CEO Remuneration (cash) BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
129 74 CEO Remuneration (non-cash) BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
130 75 Information about induction/orientation program for all new directors 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
131 76 Professional development and training activities for directors  ×  √     
132 77 Availability  and  use  of  advisorship  facility/independent  advice  
during  the period at company expense (legal advisers, insurers etc.) 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
133 78 Information on internal control system / Statement of director's 
responsibility to establish appropriate system of internal control 
CG Condition 1.4 
(e) 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
134 79 Narrative description of key features of the internal control system 
and the manner in which the system is monitored by the Board, Audit 
Committee or Senior Management 
×  √      
135 80 Statement  that  the  directors  have  reviewed  the  adequacy of  the  
system of internal controls 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
136 81 Statement of business risks facing the organization/ Disclosure of the 
identification of risks the company is exposed to both internally and 
externally 
×  √    × 
    ×  √    × 
137 82 Risk  management  objective,  systems  and  activities  in  the  
organization/ Disclosure of the strategies adopted to manage and 
mitigate the risks 
BRPD Circular # 
16- 
18 
×  √    × 
 (a) Credit risk  ×  √    × 
 (b) Asset Liability Management Risk  ×  √    × 
 (c) Foreign Exchange Risk  ×  √    × 
 (d) Internal Control & Compliance Risk  ×  √    × 
 (e) Prevention of money laundering  ×  √    × 
 (f) Liquidity risk  ×  √    × 
 (g) Operational Risk  ×  √    × 
 Disclosure Item Legal Reference Disclosure Quantitative 
Information 
(If Any) 
NO 
  
yes  Comprehensiveness 
 
Minima
l 
Moderate Adequate 
IV. Corporate Responsibility and Compliance 
138 1 Statement of corporate social and environmental responsibility  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
139 2 Information on social and environmental activities - qualitative  ×  √      
140 
 
140 
3 
 
3 
Information on social and environmental activities - quantitative (e.g. 
scholarship program, Zakat fund, Donations to charitable institutions, 
Direct philanthropic activities, Donations to Chief Advisor's/PM's 
Relief fund etc.) 
×  √  √ 
 3(i) Total amount expended on social and environmental activities 
without any breakdown 
×  √ Not Applicable  √ 
 3(ii) Total amount expended on social and environmental activities with 
detailed breakdown 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
141 4 Compliance   and   international   and/or   legal   laws   regarding   
i t 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
142 5 Existence of policies on recruitment and promotion of employees BRPD Circular # 
 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
143 6 Does the company explicitly mention the welfare of its employees?  ×  √      
144 7 Does  the  company provide  a  retirement  plan/fund or  its 
equivalent  for its employees? 
×  √ Not Applicable × 
145 8 Does the company provide a continuing training program for its 
employees? 
×  √     × 
146 9 Does the company explicitly mention the role (providing useful 
products that are valued by customers, etc.) of customers? 
×  √    × 
147 10 Does the company explicitly mention the role (providing raw 
materials; honor of business agreements; timely payment; cooperative 
efforts) of suppliers/ business partners? 
×  √    × 
148 11 Does the company explicitly mention its obligations (e.g. creation 
and growth in value; stability and long-term competitiveness) to 
h h ld ? 
×  √    × 
149 12 Does the company explicitly mention its obligation to creditors? (e.g. 
honoring debt agreement(s) and timely payment of debt obligations) 
×  √    × 
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150 13 Information on company's contribution to the national exchequer and 
to the economy 
×  √    × 
V. Auditing 
151 1 Company has a brand name auditor (audit firms with international 
li k )  
×  √ Not Applicable × 
152 2 Appointment of auditor at the AGM  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
153 3 Auditor rotation  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
154 4 Amount of audit fees paid to auditors SE Rules ’87: 
 
×  √ Not Applicable √ 
155 5 Amount of non-audit fees paid to auditors SE Rules ’87: 
 
N/A  √ Not Applicable √ 
156 6 Coverage of External Audit BRPD Circular # 
 
 ×  √ Not Applicable × 
2. Corporate governance checklist for Insurance companies of Bangladesh 
 Disclosure 
Item 
Legal Reference Disclosu
 
Quantitativ
e 
Information 
  
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minim
 
Moderat
 
Adequat
 I. Ownership Structure and Investor Rights 
I.A Transparency of Ownership 
1 1 The number of authorized ordinary shares  ×  √  Not Applicable √  
2 2 The par value of each ordinary share  × √ Not Applicable √  
3 3 The number of issued, subscribed and fully paid ordinary shares  × √ Not Applicable √  
4 4 Shares issued for cash or non-cash (bonus share)  × √ Not Applicable √  
 
5 
 
5 
Review of shareholders by type - % of equity holding by 
Sponsors, Govt., Institutions, Foreigners and General Public 
LR NO. 20(2) × √ Not Applicable √  
 
6 
 
6 
Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held 
by parent/subsidiary/Associated companies and other 
  
CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held by directors, 
CEO, Company Secretary, CFO, Head of Internal Audit and their 
spouses and minor children 
CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
8 8 Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held by executives CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
 
9 
 
9 
Distribution schedule of each class of equity security for 
categories like less than 500 shares, 501 to 5,000 shares,… … 
   
LR NO. 37(3) × √ Not Applicable √  
I.B Ownership Concentration 
10 1 The number and identity of shareholders holding 10% or less  × √ Not Applicable √  
11 2 The number and identity of shareholders holding 10% or more CG Condition 1.4 
(k) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
I.C Shareholder Rights 
12 1 Availability and accessibility of AGM agenda  × √ Not Applicable ×  
13 2 Date and location of AGM  × √ Not Applicable ×  
14 3 AGM notice sent at least 14 days before the AGM?  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
15 
 
4 
Availability and  accessibility of  proxy form/  Proxy form sent  
with annual report 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
 
16 
 
5 
Is there any requirement for a proxy appointment to be notarized/ 
signature by witness 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
17 6 A review of last shareholder meeting (such as minutes)  × √    ×   
 
18 
 
7 
Disclosure of the company's policy/ strategy to facilitate 
effective communication with shareholders and other 
 
 × √    ×   
 
19 
 
8 Disclosure of company’s policy on ensuring participation of 
shareholders in the AGM and providing reasonable opportunity for 
the shareholder participation in the AGM 
× √    ×   
20 9 The existence of Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best 
 
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
21 10 The details of Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best 
 
 × √  ×     
22 11 Existence of a code of business conduct and ethics / core values  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
23 
 
12 
The contents of a code of business conduct and ethics/ Disclosure of 
statement of ethics and values, covering basic principles such as 
   
 × √  ×     
 
24 
 
13 Dissemination/communication of the statement of ethics & business 
practices to all directors and employees and their acknowledgement 
   
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
25 
 
14 
Board's statement on commitment to establishing high level of 
ethics and compliance within the organization 
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
 
26 
 
 
15 
Information on effective anti-fraud programs and controls, including 
effective protection of whistle blowers, establishing a hot line 
reporting of irregularities etc. 
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
27 16 A formalized dividend policy  × √       
II. Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure 
28 1 Company mission/vision statement disclosure  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
29 
 
2 
Identification of business objectives and areas of business focus 
disclosed/ Objective statement 
× √  ×     
 
30 
 
3 
General description of strategies to achieve the company's business 
objectives 
 × √  ×     
 
31 
 
4 
Information  on  business  operations,  competitive  position,  and  
other  non- financial matters 
× √  ×     
 
32 
 
5(a) 
Does the company have a separate report of the board of directors 
describing their responsibilities in reviewing the firm's financial 
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
  
5(b) 
Board of directors' responsibilities in reviewing the firm's financial 
statement disclosed in the notes 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
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33 6 Board’s statement on fairness of financial statements CG Condition 1.4 
(a) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
34 7 Board's statement on maintenance of proper books of accounts CG Condition 1.4 
(b) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
 
35 
 
8(a) 
Board's statement on consistent adaptation of appropriate 
accounting policies and estimates 
CG Condition 1.4 
(c) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
  
8(b
) 
Statement  on  consistent  adaptation  of  appropriate  accounting  
policies  and estimates in the notes to the financial statements 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
36 9(a) Board's statement on compliance with relevant accounting standards CG Condition 1.4 
(d) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
 9(b
 
Statement on compliance with relevant accounting standards in notes  × √ Not Applicable ×  
37 10 Principal Accounting Policies  × √  ×     
 
38 
 
11 
Statement on significant changes in accounting and valuation 
principles and impact of alternative accounting decisions 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
39 12(a
 
Board's statement on risk and uncertainty for use of estimates and 
 
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
 12(b
 
Statement on risk and uncertainty for use of estimates and judgments 
  
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
40 13(a
) 
Directors' statement on ability to continue as going concern CG Condition 1.4 
(f) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
 Disclosure 
Item 
Legal Reference Disclosu
 
Quantitativ
e 
Information 
  
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minima
 
Moderat
 
Adequat
  13(b)
 
Statement on ability to continue as going concern in the notes  × √ Not Applicable ×  
41 14 Board's statement on significant deviation from last year operating 
results 
CG Condition 1.4 
(g) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
42 15 Financial and operating results for at least last three years CG Condition 1.4 
(h) 
× √ Not Applicable ×   
43 16 Information on related party transactions: BAS 24 × √   
 16(a
 
Names of related parties  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(b
 
Primary lines of business of related party  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(c
 
Nature of relationship  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(d
 
Nature of transactions  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(e
 
Value of transactions in current year  × √ Not Applicable √  
 16(f
 
Balance at year end  × √ Not Applicable √  
44 17 Directors' Certificate under 1st Schedule of the Insurance Act Insurance Act' 38 × √   
 17a Valuation of Investments in Stocks and shares  × √   
 17b Valuation of assets in relation with their realisable or market values  × √ Not Applicable × 
 17c Accounting for management expenses  × √ Not Applicable × 
45 18 Dividend information and disclosure for non-payment CG Condition 1.4 
(i) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
46 19 Information on foreign currency transaction/exposure  × √ Not Applicable ×  
47 20 Information on financing and management of the staff pension fund  × √ Not Applicable ×  
48 21 Credit rating information  × √    ×  
49 22 Compliance with Form AA requirement Insurance Act' 38 × √ Not Applicable √ 
50 23 Information about future plans  × √  ×     
51 24 Commission Business with parties outside Bangladesh Part 1, 3rd 
Schedule 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
52 25(a
 
Chairman’s statement about events occurring after the Balance Sheet 
 
LR NO. 37(5) × √ Not Applicable ×  
 25(b
 
Events after the Balance Sheet date in the notes  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
53 
 
26 
Separate Corporate Governance statement/ separate section for 
corporate governance 
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
54 27 Compliance with SEC notification CG Condition 5.0 × √ Not Applicable ×  
55 28 Awards or external recognition for governance quality  × √ Not Applicable ×  
III. Board and Management Structure and Process 
56 1 Number of directors on the board CG Condition 1.1 × √ Not Applicable √  
57 2 List of directors on the board (names/titles)  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
58 
 
3 
Reconstitution of the board every year /Appointment and rotation of 
the board members 
CA 1994      Sec. 
91(2) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
59 4 Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director 
 
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
60 
 
5 
Details about directors (other than name/title)- year of birth, 
academic and professional qualification etc. 
× √  ×     
61 6 Date of joining as directors on the board  × √ Not Applicable ×  
62 7 Details about current employment/positions of directors  × √  ×     
63 8 Details about previous employment/positions of directors  × √  ×     
64 9 No. of directorships held by individual board member  × √ Not Applicable √ 
65 10 Role and functions of the board  × √  ×     
 
66 
 
11 
Does the company clearly distinguish the roles and responsibilities of 
the board and management? 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
67 12 Number/appointment of Independent Directors on the board CG Condition 
1.2(i) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
68 13 Name(s) of Independent Director(s)  × √ Not Applicable ×   
 
69 
 
 
14 
Affirmation of the board on independent director's independence/ does 
the company state in the annual report the definition of 
"independence" for identifying independent directors in public 
communications? 
× √  ×     
 
70 
 
15 
Details  about  independent  director  (other  than  name/title)-  year  
of  birth, academic and professional qualification etc. 
× √  ×     
71 16 Date of joining as independent director on the board  × √ Not Applicable ×  
72 17 Details about current employment/positions of Independent director  × √  ×     
73 18 Details about previous employment/positions of independent director  × √  ×     
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74 19 The chairman and CEO positions held by same/related/unrelated 
persons 
CG Condition 1.3 × √  ×     
75 20 Chairman of the board is a non-executive director  × √ Not Applicable ×  
76 21 Chairman of the board is independent  × √ Not Applicable ×  
77 22 Responsibilities of the chairman of the board of directors disclosed  × √  ×     
78 23 Biography of the CEO supplied  × √  ×     
79 24 Responsibilities of the CEO  × √  ×     
80 25 Appointment/rotation of adviser/ consultant  × √ Not Applicable ×  
81 26 Biography of the adviser  × √  ×     
82 27 Responsibilities of the adviser  × √  ×     
83 28 An audit committee has been established CG Condition 3.0 × √ Not Applicable ×  
84 29 Number of directors on the audit committee CG Condition 
3 1(i) 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
85 30 Number of independent directors on the audit committee CG Condition 
3.1(ii) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
 30(b
 
Existence of non-executive directors on the audit committee  × √ Not Applicable √  
86 31 Names of all members in the audit committee provided  × √ Not Applicable ×  
87 32 Chairman of the audit committee is an independent director  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 32(b
 
Chairman of the audit committee is a non-executive director  × √ Not Applicable ×  
88 33 Chairman of the audit committee is not also the chairman of the board  × √ Not Applicable ×  
89 34 Qualification of the chairman of the audit committee CG Condition 
3.2(ii) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
90 35 Qualification of audit committee members  × √ Not Applicable ×  
91 36 Rotation of audit committee members  ×  √ Not Applicable ×  
 Disclosure 
Item 
Legal 
Reference 
Disclosu
 
Quantitative 
Information 
(If Any) 
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minim
 
Moderat
 
Adequat
  
92 
 
37 
The audit committee has a formal charter/ Disclosure of audit 
committee's roles and responsibilities 
CG 
Condition 
3 0 
× √      
93 38 Disclosure of audit committee report in the annual report CG 
C diti  
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
94 39 Audit committee report signed by the Chairman of the audit committee CG 
C di i  
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
95 40 Number of audit committee meetings during the year  × √ Not Applicable √  
96 41 Attendance in the audit committee meetings  × √ Not Applicable √  
97 42 Overview of last audit committee meeting/ activities during last year  × √       
98 43(i) An executive committee has been established  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 43(ii
 
A management committee has been established  × √ Not Applicable ×  
99 44 Number of directors on the executive/management committee  × √ Not Applicable ×  
100 45 Names of all members in the executive/management committee 
provided 
× √ Not Applicable √  
101 46 Role and functions of the executive/management committee are stated  × √      
102 47 Number of executive/management committee meetings during the year  × √ Not Applicable √  
103 48 Attendance in the executive/management committee meetings  × √ Not Applicable √  
104 49 Establishment of an Investment Committee  × √ Not Applicable ×  
105 50 Role and functions of the Investment committee  × √       
106 51 Names/Number of members in the Investment committee  × √ Not Applicable ×  
107 52 Biography of the chairman of the Investment committee  × √       
108 53 Establishment of Claim/ Policy and Claim Committee  × √ Not Applicable ×  
109 54 Role and functions of Claim/ Policy and Claim Committee  × √      
110 55 Names/Number of members in Claim/ Policy and Claim Committee  × √ Not Applicable ×  
111 56 Biography of the chairman of Claim/ Policy and Claim Committee  × √       
112 57 Appointment of a CFO CG 
C diti  
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
113 58 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO CG 
C diti  
 
× √       
114 59 Appointment of head of internal audit CG 
C diti  
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
115 60 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the head of internal CG 
C diti  
 
× √       
116 61 Appointment of a company secretary CG 
C diti  
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
117 62 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the company secretary CG 
C diti  
 
× √       
118 63 No. of board meeting during the year CG 
Condition 
1.4(j) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
        
119 64 Disclosure of aggregate board attendance in the board meeting  × √ Not Applicable √  
120 65 Attendance of individual director in the board meeting CG 
Condition 
1 4(j) 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
121 66 Attendance of CFO and company secretary in the board meeting CG 
C diti  
 
× √ Not Applicable √  
122 67 An overview of board meeting (procedure and/or issued discussed)  × √       
123 68 Director remuneration (cash) SE Rules 
  
× √ Not Applicable √  
124 69 Director remuneration (non-cash) SE Rules 
  
× √ Not Applicable √  
125 70 Share option given to directors and executives  × √ Not Applicable ×  
126 71 Managerial remuneration (cash)  × √ Not Applicable √ 
127 72 Managerial remuneration (non-cash)  × √ Not Applicable √  
128 73 CEO Remuneration (cash)  × √ Not Applicable ×  
129 74 CEO Remuneration (non-cash)  × √ Not Applicable ×  
130 75 Information about induction/orientation program for all new directors 
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
131 76 Professional development and training activities for directors  × √       
 
132 
 
77 
Availability and use of advisorship facility/independent advice during  
the period at company expense (legal advisers, insurers etc.) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
 
133 
 
78 
Information on internal control system / Statement of director's 
responsibility to establish appropriate system of internal control 
CG 
Condition 
1.4 (e) 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
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134 
 
 
79 
Narrative description of key features of the internal control system and 
the manner in which the system is monitored by the Board, Audit 
Committee or Senior Management 
× √       
 
135 
 
80 
Statement  that  the  directors  have  reviewed  the  adequacy of  the  
system of internal controls 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
 
136 
 
81 
Statement of business risks facing the organization/ Disclosure of the 
identification of risks the company is exposed to both internally and 
t ll  
× √       
 
137 
 
82 
Risk  management  objective,  systems  and  activities  in  the  
organization/ Disclosure of the strategies adopted to manage and 
mitigate the risks 
× √      
IV. Corporate Responsibility and Compliance 
138 1 Statement of corporate social and environmental responsibility  × √ Not Applicable ×  
139 2 Information on social and environmental activities - qualitative  × √       
 
 
140 
 
 
3 
Information on social and environmental activities - quantitative (e.g. 
scholarship program, Zakat fund, Donations to charitable institutions, 
Direct philanthropic activities, Donations to Chief Advisor's/PM's Relief 
  
× √  √  
  
3(i) 
Total amount expended on social and environmental activities without 
any breakdown 
× √ Not Applicable √  
  
3(ii
) 
Total amount expended on social and environmental activities with 
detailed breakdown 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
141 4 Compliance   and   international   and/or   legal   laws   regarding   
environment 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
142 5 Existence of policies on recruitment and promotion of employees  × √ Not Applicable ×  
143 6 Does the company explicitly mention the welfare of its employees?  × √      
 
144 
 
7 
Does the company provide a retirement plan/fund or its equivalent for 
its employees? 
×  √ Not Applicable ×  
 
145 
 
8 
Does the company provide a continuing training program for its 
employees? 
 ×  √       
 Disclosure Item Legal 
Reference 
Disclosu
 
Quantitative 
Information 
(If Any) 
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minim
 
Moderat
 
Adequat
  
146 
 
9 
Does the company explicitly mention the role (providing useful 
products that are valued by customers, etc.) of customers? 
×  √      
 
 
147 
 
 
10 
Does the company explicitly mention the role (providing raw materials; 
honor of business agreements; timely payment; cooperative efforts) of 
suppliers/ business partners? 
× √      
 
148 
 
11 
Does the company explicitly mention its obligations (e.g. creation and 
growth in value; stability and long-term competitiveness) to shareholders? 
× √      
 
149 
 
12 
Does the company explicitly mention its obligation to creditors? (e.g. 
honouring debt agreement(s) and timely payment of debt obligations) 
× √      
 
150 
 
13 
Information on company's contribution to the national exchequer and 
to the economy 
× √      
V. Auditing 
151 1 Company has a brand name auditor (audit firms with international 
 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
152 2 Appointment of auditor at the AGM  × √ Not Applicable ×  
153 3 Auditor rotation  × √ Not Applicable ×  
154 4 Amount of audit fees paid to auditors SE Rules ’87: 
1(D) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
155 5 Amount of non-audit fees paid to auditors SE Rules ’87: 
1(D) 
× √ Not Applicable √  
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3. Corporate governance checklist for non-financial companies 
 
Disclosure 
Item 
Legal Reference Disclosu
 
Quantitati
ve 
Informatio
   
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minima
 
Moderat
 
Adequat
 I. Ownership Structure and Investor Rights 
I.A Transparency of Ownership 
1 1 The number of authorized ordinary shares disclosed  ×  √  Not Applicable √ 
2 2 The par value of each ordinary share  × √ Not Applicable √ 
3 3 The number of issued, subscribed and fully paid ordinary shares  × √ Not Applicable √ 
4 4 Shares issued for cash or non-cash (bonus share)  × √ Not Applicable √  
5 
 
5 Disclosure of shareholders by type - % of equity holding by 
Sponsors, Govt., Institutions, Foreigners and General Public 
LR NO. 20(2) × √ Not Applicable √ 
 
6 
 
6 Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held 
by parent/subsidiary/Associated companies and other 
  
CG Condition 1.4 (k) × √ Not Applicable √ 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held by directors, 
CEO, Company Secretary, CFO, Head of Internal Audit and their 
spouses and minor children 
CG Condition 1.4 (k) × √ Not Applicable √ 
8 8 Name wise details of aggregate number of shares held by executives CG Condition 1.4 (k) × √ Not Applicable √  
9 
 
9 Distribution schedule of each class of equity security for categories 
like less than 500 shares, 501 to 5,000 shares,… … ,over 
  
LR NO. 37(3) × √ Not Applicable √ 
I.B Ownership Concentration 
10 2 The identity of shareholder(s) holding less than 10% of voting shares 
  
× √ Not Applicable √ 
11 1 The number and identity of shareholders holding 10% or more CG Condition 1.4 (k) × √ Not Applicable √ 
I.C Shareholder Rights 
12 1 Availability and accessibility of AGM agenda/ Disclosure of AGM 
 
× √ Not Applicable × 
13 2 Date and location of AGM disclosed  × √ Not Applicable × 
14 3 AGM notice sent at least 14 days before the AGM?  × √ Not Applicable √  
15 
 
4 Availability and  accessibility of  proxy form/  Proxy form sent  
with annual report 
× √ Not Applicable × 
 
16 
 
5 Is there any requirement for a proxy appointment to be notarized/ 
signature by witness 
× √ Not Applicable × 
17 6 A review of last shareholder meeting (such as minutes)  × √  ×     
18 
 
7 Disclosure of the company's policy/ strategy to facilitate 
effective communication with shareholders and other 
 
 × √  ×    
 
 
19 
 
 
8 
Disclosure of company’s policy on ensuring participation of 
shareholders in the AGM and providing reasonable opportunity for 
the shareholder participation in the AGM 
× √  ×    
 
20 
 
9 The existence of Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best Practice 
× √ Not Applicable × 
21 10 The details of Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best Practice  × √  ×    
22 11 Existence of a code of business conduct and ethics / core values  × √ Not Applicable ×  
 
23 
 
 
12 
The contents of a code of business conduct and ethics/ Disclosure of 
statement of ethics and values, covering basic principles such as 
integrity, conflict of interest, compliance with laws and regulation 
 
 × √  ×    
 
24 
 
13 Dissemination/communication of the statement of ethics & business 
practices to all directors and employees and their acknowledgement 
   
 × √ Not Applicable × 
 
25 
 
14 Board's statement on commitment to establishing high level of 
ethics and compliance within the organization 
 × √ Not Applicable × 
 
26 
 
15 Information on effective anti-fraud programs and controls, including 
effective protection of whistle blowers, establishing a hot line 
   
 × √ Not Applicable × 
27 16 A formalized dividend policy  × √    × 
II. Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure 
28 1 Company mission/vision statement disclosure  × √ Not Applicable ×  
29 
 
2 Identification of business objectives and areas of business focus 
disclosed/ Objective statement 
× √      
30 3 General description of strategies to achieve the company's business 
 
× √       
31 
 
4 Information  on  business  operations,  competitive  position,  and  
other  non- financial matters 
× √      
 
32 
 
5(a) Does the company have a separate report of the board of directors 
describing their responsibilities in reviewing the firm's financial 
 
× √ Not Applicable × 
  5(b) Board of directors' responsibilities in reviewing the firm's financial 
statement disclosed in the notes 
× √ Not Applicable × 
33 6 Board’s statement on fairness of financial statements CG Condition 1.4 (a) × √ Not Applicable × 
34 7 Board's statement on maintenance of proper books of accounts CG Condition 1.4 (b) × √ Not Applicable ×  
35 
 
8(a) Board's statement on consistent adaptation of appropriate 
accounting policies and estimates 
CG Condition 1.4 (c) × √ Not Applicable × 
  8(b) Statement  on  consistent  adaptation  of  appropriate  accounting  
policies  and estimates in the notes to the financial statements 
× √ Not Applicable × 
36 9(a) Board's statement on compliance with relevant accounting standards CG Condition 1.4 (d) × √ Not Applicable × 
 9(b) Statement on compliance with relevant accounting standards in notes  × √ Not Applicable × 
37 10 Principal Accounting Policies  × √  ×     
38 
 
11 Statement on significant changes in accounting and valuation 
principles and impact of alternative accounting decisions 
× √ Not Applicable × 
39 12(a) Board's statement on risk and uncertainty for use of estimates and 
judgments 
× √ Not Applicable × 
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Disclosure 
Item 
Legal Reference Disclosu
 
Quantitati
ve 
Informatio
   
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minima
 
Moderat
 
Adequat
  12(b) Statement on risk and uncertainty for use of estimates and judgments 
  
× √ Not Applicable × 
40 13(a) Directors' statement on ability to continue as going concern CG Condition 1.4 (f) × √ Not Applicable × 
 13(b) Statement on ability to continue as going concern in the notes  × √ Not Applicable × 
41 14 Board's statement on significant deviation from last year operating 
results 
CG Condition 1.4 (g) × √ Not Applicable × 
42 15 Financial and operating results for at least last three years CG Condition 1.4 (h) × √ Not Applicable × 
43 16 Information on related party transactions: BAS 24 × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(a) Names of related parties  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(b) Nature of relationship  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(c) Nature of transactions  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(d) Value of transactions in current year  × √ Not Applicable × 
 16(e) Balance at year end  × √ Not Applicable × 
44 17 Dividend information and disclosure for non-payment CG Condition 1.4 (i) × √ Not Applicable √ 
45 18 Information on foreign currency transaction/exposure  × √ Not Applicable × 
46 19 Information on financing and management of the staff pension fund  × √ Not Applicable × 
47 20 Information about future plans  × √      
48 21 Chairman’s statement about events occurring after the Balance Sheet 
 
LR NO. 37(5) × √ Not Applicable × 
 21(b) Events occurring after the Balance Sheet date in notes  × √ Not Applicable ×  
49 
 
22 Separate Corporate Governance statement/ separate section for 
corporate governance 
 × √ Not Applicable × 
50 23 Compliance with the SEC notification CG Condition 5.0 × √ Not Applicable × 
51 24 Awards or external recognition for governance quality  ×  √ Not Applicable × 
III. Board and Management Structure and Process 
52 1 Number of directors on the board CG 
  × √ Not Applicable √ 53 2 List of directors on the board (names/titles)  × √ Not Applicable √ 
54 3 Reconstitution of the board every year /Appointment and rotation of the 
 
CA 1994 
  
× √ Not Applicable × 
55 4 Classification of directors as an executive or an outside director provided  × √ Not Applicable ×  
56 
 
5 Details about directors (other than name/title)- year of birth, academic 
and professional qualification etc. 
× √    √  
57 6 Date or year of joining as directors on the board  × √ Not Applicable √ 
58 7 Details about current employment/positions of directors  × √ Not Applicable × 
59 8 Details about previous employment/positions of directors  × √ Not Applicable × 
60 9 Number of directorships held by individual board member  × √ Not Applicable √ 
61 10 Role and functions of the board  × √       
62 
 
11 Does the company clearly distinguish the roles and responsibilities of the 
board and management? 
× √ Not Applicable × 
63 12 Appointment of Independent Directors on the board CG 
di i  
 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
64 13 Name(s) of Independent Director(s)  × √ Not Applicable × 
65 14 Affirmation of the board on independent director's independence/ does the 
company state in the annual report the definition of "independence" for 
identifying independent directors in public communications? 
× √      
66 15 Details  about  independent  director  (other  than  name/title)-  year  of  
birth, academic and professional qualification etc. 
× √      
67 16 Date of joining as independent director on the board  × √ Not Applicable × 
68 17 Details about current employment/positions of Independent director  × √ Not Applicable × 
69 18 Details about previous employment/positions of independent director  × √ Not Applicable × 
70 19 The chairman and CEO positions held by same/related/unrelated persons CG 
  × √ Not Applicable × 71 20 Chairman of the board is a non-executive director  × √ Not Applicable × 
72 21 Chairman of the board is an independent director  × √ Not Applicable × 
73 22 Responsibilities of the chairman of the board of directors disclosed  × √      
74 23 Biography of the CEO supplied  × √      
75 24 Responsibilities of the CEO  × √      
76 25 An audit committee has been established CG 
di i   × √ Not Applicable × 77 26 Number of directors on the audit committee CG 
di i  
 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
78 27 Existence of independent director(s) on the audit committee CG 
 
 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
 27(b) Existence of non-executive directors on the audit committee  × √ Not Applicable √ 
79 28 Names of all members in the audit committee provided  × √ Not Applicable × 
80 29 Chairman of the audit committee is an independent director  × √ Not Applicable × 
 29(ii) Chairman of the audit committee is a non-executive director  × √ Not Applicable × 
81 30 Chairman of the audit committee is not also the chairman of the board  × √ Not Applicable × 
82 31 Professional qualification of the chairman of the audit committee CG 
di i  
 
× √ Not Applicable × 
83 32 Qualification of audit committee members  × √ Not Applicable × 
84 33 Rotation of audit committee members  × √ Not Applicable ×  
85 
 
34 The audit committee has a formal charter/ Disclosure of audit committee's 
roles and responsibilities 
CG 
Condition 3.0 × √    
  
86 35 Disclosure of audit committee report in the annual report CG 
di i   × √ Not Applicable × 87 36 Audit committee report signed by the Chairman of the audit committee CG 
Condition 3 4 × √ Not Applicable × 
88 37 Number of audit committee meetings during the year  × √ Not Applicable √ 
89 38 Attendance in the audit committee meetings  × √ Not Applicable √ 
90 39 Overview of last audit committee meeting/ activities during last year  × √      
91 40 An executive committee committee has been established  × √ Not Applicable ×  
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 40(ii) A management committee has been established  ×  √  Not Applicable  
        
Disclosure Item Legal 
Referen
ce 
Disclosu
 
Quantitati
ve 
Informatio
   
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minima
 
Moderat
 
Adequat
 92 41 Number of directors on the executive/management committee  × √ Not Applicable √ 
93 42 Names of all members in the executive/management committee provided  × √ Not Applicable × 
94 43 Role and functions of the executive/management committee are stated  × √  ×    
95 44 Number of executive/management committee meetings during the year  × √ Not Applicable √ 
96 45 A remuneration committee has been established  × √ Not Applicable × 
97 46 Number of directors on the remuneration committee  × √ Not Applicable √ 
98 47 Existence of independent directors on the remuneration committee  × √ Not Applicable √ 
 47(ii) Existence of non-executive directors on the remuneration committee  × √ Not Applicable √ 
99 48 Names of all members in the remuneration committee provided  × √ Not Applicable × 
100 49 Chairman of the remuneration committee is an independent director  × √ Not Applicable × 
 49(ii) Chairman of the remuneration committee is a non-executive director  × √ Not Applicable × 
101 50 Role and functions of the remuneration committee are stated  × √      
102 51 Number of remuneration committee meetings during the year  × √ Not Applicable √ 
103 52 A nomination committee has been established  × √ Not Applicable × 
104 53 Number of directors on the nomination committee  × √ Not Applicable √ 
105 54 Existence of independent directors on the nomination committee  × √ Not Applicable √ 
 54(ii) Existence of non-executive directors on the nomination committee  × √ Not Applicable × 
106 55 Names of all members in the nomination committee provided  × √ Not Applicable × 
107 56 Chairman of the nomination committee is an independent director  × √ Not Applicable × 
 56(ii) Chairman of the nomination committee is a non-executive director  × √ Not Applicable × 
108 57 Role and functions of the nomination committee are stated  × √      
109 58 Number of nomination committee meetings during the year  × √ Not Applicable √ 
110 59 Appointment of a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) CG 
  × √ Not Applicable × 111 60 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO CG 
  × √    
  
112 61 Appointment of the head of internal audit CG 
di i   × √ Not Applicable 
×  
113 62 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the head of internal audit CG 
  × √    
  
114 63 Appointment of a company secretary CG 
  × √ Not Applicable 
×  
115 64 Defining the roles, responsibilities and duties of the company secretary CG 
di i   × √    
  
116 65 Number of board meeting during the year CG 
 
 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
117 66 Disclosure of aggregate board attendance in the board meeting  × √ Not Applicable √ 
118 67 Attendance of individual director in the board meeting CG 
 
 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
119 68 Attendance of CFO and company secretary in the board meeting CG 
di i   × √ Not Applicable √ 120 69 An overview of board meeting  × √      
121 70 Director remuneration (cash) SE Rules 
  
× √ Not Applicable √ 
122 71 Director remuneration (non-cash) SE Rules 
  
× √ Not Applicable √ 
123 72 Managerial remuneration (cash)  × √ Not Applicable √ 
124 73 Managerial remuneration (non-cash)  × √ Not Applicable √  
125 
 
74 Information about induction/orientation program for all new directors disclosed 
× √ Not Applicable × 
126 75 Professional development and training activities for directors  × √     
127 
 
76 Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting period/ Access 
to independent advice is allowed at company expense 
× √ Not Applicable × 
 
128 
 
77 Information on internal control system / Statement of director's 
responsibility to establish appropriate system of internal control 
CG 
Condition 1.4 
(e) 
× √ Not Applicable × 
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78 
Narrative description of key features of the internal control system and the 
manner in which the system is monitored by the Board, Audit Committee or 
Senior Management 
× √      
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79 Statement  that  the  directors  have  reviewed  the  adequacy of  the  system 
of internal controls 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
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80 Statement  of  business  risks  facing  the  organization/  Disclosure  of  
the identification of risks the company is exposed to both internally and 
 
× √    ×   
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81 Risk  management  objective,  systems  and  activities  in  the  
organization/ Disclosure of the strategies adopted to manage and mitigate the 
risks 
× √    ×   
IV. Corporate Responsibility and Compliance 
133 1 Statement of corporate social and environmental responsibility  × √ Not Applicable  × 
134 2 Information on social and environmental activities - qualitative  × √       
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3 
Information on social and environmental activities - quantitative (e.g. 
scholarship program, Zakat fund, Donations to charitable institutions, 
Direct philanthropic activities, Donations to Chief Advisor's/PM's 
   
× √  × 
  3(i) Total amount expended on social and environmental activities 
without any breakdown 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
  3(ii) Total amount expended on social and environmental activities with 
detailed breakdown 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
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4 Compliance  with  international  and/or  legal  laws  regarding  
environment protection 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
137 5 Existence of policies on recruitment and promotion of employees  × √ Not Applicable ×   
138 
 
6 Does the company explicitly mention the safety and welfare of its employees? 
× √      
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7 Does the company provide  a  retirement  plan/fund or  its equivalent  
for its employees? 
× √ Not Applicable ×  
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8 Does the company provide a continuing training program for its employees? 
× √    × 
 
Disclosure 
Item 
Legal 
Reference 
Disclos
 
Quantitati
ve 
Informatio
n (If Any) 
NO 
  
YES 
  
Comprehensiveness 
Minim
al 
Moderat
e 
Adequat
e 
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9 Does the company explicitly mention the role (providing useful 
products that are valued by customers, etc.) of customers? 
× √    ×  
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10 
Does the company explicitly mention the role (providing raw 
materials; honor of business agreements; timely payment; 
cooperative efforts) of suppliers/ business partners? 
× √    × 
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11 Does the company explicitly mention its obligations (e.g. creation 
and growth in value; stability and long-term competitiveness) to 
 
× √    × 
 
144 
 
12 Does the company explicitly mention its obligation to creditors? 
(e.g. honoring debt agreement(s) and timely payment of debt 
 
× √    × 
 
145 
 
13 Information on company's contribution to the national exchequer 
and to the economy 
× √    √ 
V. Auditing 
146 1 Company has a brand name auditor (audit firms with international 
 
 × √ Not Applicable ×  
147 2 Appointment of auditor at the AGM  × √ Not Applicable ×  
148 3 Rotation of audit partners  × √ Not Applicable ×  
149 4 Amount of audit fees paid to auditors SE Rules ’87: 
 
× √ Not Applicable √ 
150 5 Amount of non-audit fees paid to auditors SE Rules ’87: 
1(D) 
N/
A 
√ Not Applicable √ 
 
Source: 1) Securities and Exchange Commission’s of Bangladesh (SEC) notification: Status of compliance with the 
conditions imposed by the Commission’s Order No.SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-06 dated 09/01/2006, Condition 
No. 5 issued under section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. 
 
2) Securities and Exchange Commission’s of Bangladesh (SEC) notification: Status of compliance with the conditions 
imposed by the Commission’s Order No.SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/Dated February-20/2006, Condition No. 5 
issued under section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 6 VIF Report 
 
 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkdegree 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA networkcloseness networkbet. 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 24-AUG-2013 12:22:07 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet2 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
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N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkdegree 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA 
networkcloseness networkbet. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.05 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.05 
Memory Required 2452 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet2]  
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
networkbet, ROA, 
tobinq, 
networkclosenessb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: networkdegree 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
tobinq .783 1.277 
ROA .831 1.203 
networkcloseness .714 1.401 
networkbet .709 1.410 
a. Dependent Variable: networkdegree 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) tobinq ROA networkcloseness networkbet 
1 
1 2.974 1.000 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 
2 .958 1.762 .00 .05 .14 .07 .29 
3 .539 2.348 .12 .05 .11 .15 .43 
4 .364 2.857 .01 .55 .71 .05 .00 
5 .164 4.258 .84 .32 .00 .71 .26 
a. Dependent Variable: networkdegree 
 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkcloseness 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA networkbet networkdegree. 
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Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 24-AUG-2013 12:25:51 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet2 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkcloseness 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA 
networkbet networkdegree. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.03 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.02 
Memory Required 2452 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet2]  
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
networkdegree, 
ROA, networkbet, 
tobinqb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: networkcloseness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
tobinq .804 1.243 
ROA .833 1.201 
networkbet .908 1.101 
networkdegree .926 1.080 
a. Dependent Variable: networkcloseness 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) tobinq ROA networkbet networkdegree 
1 
1 2.829 1.000 .04 .04 .04 .03 .04 
2 .892 1.781 .00 .05 .14 .43 .13 
3 .645 2.094 .04 .04 .03 .49 .42 
4 .384 2.716 .14 .29 .79 .01 .08 
5 .250 3.362 .78 .58 .01 .04 .34 
a. Dependent Variable: networkcloseness 
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REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkbet 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA networkdegree networkcloseness. 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 24-AUG-2013 12:27:10 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet2 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkbet 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA 
networkdegree networkcloseness. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.03 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.02 
Memory Required 2452 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet2]  
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
networkcloseness, 
ROA, tobinq, 
networkdegreeb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: networkbet 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
tobinq .826 1.211 
ROA .828 1.208 
networkdegree .456 2.195 
networkcloseness .450 2.222 
a. Dependent Variable: networkbet 
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Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) tobinq ROA networkdegree networkcloseness 
1 
1 3.210 1.000 .02 .03 .03 .02 .02 
2 1.011 1.782 .00 .10 .16 .08 .05 
3 .386 2.885 .09 .32 .79 .04 .00 
4 .259 3.520 .57 .52 .01 .22 .01 
5 .134 4.887 .31 .04 .02 .64 .93 
a. Dependent Variable: networkbet 
 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkbet 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA networkdegree networkcloseness Boardsize Firmsize boardindependence ceoduality 
percentageoffamilymember familycontrolledfirm isolatedfirn subconnectedfirm. 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 24-AUG-2013 12:55:55 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet2 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkbet 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA 
networkdegree networkcloseness 
Boardsize Firmsize 
boardindependence ceoduality 
percentageoffamilymember 
familycontrolledfirm isolatedfirn 
subconnectedfirm. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.05 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.07 
Memory Required 6196 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet2]  
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
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1 
subconnectedfirm, 
boardindependenc
e, 
percentageoffamily
member, 
ceoduality, tobinq, 
networkcloseness, 
ROA, Firmsize, 
Boardsize, 
isolatedfirn, 
networkdegree, 
familycontrolledfirm
b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: networkbet 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
tobinq .699 1.430 
ROA .781 1.281 
networkdegree .312 3.206 
networkcloseness .226 4.427 
Boardsize .561 1.783 
Firmsize .577 1.732 
boardindependence .840 1.190 
ceoduality .665 1.503 
percentageoffamilymember .280 3.578 
familycontrolledfirm .281 3.562 
isolatedfirn .351 2.848 
subconnectedfirm .868 1.152 
a. Dependent Variable: networkbet 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Mod
el 
Dimensi
on 
Eigenva
lue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Consta
nt) 
tobinq ROA networkde
gree 
networkcl
oseness 
Boardsi
ze 
Firmsi
ze 
boardinde
pendence 
ceodua
lity 
percentag
eoffamily
member 
familycont
rolledfirm 
isolatedf
irn 
subconne
ctedfirm 
1 
1 6.113 1.000 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 1.647 1.927 .00 .01 .01 .03 .01 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .00 .02 .06 
3 1.193 2.264 .00 .02 .01 .00 .00 .01 .16 .02 .00 .02 .01 .00 .04 
4 1.016 2.453 .00 .05 .11 .00 .00 .00 .01 .02 .04 .04 .03 .00 .01 
5 .774 2.811 .00 .01 .03 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00 .47 .00 .00 .02 .12 
6 .683 2.992 .00 .00 .04 .01 .01 .00 .09 .01 .05 .00 .00 .01 .62 
7 .591 3.215 .00 .02 .10 .00 .00 .00 .01 .73 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 
8 .368 4.076 .00 .29 .62 .00 .00 .00 .02 .02 .00 .00 .02 .05 .09 
9 .267 4.784 .00 .44 .02 .07 .01 .00 .24 .00 .04 .00 .02 .21 .05 
10 .163 6.119 .01 .05 .01 .42 .04 .14 .32 .00 .20 .07 .02 .03 .00 
11 .085 8.478 .00 .01 .04 .33 .25 .05 .02 .00 .12 .56 .50 .00 .00 
12 .067 9.575 .01 .00 .01 .10 .32 .58 .13 .03 .00 .30 .35 .16 .01 
13 .033 13.642 .97 .09 .00 .02 .35 .21 .00 .16 .01 .00 .05 .49 .01 
a. Dependent Variable: networkbet 
 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkcloseness 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA networkdegree Boardsize Firmsize boardindependence ceoduality percentageoffamilymember 
familycontrolledfirm isolatedfirn subconnectedfirm networkbet. 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 24-AUG-2013 12:56:46 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet2 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkcloseness 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA 
networkdegree Boardsize Firmsize 
boardindependence ceoduality 
percentageoffamilymember 
familycontrolledfirm isolatedfirn 
subconnectedfirm networkbet. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.05 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.08 
Memory Required 6196 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet2]  
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
networkbet, 
Firmsize, 
ceoduality, ROA, 
subconnectedfirm, 
boardindependenc
e, 
familycontrolledfirm
, isolatedfirn, 
tobinq, Boardsize, 
networkdegree, 
percentageoffamily
memberb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: networkcloseness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
tobinq .647 1.545 
ROA .784 1.275 
networkdegree .482 2.074 
Boardsize .559 1.789 
Firmsize .587 1.703 
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boardindependence .832 1.201 
ceoduality .674 1.484 
percentageoffamilymember .279 3.589 
familycontrolledfirm .283 3.534 
isolatedfirn .549 1.821 
subconnectedfirm .853 1.173 
networkbet .717 1.395 
a. Dependent Variable: networkcloseness 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Mod
el 
Dimensi
on 
Eigenva
lue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Consta
nt) 
tobinq ROA networkde
gree 
Boardsi
ze 
Firmsi
ze 
boardinde
pendence 
ceodua
lity 
percentag
eoffamily
member 
familycont
rolledfirm 
isolatedf
irn 
subconne
ctedfirm 
network
bet 
1 
1 5.752 1.000 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 1.502 1.957 .00 .00 .00 .05 .00 .00 .00 .09 .00 .00 .04 .09 .05 
3 1.180 2.208 .00 .01 .01 .00 .01 .15 .04 .01 .01 .01 .00 .01 .06 
4 1.061 2.329 .00 .05 .06 .00 .00 .03 .00 .11 .00 .00 .00 .01 .22 
5 1.008 2.389 .00 .02 .07 .01 .00 .00 .02 .16 .03 .03 .00 .02 .02 
6 .676 2.918 .00 .00 .03 .02 .00 .07 .09 .01 .00 .00 .00 .64 .03 
7 .576 3.160 .00 .01 .10 .01 .00 .00 .55 .07 .00 .00 .06 .06 .01 
8 .415 3.722 .00 .08 .46 .06 .00 .00 .02 .17 .00 .01 .12 .03 .19 
9 .311 4.300 .01 .15 .19 .26 .01 .03 .07 .25 .00 .02 .01 .09 .28 
10 .253 4.765 .00 .53 .02 .09 .00 .24 .02 .01 .00 .01 .32 .02 .09 
11 .150 6.187 .04 .02 .03 .26 .26 .42 .00 .07 .11 .03 .13 .00 .03 
12 .076 8.691 .00 .01 .01 .10 .09 .03 .00 .06 .82 .87 .12 .00 .00 
13 .041 11.915 .95 .12 .01 .13 .64 .02 .17 .01 .00 .01 .19 .02 .01 
a. Dependent Variable: networkcloseness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
GET 
  FILE='C:\Users\User\Desktop\thesis format\Untitled3.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
NEW FILE. 
DATASET NAME DataSet2 WINDOW=FRONT. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
SAVE OUTFILE='C:\Users\User\Desktop\thesis format\Untitled3.sav' 
 /COMPRESSED. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet2. 
DATASET CLOSE DataSet1. 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkdegree 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA Boardsize Firmsize boardindependence ceoduality networkcloseness networkbet 
percentageoffamilymember familycontrolledfirm isolatedfirn subconnectedfirm. 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 24-AUG-2013 12:13:43 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet2 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
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Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT networkdegree 
  /METHOD=ENTER tobinq ROA 
Boardsize Firmsize 
boardindependence ceoduality 
networkcloseness networkbet 
percentageoffamilymember 
familycontrolledfirm isolatedfirn 
subconnectedfirm. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.03 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.09 
Memory Required 6196 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet2]  
 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
subconnectedfirm, 
boardindependenc
e, 
percentageoffamily
member, 
ceoduality, tobinq, 
networkcloseness, 
ROA, Firmsize, 
networkbet, 
Boardsize, 
isolatedfirn, 
familycontrolledfir
mb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: networkdegree 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
tobinq .632 1.582 
ROA .786 1.272 
Boardsize .553 1.808 
Firmsize .577 1.734 
boardindependence .832 1.202 
ceoduality .893 1.120 
networkcloseness .298 3.356 
networkbet .612 1.635 
percentageoffamilymember .281 3.564 
familycontrolledfirm .276 3.617 
isolatedfirn .348 2.876 
subconnectedfirm .850 1.176 
a. Dependent Variable: networkdegree 
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Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimensi
on 
Eigenval
ue 
Conditio
n Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Consta
nt) 
tobinq ROA Boardsi
ze 
Firmsize boardin
depend
ence 
ceoduali
ty 
network
closene
ss 
network
bet 
percent
ageoffa
milyme
mber 
familyco
ntrolledfi
rm 
isolatedf
irn 
subconn
ectedfir
m 
1 
1 5.858 1.000 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 1.470 1.996 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .02 .02 .10 .00 .00 .03 .09 
3 1.217 2.194 .00 .01 .00 .01 .12 .02 .05 .00 .02 .02 .01 .00 .05 
4 1.057 2.355 .00 .07 .10 .00 .06 .01 .08 .00 .07 .01 .01 .00 .00 
5 .951 2.482 .00 .00 .03 .00 .01 .02 .52 .00 .03 .02 .02 .00 .00 
6 .659 2.980 .00 .00 .04 .00 .07 .05 .07 .01 .02 .00 .00 .01 .67 
7 .610 3.100 .00 .01 .07 .00 .00 .53 .08 .02 .01 .00 .00 .03 .03 
8 .416 3.754 .00 .07 .49 .00 .00 .05 .07 .02 .22 .00 .01 .08 .03 
9 .310 4.347 .01 .20 .19 .01 .05 .14 .05 .08 .41 .00 .01 .00 .07 
10 .246 4.882 .01 .49 .01 .01 .39 .00 .00 .04 .02 .01 .01 .17 .02 
11 .108 7.376 .00 .00 .05 .27 .19 .00 .00 .19 .00 .36 .27 .07 .00 
12 .069 9.235 .01 .00 .00 .45 .11 .03 .03 .16 .01 .55 .58 .14 .00 
13 .031 13.850 .97 .14 .00 .25 .00 .13 .00 .47 .09 .01 .07 .48 .02 
a. Dependent Variable: networkdegree 
 
 
APPENDIX 7 supplemental regression analysis 
Regression run with ROA and TQ both 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 13:31:03 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT Networkdegree 
  /METHOD=ENTER ROA 
TobinsQTQ Boardsize Firmsize 
Boardindependence CEODuality 
ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.11 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.14 
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Memory Required 5308 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1]  
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network degree 2.510638 3.4602029 94 
ROA .0646 .09225 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 2.0161 2.19069 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
degree 
ROA Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
Board 
size 
Firm 
size 
Board 
indepen
dence % 
CEO Duality % of 
Family 
members 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
Main 
connected 
firm 
sub 
connected 
firm 
Pearson Correlation 
Network 
degree 
1.000 -.022 -.075 .050 -.054 -.063 .492 .045 .077 -.554 -.157 
ROA -.022 1.000 .408 -.023 -.168 .126 .022 -.114 -.078 .089 .028 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
-.075 .408 1.000 -.275 -.377 .159 -.005 -.025 -.071 .098 .067 
Board size .050 -.023 -.275 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 
Firm size -.054 -.168 -.377 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 
Board 
independen
ce % 
-.063 .126 .159 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 
CEO 
Duality 
.492 .022 -.005 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 
% of Family 
members 
.045 -.114 -.025 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
.077 -.078 -.071 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 
Main 
connected 
firm 
-.554 .089 .098 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 
sub 
connected 
firm 
-.157 .028 .067 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network 
degree 
. .415 .235 .316 .302 .273 .000 .332 .229 .000 .065 
ROA .415 . .000 .411 .053 .113 .418 .137 .228 .197 .394 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
.235 .000 . .004 .000 .062 .482 .405 .248 .175 .259 
Board size .316 .411 .004 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 
Firm size .302 .053 .000 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 
Board 
independen
ce % 
.273 .113 .062 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 
CEO 
Duality 
.000 .418 .482 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 
% of Family 
members 
.332 .137 .405 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 
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Family 
controlled 
firm 
.229 .228 .248 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 
Main 
connected 
firm 
.000 .197 .175 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 
sub 
connected 
firm 
.065 .394 .259 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . 
N 
Network 
degree 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
ROA 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
independen
ce % 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO 
Duality 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of Family 
members 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
% of Family 
members, CEO 
Duality, Tobin's Q 
(TQ), Main 
connected firm, 
ROA, Firm size, 
Board size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .709a .502 .442 2.5839380 .502 8.377 10 83 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, Tobin's Q (TQ), Main connected firm, ROA, Firm size, Board 
size, Family controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 559.320 10 55.932 8.377 .000b 
Residual 554.169 83 6.677   
 
 
192 
 
Total 1113.489 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
b. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, 
Tobin's Q (TQ), Main connected firm, ROA, Firm size, Board size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 3.951 1.016  3.891 .000 1.931 5.971 
ROA 1.585 3.274 .042 .484 .630 -4.927 8.098 
Tobin's Q (TQ) -.092 .146 -.058 -.634 .528 -.382 .198 
Board size .032 .075 .043 .426 .671 -.116 .180 
Firm size -5.911E-006 .000 -.087 -.864 .390 .000 .000 
Board independence % -.035 .034 -.086 -1.026 .308 -.102 .033 
CEO Duality 6.046 1.117 .429 5.411 .000 3.824 8.269 
% of Family members .023 .016 .199 1.377 .172 -.010 .055 
Family controlled firm -1.323 .989 -.192 -1.338 .184 -3.291 .644 
Main connected firm -3.573 .591 -.518 -6.049 .000 -4.748 -2.398 
sub connected firm .364 .780 .039 .467 .642 -1.187 1.915 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Network degree Predicted Value Residual 
26 3.398 13.0000 4.220817 8.7791831 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.066869 10.376777 2.510638 2.4523860 94 
Residual -5.8588548 8.7791834 0E-7 2.4410668 94 
Std. Predicted Value -1.459 3.208 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -2.267 3.398 .000 .945 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 13:41:39 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
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Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT 
Networkclossness 
  /METHOD=ENTER ROA 
TobinsQTQ Boardsize Firmsize 
Boardindependence CEODuality 
ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.11 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.11 
Memory Required 5308 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1]  
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network clossness .032751 .0327486 94 
ROA .0646 .09225 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 2.0161 2.19069 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
clossness 
ROA Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
Board 
size 
Firm size Board 
indepe
ndenc
e % 
CEO 
Duality 
% of 
Family 
member
s 
Family 
controlle
d firm 
Main 
connected 
firm 
sub 
connect
ed firm 
Pearson Correlation 
Network 
clossness 
1.000 -.094 -.125 .197 -.007 -.120 .179 -.060 .005 -.769 -.191 
ROA -.094 1.000 .408 -.023 -.168 .126 .022 -.114 -.078 .089 .028 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
-.125 .408 1.000 -.275 -.377 .159 -.005 -.025 -.071 .098 .067 
Board size .197 -.023 -.275 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 
Firm size -.007 -.168 -.377 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 
Board 
independenc
e % 
-.120 .126 .159 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 
CEO Duality .179 .022 -.005 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 
% of Family 
members 
-.060 -.114 -.025 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
.005 -.078 -.071 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 
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Main 
connected 
firm 
-.769 .089 .098 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 
sub 
connected 
firm 
-.191 .028 .067 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network 
clossness 
. .185 .116 .028 .475 .125 .042 .281 .481 .000 .032 
ROA .185 . .000 .411 .053 .113 .418 .137 .228 .197 .394 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
.116 .000 . .004 .000 .062 .482 .405 .248 .175 .259 
Board size .028 .411 .004 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 
Firm size .475 .053 .000 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 
Board 
independenc
e % 
.125 .113 .062 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 
CEO Duality .042 .418 .482 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 
% of Family 
members 
.281 .137 .405 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
.481 .228 .248 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 
Main 
connected 
firm 
.000 .197 .175 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 
sub 
connected 
firm 
.032 .394 .259 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . 
N 
Network 
clossness 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
ROA 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
independenc
e % 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO Duality 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of Family 
members 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
% of Family 
members, CEO 
Duality, Tobin's Q 
(TQ), Main 
connected firm, 
ROA, Firm size, 
Board size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
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b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .800a .640 .596 .0208128 .640 14.725 10 83 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, Tobin's Q (TQ), Main connected firm, ROA, Firm size, Board 
size, Family controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .064 10 .006 14.725 .000b 
Residual .036 83 .000   
Total .100 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
b. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, 
Tobin's Q (TQ), Main connected firm, ROA, Firm size, Board size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) .055 .008  6.683 .000 .038 .071 
ROA -.005 .026 -.015 -.207 .837 -.058 .047 
Tobin's Q (TQ) -.001 .001 -.049 -.626 .533 -.003 .002 
Board size .001 .001 .143 1.661 .101 .000 .002 
Firm size -8.166E-008 .000 -.127 -1.482 .142 .000 .000 
Board independence % .000 .000 -.096 -1.356 .179 -.001 .000 
CEO Duality .012 .009 .087 1.294 .199 -.006 .030 
% of Family members .000 .000 .123 1.000 .320 .000 .000 
Family controlled firm -.013 .008 -.203 -1.660 .101 -.029 .003 
Main connected firm -.050 .005 -.765 -10.490 .000 -.059 -.040 
sub connected firm .002 .006 .020 .290 .773 -.011 .014 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.010086 .071739 .032751 .0261893 94 
Residual -.0556928 .0494795 0E-7 .0196620 94 
Std. Predicted Value -1.636 1.489 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -2.676 2.377 .000 .945 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 13:42:34 
Comments  
Input 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
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Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT 
Networkbetweenness 
  /METHOD=ENTER ROA 
TobinsQTQ Boardsize Firmsize 
Boardindependence CEODuality 
ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.11 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.11 
Memory Required 5308 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1]  
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network betweenness .002790 .0077345 94 
ROA .0646 .09225 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 2.0161 2.19069 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
betweenness 
ROA Tobin's 
Q (TQ) 
Board 
size 
Firm size Board 
independe
nce % 
CEO 
Duality 
% of 
Family 
members 
Family 
control
led 
firm 
Main 
connect
ed firm 
sub connected firm 
Pearson Correlation 
Network betweenness 1.000 .046 .154 .223 .007 -.181 -.076 -.040 .033 -.340 -.158 
ROA .046 1.000 .408 -.023 -.168 .126 .022 -.114 -.078 .089 .028 
Tobin's Q (TQ) .154 .408 1.000 -.275 -.377 .159 -.005 -.025 -.071 .098 .067 
Board size .223 -.023 -.275 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 
Firm size .007 -.168 -.377 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 
Board independence % -.181 .126 .159 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 
CEO Duality -.076 .022 -.005 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 
% of Family members -.040 -.114 -.025 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 
Family controlled firm .033 -.078 -.071 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 
Main connected firm -.340 .089 .098 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 
sub connected firm -.158 .028 .067 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 
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Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network betweenness . .330 .069 .015 .473 .040 .233 .350 .375 .000 .064 
ROA .330 . .000 .411 .053 .113 .418 .137 .228 .197 .394 
Tobin's Q (TQ) .069 .000 . .004 .000 .062 .482 .405 .248 .175 .259 
Board size .015 .411 .004 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 
Firm size .473 .053 .000 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 
Board independence % .040 .113 .062 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 
CEO Duality .233 .418 .482 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 
% of Family members .350 .137 .405 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 
Family controlled firm .375 .228 .248 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 
Main connected firm .000 .197 .175 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 
sub connected firm .064 .394 .259 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . 
N 
Network betweenness 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
ROA 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board independence % 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO Duality 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of Family members 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family controlled firm 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main connected firm 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub connected firm 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
% of Family 
members, CEO 
Duality, Tobin's Q 
(TQ), Main 
connected firm, 
ROA, Firm size, 
Board size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .510a .260 .171 .0070425 .260 2.917 10 83 .004 
a. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, Tobin's Q (TQ), Main connected firm, ROA, Firm size, Board 
size, Family controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .001 10 .000 2.917 .004b 
Residual .004 83 .000   
Total .006 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
b. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, 
Tobin's Q (TQ), Main connected firm, ROA, Firm size, Board size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
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B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) .001 .003  .270 .788 -.005 .006 
ROA -.001 .009 -.015 -.143 .886 -.019 .016 
Tobin's Q (TQ) .001 .000 .277 2.460 .016 .000 .002 
Board size .000 .000 .234 1.889 .062 .000 .001 
Firm size -5.438E-009 .000 -.036 -.292 .771 .000 .000 
Board independence % .000 .000 -.148 -1.449 .151 .000 .000 
CEO Duality -.004 .003 -.120 -1.239 .219 -.010 .002 
% of Family members -1.334E-005 .000 -.053 -.299 .766 .000 .000 
Family controlled firm .001 .003 .073 .417 .677 -.004 .006 
Main connected firm -.005 .002 -.316 -3.031 .003 -.008 -.002 
sub connected firm -.002 .002 -.115 -1.133 .261 -.007 .002 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Network 
betweenness 
Predicted Value Residual 
4 3.472 .0309 .006403 .0244528 
64 3.189 .0332 .010734 .0224596 
70 3.711 .0316 .005425 .0261318 
89 3.496 .0295 .004834 .0246190 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.006214 .017766 .002790 .0039444 94 
Residual -.0087429 .0261318 0E-7 .0066531 94 
Std. Predicted Value -2.283 3.797 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -1.241 3.711 .000 .945 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
 
 
Regression with ROA only 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 16:42:47 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th 
sep.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
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Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT Networkdegree 
  /METHOD=ENTER ROA 
Boardsize Firmsize 
Boardindependence CEODuality 
ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.09 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.11 
Memory Required 4788 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th sep.sav 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network degree 2.510638 3.4602029 94 
ROA .0646 .09225 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
degree 
ROA Board 
size 
Firm 
size 
Board 
independen
ce % 
CEO Duality % of 
Family 
member
s 
Family 
controlle
d firm 
Main connected 
firm 
sub connected firm 
Pearson Correlation 
Network degree 1.000 -.022 .050 -.054 -.063 .492 .045 .077 -.554 -.157 
ROA -.022 1.000 -.023 -.168 .126 .022 -.114 -.078 .089 .028 
Board size .050 -.023 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 
Firm size -.054 -.168 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 
Board 
independence % 
-.063 .126 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 
CEO Duality .492 .022 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 
% of Family 
members 
.045 -.114 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 
Family controlled 
firm 
.077 -.078 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 
Main connected 
firm 
-.554 .089 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 
sub connected firm -.157 .028 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network degree . .415 .316 .302 .273 .000 .332 .229 .000 .065 
ROA .415 . .411 .053 .113 .418 .137 .228 .197 .394 
Board size .316 .411 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 
Firm size .302 .053 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 
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Board 
independence % 
.273 .113 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 
CEO Duality .000 .418 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 
% of Family 
members 
.332 .137 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 
Family controlled 
firm 
.229 .228 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 
Main connected 
firm 
.000 .197 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 
sub connected firm .065 .394 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . 
N 
Network degree 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
ROA 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
independence % 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO Duality 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of Family 
members 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family controlled 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub connected firm 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
% of Family 
members, CEO 
Duality, ROA, 
Main connected 
firm, Firm size, 
Board size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .707a .500 .446 2.5747149 .500 9.330 9 84 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, ROA, Main connected firm, Firm size, Board size, Family 
controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 556.640 9 61.849 9.330 .000b 
Residual 556.849 84 6.629   
Total 1113.489 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
b. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, 
ROA, Main connected firm, Firm size, Board size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
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B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 3.720 .944  3.940 .000 1.842 5.597 
ROA .826 3.036 .022 .272 .786 -5.212 6.865 
Board size .037 .074 .050 .501 .618 -.110 .184 
Firm size -4.824E-006 .000 -.071 -.731 .467 .000 .000 
Board independence % -.035 .034 -.087 -1.048 .298 -.103 .032 
CEO Duality 6.051 1.113 .430 5.434 .000 3.836 8.265 
% of Family members .022 .016 .197 1.369 .175 -.010 .055 
Family controlled firm -1.270 .982 -.185 -1.294 .199 -3.223 .682 
Main connected firm -3.582 .588 -.519 -6.088 .000 -4.752 -2.412 
sub connected firm .330 .775 .035 .426 .671 -1.211 1.872 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Network degree Predicted Value Residual 
26 3.449 13.0000 4.120587 8.8794130 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.952650 10.361712 2.510638 2.4465033 94 
Residual -5.8486338 8.8794127 0E-7 2.4469625 94 
Std. Predicted Value -1.416 3.209 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -2.272 3.449 .000 .950 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 16:47:09 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th 
sep.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
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Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT 
Networkclossness 
  /METHOD=ENTER ROA 
Boardsize Firmsize 
Boardindependence CEODuality 
ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.09 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.14 
Memory Required 4788 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th sep.sav 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network clossness .032751 .0327486 94 
ROA .0646 .09225 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
clossness 
ROA Board 
size 
Firm 
size 
Board 
indepen
dence % 
CEO Duality % of Family 
members 
Family 
controlle
d firm 
Main connected 
firm 
sub connected firm 
Pearson Correlation 
Network 
clossness 
1.000 -.094 .197 -.007 -.120 .179 -.060 .005 -.769 -.191 
ROA -.094 1.000 -.023 -.168 .126 .022 -.114 -.078 .089 .028 
Board size .197 -.023 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 
Firm size -.007 -.168 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 
Board 
independe
nce % 
-.120 .126 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 
CEO 
Duality 
.179 .022 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 
% of 
Family 
members 
-.060 -.114 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
.005 -.078 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 
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Main 
connected 
firm 
-.769 .089 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 
sub 
connected 
firm 
-.191 .028 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network 
clossness 
. .185 .028 .475 .125 .042 .281 .481 .000 .032 
ROA .185 . .411 .053 .113 .418 .137 .228 .197 .394 
Board size .028 .411 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 
Firm size .475 .053 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 
Board 
independe
nce % 
.125 .113 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 
CEO 
Duality 
.042 .418 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 
% of 
Family 
members 
.281 .137 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
.481 .228 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 
Main 
connected 
firm 
.000 .197 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 
sub 
connected 
firm 
.032 .394 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . 
N 
Network 
clossness 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
ROA 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
independe
nce % 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO 
Duality 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of 
Family 
members 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
% of Family 
members, CEO 
Duality, ROA, 
Main connected 
firm, Firm size, 
Board size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
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Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .799a .638 .599 .0207374 .638 16.437 9 84 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, ROA, Main connected firm, Firm size, Board size, Family 
controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .064 9 .007 16.437 .000b 
Residual .036 84 .000   
Total .100 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
b. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, 
ROA, Main connected firm, Firm size, Board size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) .053 .008  6.947 .000 .038 .068 
ROA -.011 .024 -.032 -.470 .640 -.060 .037 
Board size .001 .001 .149 1.747 .084 .000 .002 
Firm size -7.300E-008 .000 -.113 -1.373 .173 .000 .000 
Board independence % .000 .000 -.098 -1.379 .172 -.001 .000 
CEO Duality .012 .009 .088 1.303 .196 -.006 .030 
% of Family members .000 .000 .122 .991 .324 .000 .000 
Family controlled firm -.013 .008 -.196 -1.618 .109 -.029 .003 
Main connected firm -.050 .005 -.766 -10.547 .000 -.059 -.041 
sub connected firm .002 .006 .017 .248 .805 -.011 .014 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.009345 .072762 .032751 .0261544 94 
Residual -.0559203 .0498186 0E-7 .0197084 94 
Std. Predicted Value -1.610 1.530 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -2.697 2.402 .000 .950 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 16:48:31 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th 
sep.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
 
 
205 
 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT 
Networkbetweenness 
  /METHOD=ENTER ROA 
Boardsize Firmsize 
Boardindependence CEODuality 
ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.05 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.13 
Memory Required 4788 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th sep.sav 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network betweenness .002790 .0077345 94 
ROA .0646 .09225 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
betweenness 
ROA Board size Firm size Board 
independen
ce % 
CEO Duality % of 
Family 
members 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
Main connected 
firm 
sub connected firm 
Pearson Correlation 
Network 
betweenness 
1.000 .046 .223 .007 -.181 -.076 -.040 .033 -.340 -.158 
ROA .046 1.000 -.023 -.168 .126 .022 -.114 -.078 .089 .028 
Board size .223 -.023 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 
Firm size .007 -.168 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 
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Board 
independence 
% 
-.181 .126 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 
CEO Duality -.076 .022 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 
% of Family 
members 
-.040 -.114 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 
Family 
controlled firm 
.033 -.078 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 
Main 
connected 
firm 
-.340 .089 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 
sub 
connected 
firm 
-.158 .028 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network 
betweenness 
. .330 .015 .473 .040 .233 .350 .375 .000 .064 
ROA .330 . .411 .053 .113 .418 .137 .228 .197 .394 
Board size .015 .411 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 
Firm size .473 .053 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 
Board 
independence 
% 
.040 .113 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 
CEO Duality .233 .418 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 
% of Family 
members 
.350 .137 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 
Family 
controlled firm 
.375 .228 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 
Main 
connected 
firm 
.000 .197 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 
sub 
connected 
firm 
.064 .394 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . 
N 
Network 
betweenness 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
ROA 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
independence 
% 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO Duality 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of Family 
members 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family 
controlled firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
% of Family 
members, CEO 
Duality, ROA, 
Main connected 
firm, Firm size, 
Board size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
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a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .454a .206 .121 .0072512 .206 2.423 9 84 .017 
a. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, ROA, Main connected firm, Firm size, Board size, Family 
controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .001 9 .000 2.423 .017b 
Residual .004 84 .000   
Total .006 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
b. Predictors: (Constant), sub connected firm, Board independence %, % of Family members, CEO Duality, 
ROA, Main connected firm, Firm size, Board size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) .003 .003  1.203 .232 -.002 .008 
ROA .007 .009 .081 .790 .432 -.010 .024 
Board size .000 .000 .200 1.581 .118 .000 .001 
Firm size -1.695E-008 .000 -.111 -.912 .365 .000 .000 
Board independence % .000 .000 -.141 -1.341 .183 .000 .000 
CEO Duality -.004 .003 -.121 -1.218 .227 -.010 .002 
% of Family members -1.111E-005 .000 -.044 -.242 .809 .000 .000 
Family controlled firm .001 .003 .037 .203 .839 -.005 .006 
Main connected firm -.005 .002 -.310 -2.887 .005 -.008 -.001 
sub connected firm -.002 .002 -.098 -.939 .350 -.006 .002 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Network 
betweenness 
Predicted Value Residual 
4 3.448 .0309 .005855 .0250003 
5 4.122 .0372 .007276 .0298913 
70 3.607 .0316 .005403 .0261539 
89 3.285 .0295 .005632 .0238209 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.005071 .012202 .002790 .0035116 94 
Residual -.0088446 .0298913 0E-7 .0068914 94 
Std. Predicted Value -2.239 2.680 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -1.220 4.122 .000 .950 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
Regression with TQ only 
 
 
Regression 
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Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 16:49:29 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th 
sep.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT Networkdegree 
  /METHOD=ENTER Boardsize 
Firmsize Boardindependence 
CEODuality ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm TobinsQTQ 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.05 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.08 
Memory Required 4788 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th sep.sav 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network degree 2.510638 3.4602029 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 2.0161 2.19069 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
degree 
Board size Firm size Board 
independence % 
CEO Duality % of 
Family 
members 
Family controlled 
firm 
Main 
connected 
firm 
sub connected firm Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
Pearson Correlation 
Network 
degree 
1.000 .050 -.054 -.063 .492 .045 .077 -.554 -.157 -.075 
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Board 
size 
.050 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 -.275 
Firm 
size 
-.054 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 -.377 
Board 
indepen
dence % 
-.063 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 .159 
CEO 
Duality 
.492 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 -.005 
% of 
Family 
member
s 
.045 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 -.025 
Family 
controlle
d firm 
.077 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 -.071 
Main 
connect
ed firm 
-.554 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 .098 
sub 
connect
ed firm 
-.157 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 .067 
Tobin's 
Q (TQ) 
-.075 -.275 -.377 .159 -.005 -.025 -.071 .098 .067 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network 
degree 
. .316 .302 .273 .000 .332 .229 .000 .065 .235 
Board 
size 
.316 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 .004 
Firm 
size 
.302 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 .000 
Board 
indepen
dence % 
.273 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 .062 
CEO 
Duality 
.000 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 .482 
% of 
Family 
member
s 
.332 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 .405 
Family 
controlle
d firm 
.229 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 .248 
Main 
connect
ed firm 
.000 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 .175 
sub 
connect
ed firm 
.065 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . .259 
Tobin's 
Q (TQ) 
.235 .004 .000 .062 .482 .405 .248 .175 .259 . 
N 
Network 
degree 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
size 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm 
size 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
indepen
dence % 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO 
Duality 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of 
Family 
member
s 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
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Family 
controlle
d firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main 
connect
ed firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub 
connect
ed firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Tobin's 
Q (TQ) 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
Tobin's Q (TQ), 
CEO Duality, % of 
Family members, 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
Main connected 
firm, Board size, 
Firm size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .708a .501 .447 2.5721355 .501 9.367 9 84 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin's Q (TQ), CEO Duality, % of Family members, sub connected firm, Board independence %, Main connected firm, Board size, Firm size, 
Family controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 557.755 9 61.973 9.367 .000b 
Residual 555.734 84 6.616   
Total 1113.489 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin's Q (TQ), CEO Duality, % of Family members, sub connected firm, Board 
independence %, Main connected firm, Board size, Firm size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 3.943 1.011  3.901 .000 1.933 5.953 
Board size .037 .073 .051 .509 .612 -.108 .183 
Firm size -6.282E-006 .000 -.092 -.928 .356 .000 .000 
Board independence % -.033 .034 -.081 -.984 .328 -.100 .034 
CEO Duality 6.070 1.111 .431 5.462 .000 3.860 8.280 
% of Family members .022 .016 .191 1.334 .186 -.011 .054 
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Family controlled firm -1.293 .983 -.188 -1.316 .192 -3.247 .660 
Main connected firm -3.540 .584 -.513 -6.061 .000 -4.702 -2.379 
sub connected firm .345 .775 .037 .445 .657 -1.197 1.887 
Tobin's Q (TQ) -.067 .135 -.042 -.493 .624 -.335 .202 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Network degree Predicted Value Residual 
26 3.418 13.0000 4.207544 8.7924560 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.973633 10.376622 2.510638 2.4489527 94 
Residual -5.9065733 8.7924557 0E-7 2.4445111 94 
Std. Predicted Value -1.423 3.212 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -2.296 3.418 .000 .950 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network degree 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 16:50:35 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th 
sep.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
 
 
 
 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT 
Networkclossness 
  /METHOD=ENTER Boardsize 
Firmsize Boardindependence 
CEODuality ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm TobinsQTQ 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.03 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.06 
Memory Required 4788 bytes 
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Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th sep.sav 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network clossness .032751 .0327486 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 2.0161 2.19069 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
clossness 
Board size Firm 
size 
Board 
indepen
dence % 
CEO 
Duality 
% of Family 
members 
Family 
controlled firm 
Main 
connected 
firm 
sub connected 
firm 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 
Pearson Correlation 
Network clossness 1.000 .197 -.007 -.120 .179 -.060 .005 -.769 -.191 -.125 
Board size .197 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 -.275 
Firm size -.007 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 -.377 
Board independence 
% 
-.120 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 .159 
CEO Duality .179 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 -.005 
% of Family 
members 
-.060 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 -.025 
Family controlled 
firm 
.005 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 -.071 
Main connected firm -.769 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 .098 
sub connected firm -.191 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 .067 
Tobin's Q (TQ) -.125 -.275 -.377 .159 -.005 -.025 -.071 .098 .067 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network clossness . .028 .475 .125 .042 .281 .481 .000 .032 .116 
Board size .028 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 .004 
Firm size .475 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 .000 
Board independence 
% 
.125 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 .062 
CEO Duality .042 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 .482 
% of Family 
members 
.281 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 .405 
Family controlled 
firm 
.481 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 .248 
Main connected firm .000 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 .175 
sub connected firm .032 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . .259 
Tobin's Q (TQ) .116 .004 .000 .062 .482 .405 .248 .175 .259 . 
N 
Network clossness 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board independence 
% 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO Duality 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of Family 
members 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family controlled 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main connected firm 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
sub connected firm 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
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Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
Tobin's Q (TQ), 
CEO Duality, % of 
Family members, 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
Main connected 
firm, Board size, 
Firm size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .800a .639 .601 .0206939 .639 16.545 9 84 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin's Q (TQ), CEO Duality, % of Family members, sub connected firm, Board independence %, Main connected firm, Board size, Firm size, 
Family controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .064 9 .007 16.545 .000b 
Residual .036 84 .000   
Total .100 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin's Q (TQ), CEO Duality, % of Family members, sub connected firm, Board 
independence %, Main connected firm, Board size, Firm size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) .055 .008  6.726 .000 .039 .071 
Board size .001 .001 .141 1.658 .101 .000 .002 
Firm size -8.039E-008 .000 -.125 -1.476 .144 .000 .000 
Board independence % .000 .000 -.098 -1.395 .167 -.001 .000 
CEO Duality .012 .009 .087 1.294 .199 -.006 .029 
% of Family members .000 .000 .126 1.039 .302 .000 .000 
Family controlled firm -.013 .008 -.204 -1.685 .096 -.029 .002 
Main connected firm -.050 .005 -.766 -10.644 .000 -.059 -.041 
sub connected firm .002 .006 .021 .302 .763 -.011 .014 
Tobin's Q (TQ) -.001 .001 -.055 -.758 .450 -.003 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.010406 .071577 .032751 .0261855 94 
Residual -.0556889 .0494682 0E-7 .0196671 94 
Std. Predicted Value -1.648 1.483 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -2.691 2.390 .000 .950 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network clossness 
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Regression 
 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 01-OCT-2013 16:55:57 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th 
sep.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 94 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN 
STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) 
POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT 
Networkbetweenness 
  /METHOD=ENTER Boardsize 
Firmsize Boardindependence 
CEODuality ofFamilymembers 
Familycontrolledfirm 
Mainconnectedfirm 
subconnectedfirm TobinsQTQ 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) 
OUTLIERS(3). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.08 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.06 
Memory Required 4788 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\User\Desktop\for 30th sep.sav 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Network betweenness .002790 .0077345 94 
Board size 10.15 4.709 94 
Firm size 31739.09 50858.934 94 
Board independence % 6.35 8.528 94 
CEO Duality .06 .246 94 
% of Family members 26.88 30.623 94 
Family controlled firm .49 .503 94 
Main connected firm .47 .502 94 
sub connected firm .16 .368 94 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 2.0161 2.19069 94 
 
 
Correlations 
 Network 
between
ness 
Board size Firm 
size 
Board 
independence 
% 
CEO 
Duality 
% of Family 
members 
Family 
controlled firm 
Main 
connected 
firm 
sub connected 
firm 
Tobin's Q (TQ) 
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Pearson Correlation 
Network 
betweenn
ess 
1.000 .223 .007 -.181 -.076 -.040 .033 -.340 -.158 .154 
Board size .223 1.000 .541 -.339 -.073 -.192 -.090 -.112 .110 -.275 
Firm size .007 .541 1.000 -.186 -.018 -.268 -.225 .011 .047 -.377 
Board 
independe
nce % 
-.181 -.339 -.186 1.000 .040 .028 .022 -.011 .020 .159 
CEO 
Duality 
-.076 -.073 -.018 .040 1.000 .037 .093 -.158 -.114 -.005 
% of 
Family 
members 
-.040 -.192 -.268 .028 .037 1.000 .825 .032 -.098 -.025 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
.033 -.090 -.225 .022 .093 .825 1.000 -.108 -.136 -.071 
Main 
connected 
firm 
-.340 -.112 .011 -.011 -.158 .032 -.108 1.000 .290 .098 
sub 
connected 
firm 
-.158 .110 .047 .020 -.114 -.098 -.136 .290 1.000 .067 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
.154 -.275 -.377 .159 -.005 -.025 -.071 .098 .067 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Network 
betweenn
ess 
. .015 .473 .040 .233 .350 .375 .000 .064 .069 
Board size .015 . .000 .000 .241 .032 .194 .142 .145 .004 
Firm size .473 .000 . .037 .433 .005 .015 .458 .327 .000 
Board 
independe
nce % 
.040 .000 .037 . .349 .395 .416 .457 .425 .062 
CEO 
Duality 
.233 .241 .433 .349 . .363 .187 .064 .137 .482 
% of 
Family 
members 
.350 .032 .005 .395 .363 . .000 .381 .173 .405 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
.375 .194 .015 .416 .187 .000 . .150 .096 .248 
Main 
connected 
firm 
.000 .142 .458 .457 .064 .381 .150 . .002 .175 
sub 
connected 
firm 
.064 .145 .327 .425 .137 .173 .096 .002 . .259 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
.069 .004 .000 .062 .482 .405 .248 .175 .259 . 
N 
Network 
betweenn
ess 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Firm size 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Board 
independe
nce % 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
CEO 
Duality 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
% of 
Family 
members 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Family 
controlled 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Main 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
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sub 
connected 
firm 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Tobin's Q 
(TQ) 
94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
Tobin's Q (TQ), 
CEO Duality, % of 
Family members, 
sub connected 
firm, Board 
independence %, 
Main connected 
firm, Board size, 
Firm size, Family 
controlled firmb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .510a .260 .181 .0070013 .260 3.277 9 84 .002 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin's Q (TQ), CEO Duality, % of Family members, sub connected firm, Board independence %, Main connected firm, Board size, Firm size, 
Family controlled firm 
b. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .001 9 .000 3.277 .002b 
Residual .004 84 .000   
Total .006 93    
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin's Q (TQ), CEO Duality, % of Family members, sub connected firm, Board 
independence %, Main connected firm, Board size, Firm size, Family controlled firm 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) .001 .003  .274 .785 -.005 .006 
Board size .000 .000 .231 1.901 .061 .000 .001 
Firm size -5.139E-009 .000 -.034 -.279 .781 .000 .000 
Board independence % .000 .000 -.149 -1.483 .142 .000 .000 
CEO Duality -.004 .003 -.120 -1.254 .213 -.010 .002 
% of Family members -1.256E-005 .000 -.050 -.285 .776 .000 .000 
Family controlled firm .001 .003 .072 .412 .682 -.004 .006 
Main connected firm -.005 .002 -.318 -3.085 .003 -.008 -.002 
sub connected firm -.002 .002 -.114 -1.133 .260 -.007 .002 
Tobin's Q (TQ) .001 .000 .271 2.602 .011 .000 .002 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Network 
betweenness 
Predicted Value Residual 
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4 3.483 .0309 .006469 .0243865 
64 3.174 .0332 .010970 .0222231 
70 3.730 .0316 .005440 .0261168 
89 3.520 .0295 .004810 .0246429 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.006214 .017496 .002790 .0039430 94 
Residual -.0086918 .0261168 0E-7 .0066539 94 
Std. Predicted Value -2.284 3.730 .000 1.000 94 
Std. Residual -1.241 3.730 .000 .950 94 
a. Dependent Variable: Network betweenness 
 
 
 
